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Articles and student Comments in this issue deal with a
wide range of legal issues. Stephen Gurko, of Ireland, Stapleton,
Pryor, and Holmes, of Denver, leads the group with an indepth examination of the tax aspects of land investment, from
which he concludes that federal income tax laws tend to encourage "urban sprawl": continuing development of undeveloped land near urban areas. In their article on "hot-pursuit,"
a matter of continuing controversy in Denver and elsewhere,
Edmund Fennessy, Jr., and Kent Joscelyn present data derived
from a study conducted by the Center for the Environment &
Man, Inc. for the National Highway Safety Bureau. Third is a
brief article in which Sam Smith, of Hindry and Meyer, also
of Denver, analyzes the impact of Richardson v. Belcher, a
recent Supreme Court case dealing with the reduction of social
security disability insurance benefits in situtations where the
recipient is also receiving workmen's compensation disability
benefits.
The student Comments all discuss topics of interest most
particularly to Colorado lawyers. Andy Blair and Larry MacDonnell join together to discuss the district and circuit court
decisions in the Denver school busing case, Keyes v. School
District Number One, which has been granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. Doug Nichols' Comment on Greyhound Leasing & Finance Corp. v. Joiner City Unit deals with
the Tenth Circuit Court's interpretation of Oklahoma's oil and
gas unitization provision, one similar to Colorado's, and proposes
an alternative approach to that taken by the court in Greyhound. Rodney Knutson's Comment analyzes the recently enacted Colorado flag desecration statute in terms of similar
statutes which have been declared unconstitutional in other
states.
This issue reflects the initial products of increased Journal
emphasis on student writing, which we feel to be the basic
means by which a law review fulfills its educational obligation
to its students. We anticipate that future issues will continue
to reflect that emphasis and that the Journal will thereby serve
the legal community with increased analysis of local issues, in
the context of articles dealing with issues of national concern.
John P. Davidson
Editor-in-Chief
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FEDERAL INCOME TAXES AND URBAN SPRAWL
BY

STEPHEN

GURKO*

Federal income tax is one of the most complex, burgeoning
fields of law and has consequently fostered the development of
legal specialization in that area. Stephen Gurko is such a specialist. His examination of the federal income tax aspects of
real estate investments reveals a general policy inherent in
the tax law: encouragement of the devlopment of open land
near urban areas. Environmentalist concern for the prevention
of "urban sprawl" will find here the elements of the practical
reform necessary to disestablish real estate developers who
presently control the design of urban growth.
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INTRODUCTION

ESPITE certain changes made by the Tax Reform Act of
1969,1 the laws of federal income taxation continue to provide an array of special tax benefits for investments in real
estate, particularly by high-bracket taxpayers. One effect of
these laws is to encourage the gradual erosion of our countryside through the development of open land near urban areas, a
phenomenon commonly referred to as "urban sprawl." While
observers may disagree on whether or not "urban sprawl" constitutes a serious problem, surely all would agree that the federal income tax laws should at least be neutral on the question, which means that these laws should avoid favoring the
development of open land as opposed to other forms of economic activity.
The most striking tax incentives in the real estate field are
those which encourage "investors" (as distinguished from "dealers") in real estate to purchase open land either for future
sale to developers or for the immediate construction of rentproducing buildings such as apartment houses. 2 This article
will explain these incentives as they apply to individuals,
corporations, and partnerships, and then will suggest changes
in the law designed to remove these incentives and to create
non-preferential tax treatment for investors making such purchases. The objectives are both to analyze in some depth this
major area of incentives to land development, and to call
attention to the general bias of the federal income tax laws in
favor of such development, a bias which should be corrected
with maximum speed.
D

I Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, amending INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 [INT. REV. CODE of 1954, as amended through and including
The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, hereinafter
cited as CODE].
2 The term "dealer" refers generally to one who holds real estate "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" within the meaning of CODE § 1221(1), while the term "investor"
refers generally to one who holds real estate primarily for rental, or
for appreciation and sale other than as part of a business of selling,
or for both these purposes.
3 It may be argued that when an investor purchases open land for future
sale to a developer rather than for immediate development, the tax
incentives which contribute to the purchase do not contribute to the
development. However, this ignores the significant assistance which
the investor may render to the developer to whom he hopes to sell, such
as causing feasibility studies to be made and development plans to be
formulated, arranging for vitally important rezoning, and acting as a
political force against laws which restrict land development by creating "green belts," parks, wilderness areas, or the like. Moreover, the
tax benefits to the investor may be partially reflected in a lower selling
price to the developer, thereby obviously facilitating the development
endeavor.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

I.

VOL. 48

TAX TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL

AND CORPORATE REAL ESTATE INVESTORS

A.

Introduction

For the typical individual or corporate investor purchasing
open land for sale to developers or for the construction of rentproducing buildings, the law offers the delectible benefits of
various current deductions from ordinary income (however
unrelated such income may be to the real estate in question),
followed by an ultimate tax at the favorable long-term capital
gain rates on all or most of the gain realized when the real
estate is sold. The tax savings from the current deductions
often approach or exceed the tax on the ultimate gain, thus
producing in many cases an extraordinarily low net tax, or
even a net tax subsidy, on a transaction which yields a substantial economic net profit. The following paragraphs will first
consider the specific rules of law which provide for the attractive combination of current deductions and ultimate long-term
capitial gain (with emphasis on the complicated but rather limited "reforms" introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969), then
will set forth some examples illustrating the magnitude of the
benefits involved, and finally will discuss certain other benefits
also available to the individual or corporate investor.
B.

Current Deductions

1. Interest and Real Estate Taxes-Sections 163 and 164
The most common deductions with respect to real estate
held by investors are for interest on indebtedness incurred in
order to purchase or develop the property, and local real estate
taxes on the property. The general rule of Internal Revenue
Code sections 163 and 164 is that interest and real estate taxes,
respectively, are not required to be capitalized (i.e., added to
basis) as part of the property's cost, but rather are currently deductible from ordinary income.4 Under this general rule, the current deductions are allowed even though the property is held exclusively or primarily for the realization of gain on a future
sale, and is neither producing nor expected to produce significant amounts of current rental or other income.5 Interest on
an indebtedness secured by a mortgage on the taxpayer's
property is deductible even though the taxpayer has no personal liability for the indebtedness. 6 Although an accrual basis
taxpayer apparently must deduct interest ratably over the
4

CODE §§163(a),

164(a).

5 Id.
6

Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b)

(1965).
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period of the borrowing, 7 a cash basis taxpayer normally deducts interest when he pays it, and thus may be able to prepay
and deduct in the current taxable year interest for the use of
borrowed funds for one or more future years.8
One mild limitation on these generous rules is that if interest or taxes of an individual are not attributable to a trade
or business or to property held for the production of rental or
royalty income, the deductions are allowable from adjusted
gross income but not from gross income, so that they may be
claimed only if the standard deduction is not claimed." Another
limitation of narrow scope is that real estate taxes "assessed
against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value
of the property assessed" may not be currently deducted but
must be capitalized (i.e., added to the basis of the property
assessed), even if no actual increase in value results in a particular case.'" However, the general rule of current deductibility applies to any portion of such taxes which the taxpayer
can show to be "properly allocable to maintenance or interest
charges" (evidently meaning interest charges on funds borrowed to pay for the local benefits)."
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced a complex but not
very stringent limitation on the deduction of interest attributable to investments in real and personal property. The Act
7Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76, revoking (on another issue)
I.T. 3740, 1945 CUM. BULL. 109.
8 Cash basis taxpayers were allowed to deduct prepaid interest in John
Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), not acquiesced in, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 3,
and Court Holding Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943), not acquiesced in, 1968-2 CUM.
BULL. 3, rev'd (on another issue), 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd,
324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76, revoking (on another issue) I.T. 3740, 1945 CUM. BULL. 109, the Internal
Revenue Service announced the withdrawal of its prior acquiescences
in Fackler and Court Holding Co., and the revocation of its prior ruling
allowing a cash basis taxpayer to deduct interest prepaid for a period
of 5 years. The Service stated that (subject to certain transitional rules)
it would no longer allow a cash basis taxpayer to deduct in the current
year interest prepaid for more than 12 months beyond the close of the
current year, and would determine the deductibility in the current year
of interest prepaid fcr such 12-month period on a "case by case basis"
in accordance with certain factors. However, the Service cited no court
decisions contrary to Fackler and Court Holding Co., and there appear
to be none.
CODE §§ 62, 63. The same rule applies with respect to most other deductions of individuals.
Id. §§ 164(c) (1), 1016 (a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(a) (1964); Caldwell
Milling Co., 3 B.T.A. 1232 (1926). It has been held such taxes may not
be amortized over the useful life of the benefits. F.M. Hubbell Son &
Co. v. Burnett, 51 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1931), aff'g 19 B.T.A. 612 (1930),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 664 (1931). Apparently such taxes must be added
exclusively to the basis of the land assessed and not at all to the basis
of improvements thereon (so as to be recoverable through depreciation
if the improvements are depreciable), although there is no precise authority on this point.
11CODE § 164(c) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(b) (1) (1957).
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created new Code section 163 (d), which applies to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1971 (subject to certain transitional rules) ,'12 and which restricts deductions by individuals
for "investment interest," defined as "interest paid or accrued
on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry
property held for investment.""' The significance of the section
is considerably weakened by the broad categories of investment
interest which are allowed to be deducted before the restrictive
provision applies.
Section 163(d) first allows a deduction for each year's investment interest up to the amount of $25,000.14 Next, any remaining investment interest may be deducted to the extent of
"net investment income" for the year,1 5 which is defined essentially as the excess of non-business gross income from
interest, dividends, rents, royalties, net short-term capital gains
from dispositions of investment property, and "depreciation
recapture" under sections 1245 and 1250, over related expenses
excluding interest (with depreciation being computed for this
purpose by the straight line method at the taxpayer's option).";
It is interesting to note that the investment interest in excess
of $25,000 is deductible to the extent of net investment income
from any source, not just to the extent of such income from the
particular investment property to which the investment interest
relates. Next, any still remaining investment interest may be
deducted to the extent of any "out-of-pocket" loss (i.e., any
excess of rents over business or investment expenses, interest
and taxes) sustained with respect to "property of the taxpayer
subject to a net lease" (without regard to whether such loss
results from investment interest).1T Next, any still remaining
investment interest may be used to offset any excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss for the
8
year from dispositions of investment property." Finally, onehalf the amount of any still remaining investment interest may
163 (d) (6).
Id. § 163(d) (3) (D). This definition, plus the related rules concerning
the "investment" or "trade or business" status of "property subject to
net lease" (§§ 163 (d) (4) (A), 1963 (d) (7), as amended and introduced,
respectively, by the Revenue Act of 1971). seem likely to produce even
more litigation than has arisen under § 265(2), which disallows a deduction for interest on indebtedness "incurred or continued to purchase or
carry" tax-exempt municipal bonds.
14 CODE § 163(d) (1) (A). This exemption is $12,500 for a married individual filing a separate return, and zero for a trust.
15 Id. § 163 (d) (1) (B).
,Id. §§ 163(d) (3) (A), (B), (C).
lTId. § 163(d) (1) (B).
18 Id. §§ 163(d) (1) (C), 163 (d) (5).
12 CODE §
13
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be deducted without conditions, while the other half may not
be deducted in the current year'" but may be treated (subject
to certain limitations) as part of the investment interest of
20
future years under a complicated carry-over provision.
Assuming an interest rate of 8 percent, the deduction allowed for $25,000 of investment interest will permit an individual to borrow more than $300,000 to purchase or carry investment land or other property (whether or not productive of current income) without suffering any consequences under section
163 (d). If the individual has net investment income of $15,000
from all sources (not an unusually large amount for the highbracket individuals intended to be reached by section 163(d)),
he will be able to borrow up to $500,000 for such purpose without suffering any consequences under the section. Thus in
practice section 163(d) will disallow deductions for investment
interest only on unusually large loans by individuals having
relatively small amounts of net investment income, and even
then the disallowances will apply only to limited portions of
the interest. The section does not apply at all to corporations (except that the income and expense items of subchapter
S corporations, like those of partnerships, are attributed to the
individual shareholders or partners) .21 The section applies only
to interest and not at all to real estate taxes or any other
expenses of investing in real estate or other property.
162 and 212
2. Other Expenses -Sections
In addition to interest and real estate taxes, the investor
in real estate may normally deduct all maintenance and repair
expenses, management fees, insurance premiums, advertising
expenses, legal and accounting fees, and any other expenditures paid or incurred in connection with the current operation
or conservation of the property. These deductions are allowed
to a corporation or an individual under Code section 162 if the
expenditures are "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business,"-2 2 or are allowed to an individual under section 212
if the expenditures are "ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year . . . for the production or

collection of income [or] for the management, conservation, or
23
maintenance of property held for the production of income.
19 Id. § 163(d) (1) (D).
20 Id. § 163 (d) (2).
21 Id. §§ 163(d) (4) (B), (C)
22 Id. § 162 (a).
23Id. §§ 212(1), (2).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

While sections 162 and 212 plainly require a profit motive
(which is not required for deduction of interest and real estate
taxes), such motive is readily established under very liberal
rules of interpretation. Thus the investor will generally be
allowed the deductions if they relate to his effort to earn net
income from the property either in the current year or in a
past or future year,2 4 and either from rentals or from a' capital
gain on disposition of the property. 25 The deductions are allowable even if the property has produced little or no income
(either net or gross) for a number of years, provided that the
investor demonstrates his intention to earn net income if and
when he can.2 6 At least in some instances an intention to earn
gross income or proceeds (but not net income) may suffice,
e.g., where circumstances render the earning of net income difficult or impossible.2 7 Code section 183, as introduced by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 and amended by the Revenue Act of
1971, creates a presumption of the necessary profit motive for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969 (at least in
the case of an individual or a subchapter S corporation), if (a)
the taxpayer's "activity" with respect to the property has
yielded net income in any two of the five taxable years ending
with the current taxable year, or (b) the current taxable year,
is either the first taxable year (beginning after December 31,
1969) in which the taxpayer has engaged in such "activity," or
is one of the next four taxable years, and net income has resulted in any two of these five years. -s Although the "trade or
business" language of section 162 implies that a corporate investor must show more active management or operation of the
property than an individual investor must show under section
212, in practice no such showing by corporate investors seems
to be required.
A significant limitation with respect to the expenses other
than interest and real estate taxes is that they are deductible
only if they are for current income production or collection,
or for current management, maintenance or conservation of the
property in question, rather than for permanent improvements
24

Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (b) (1957).
Id.
26 See, e.g., Lorraine Corp., 17 T.C.M. 719 (1958); William C. Horrmann,
17 T.C. 903 (1951), acquiesced in, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 2; Mary L. Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943), acquiesced in, 1944 CUM. BULL. 23.
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957); Hartford v. United States, 265 F. Supp.
86 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
28 CODE §§ 183(d), (e). The taxpayers must elect which of the two alternatives will apply with respect to any "activity." Id. § 183 (e).
2
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or other capital items.29 To the extent expenses are nondeductible under this rule, they are capitalized, i.e., added to the
basis of the property. 31 Examples of expenses required to be
capitalized are brokers' and attorneys' fees attributable to the
acquisition of the property, 3 1 attorneys' fees attributable to the
defense or perfection of title,3 2 and construction costs of permanent improvements. 33 Expenses must be "ordinary and
necessary" in order to be deductible under section 162 or 212,
a requirement which serves primarily to reinforce the other
requirements of the sections, and to insure that the expenses are
"reasonable" in amount 34 (although the Service seems rarely
to raise the reasonableness issue).
3.

Depreciation

-

Section 167

a. In General
If the investor owns real estate which has been developed
(either by himself or a prior owner), he will normally be entitled to depreciation deductions with respect to the improvements (including, most importantly, any buildings). Code section 167 allows these deductions if the improvements are either
"used in the trade or business" or "held for the production of
income. '3 5 The profit motive implied by the phrases is readily
established by the investor under rules of interpretation
and presumption which are as liberal or nearly as liberal as
those applicable to the corresponding phrases in sections 162
and 212.36
§§ 162(a), 212(1), 212(2), 263; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-1 (1969),
1.212-1(k), 1.212-1(n) (1957), 1.263(a)-i (1965), 1.263(a)-2 (1958).
3) CODE §§ 1012, 1016 (a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (1957).
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Commisioner, 162 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1947), rev'g
7 T.C. 465 (1946); I.N. Burman, 23 B.T.A. 639 (1931).
32
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.212-1(k) (1957), 1.263(a)-2(c) (1958); see, e.g., Garrett v. Crenshaw, 196 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952).
'33Treas. Reg. §§ 1.212-1(k)
(1957), 1.263(a)-l(a) (1), 1.263(a)-2(a)
(1958), 1.263(a)-2(d) (1958).
34
Id.§ 1.212-1(d) (1957).
35
CODE §§ 167(a) (1), (2).
31"See, e.g., cases cited note 26 supra (which allow deductions for depreciation as well as for expenses covered by § 162 or § 212); George W.
Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120 (1966), not acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. XXII
(allowing depreciation of an improvement apparently held solely for the
production of a capital gain from a future sale); CODE §§ 183(d), (e).
The Service's non-acquiescence in George W. Mitchell reverses a prior
acquiescence, and perhaps results from the apprenhension that inventory
might also be considered "held for the production of income" (in the
sense of income from sale), and hence might be depreciable, contrary
to Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956) and several pre-Mitchell cases and
rulings. There has been no indicaticn that the Service will question the
depreciation deductions of the typical investor who rents his developed
real estate before selling it, although perhaps such a question should be
raised if the investor's own projections show that he anticipates earning
no net rental income but only income in the form of tax savings or
a gain from a future sale.
29CODE
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b. Depreciable Amount and Useful Life
The depreciable amount with respect to each improvement
is the adjusted basis of the improvement less its estimated net
salvage value at the end of its estimated useful life to the
investor, 37 and the deductions totaling such amount are spread
over such estimated useful life .3 The adjusted basis is normally
initial cost or other basis for determining gain, plus upward
adjustments for subsequent capital investments and downward
adjustments for each year's depreciation deduction.3 9 Basis generally reflects the amount of any mortgage liability incurred
in connection with acquisition or construction of the improvement, even if the mortgagee may look only to the mortgaged
40
property and not to the investor personally for repayment.
Useful life may generally be determined from the guidelines
published by the Internal Revenue Service (which provide,
for example, for a 40-year life for an apartment house or hotel,
and a 20-year life for a parking lot),41 or a useful life shorter
42
than the guideline life may be adopted if it can be justified.
An advance agreement may be entered into with the Service
respecting useful life and other elements in the depreciation of
43
the improvements.
Land is not depreciable (presumably because it is considered not subject to physical exhaustion or wear and tear
over a determinable useful life) ,'4 and hence the basis for
developed land must often be allocated between the land and
the improvements (in proportion to their relative values at
the time of acquisition) in order to determine the depreciable
basis for the improvements.4 5 If developed land is acquired
with the intention of demolishing existing improvements
(whether or not in order to construct new ones), the general
rule is that the demolition costs plus any basis allocable to the
existing improvements may neither be deducted nor added to
37

§ 167(g); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-l(a),
1.167(a)-1(c) (1964);
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
3
STreas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-l(a) (1964), 1.167(a)-l(b) (1956); Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
39CODE § 1011 and other sections referenced thereto, notably §§ 1016(a)
CODE

(1), (2).

40 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Blackstone Theatre Co., 12
T.C. 801 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CUM. BULL. 2.
41 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 418 & introduction thereto.

Id. introduction.
§ 167 (d); Treas. Reg. § 167 (d)-i (1959).
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i (1956); see, e.g., Algernon Blair, Inc., 29 T.C.
1205 (1958), acquiesced in, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
44Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956); see, e.g., Algernon Blair, Inc., 29 T.C.
1205 (1958), acquiesced in, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 4. A similar allocation is
often required among the improvements.
42

43
CODE
44
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the basis of any new improvements, but must be added to the
basis of the land .4 This rule tends to discourage investors from
purchasing developed urban land in order to replace undesirable structures with new ones, and to encourage investors
instead to purchase open land outside of urban areas for the
47
building of new structures.
c. Depreciation Methods
The method of spreading the depreciation deductions over
the useful life of an improvement is determined under rules
which take no account of either the actual decline (if any) in
the value of the improvement or the amounts of income (if
any) produced by the improvement over its useful life. Despite
changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, these rules continue to allow wide use of "accelerated" depreciation methods
which result in the concentration of relatively large depreciation deductions in the early years of the useful life even though
the decline in value or production of income in these years
may not be correspondingly large.
Prior to the Act, any improvement having a useful life
of 3 or more years and either constructed by the investor
or acquired new by him could be depreciated by the accelerated
methods known as "double declining balance" or "sum of the
years-digits, ' 48 while such an improvement or any other improvement could be depreciated by an accelerated method
known as "150 percent declining balance," or by the straight
line method. 4" Briefly, the straight line method consists of
dividing the total depreciable amount into equal annual deductions over the useful life,50 while the declining balance methods
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (a) (1) (1960); Rev. Rul. 69-62, 1969-1 CUM. BULL.
58; see, e.g., Providence Jcurnal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614 (1st Cir.
1939).
47 The law is more liberal with respect to a loss from a demolition decided
on after the developed land is acquired. Such a loss may under various
circumstances be (a) immediately deducted, (b) added to the basis of
any new improvement which the demolition is intended to permit, or
(c) added to the basis (amortizable) of a lease pursuant to which the
demolition work is done. The Service and some courts disagree to some
extent as to whether or when each approach is correct. Treas. Reg. §
1.165-3(b) (1960); see, e.g., Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.
1964); Commissioner v. Appleby's Estate 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941);
Estate of Henry Phipps, 5 T.C. 964 (1945), not acquiesced in, 1946-2
46

48

CUM. BULL. 6.
CODE §§ 167(a), 167(b) (2), 167(b) (3), 167(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(b)-

0, 1.167(c)-i (1956). Whether an improvement is acquired "new"
depends on whether its "original use" begins with the investor.
411CODE §§ 167(a), 167(b) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0 (1956).
Other less
common depreciation methods could also be used, subject to certain limitations. CODE §§ 167(a), 167(b) (4); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(b)-0, 1.167
(b)-4, 1.167(c)(1) (1956).
5OTreas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1 (1956).
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involve multiplying the remaining adjusted basis each year
by a percentage equal to 200 percent or 150 percent of the percentage of original adjusted basis which would be deductible
each year under the straight line method, until the estimated
salvage value is reached. 51 The sum of the years-digits method
consists in essence of multiplying, each year, the original depreciable amount by a fraction the numerator of which is the
remaining number of years in the useful life (including the
current year) and the denominator of which is the sum of the
numbers from one through the total number of years in the
useful life.5 2 Either of the declining balance methods or the
sum of the year-digits method results in larger deductions
in the early years and smaller deductions in the later years of
the useful life, in contrast to the equal deductions in all years
produced by the straight line method.
The committee reports accompanying the Act sharply criti53
cize the accelerated methods of depreciation outlined above.
Nonetheless, intricate new Code section 167(j) (introduced by
the Act) retains double declining balance and sum of the yearsdigits as permissible depreciation methods for new "residential
rental property" (defined generally as a building or structure
producing gross rental income for the taxable year at least 80
percent of which is from "dwelling units," excluding units in
hotels, motels, or other establishments in which more than half
51Id.§1.167(b)-2 (1964); Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122
(1960).
(1956). Alternately, the denominator of the
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b) (3)
fraction may be changed each year to take account of only the remaining number of years in the useful life (including the current year), but
then the fraction is applied only against the remaining adjusted basis.
Id. § 1.167(b)-3(a) (2) (1956).
53 For example, the Senate Committee Report declares that "accelerated
depreciation usually produces a deduction far in excess of the actual
decline in the usefulness of the property." S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 212 (1969). This report prcceeds to state (on the same page) that
As a result of the fast depreciation and the ability to deduct
amounts in excess of the taxpayer's equity, economically profitable real estate operations normally produce substantial tax
losses, sheltering from income tax the economic profit of the
operation and permitting avoidance of income tax on the
owner's other ordinary income, such as salary and dividends.
The Report further states (on the same page) that
Because of the present tax situation, when investment is
solicited in a real estate venture it has become the practice to
promise a prospective investor substantial tax losses which can
be used to diminish the tax on his income from other sources.
Thus, there is, in effect, substantial dealing in 'tax losses' produced by depreciable real property. The committee, agreeing
with the House, believes the desired solution is the elimination
of these losses in those cases where there is no true economic
loss.
The House Committee Report contains similar statements. H.R. Rep.
No. 413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 165-66 (1969).
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the units are used on a transient basis),54 and allows the 150
percent declining balance method for any other new real property improvements.5 5 The section does generally limit used improvements to the straight line method.5' but makes an exception for used residential rental property, which may be depreciated by the 125 percent declining balance method if it has a
useful life of 20 years or more when acquired. 57 The section
thus preserves substantial allowance of the accelerated methods
of depreciation for real property improvements, and also preserves preferred treatment for new as distinguished from used
improvements, while introducing preferred treatment for residential rental property as distinguished from other improvements. The combined effect is not merely to maintain but to
enlarge the previous depreciation incentives for the spread of
urban areas into the surrounding countryside through the construction of new residential buildings.
In contrast, continued use of existing residential buildings
is encouraged to a limited extent by new section 167(k), which
permits depreciation over a 5-year period for expenditures 'incurred after July 24, 1969, and before January 1, 1975, to rehabilitate "low-income rental housing" (to be defined by the
regulations consistently with the policies of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 196858), provided that the expenditures produce improvements with a useful life of 5 years or
more and that the expenditures per dwelling unit exceed a
total of $3,000 for 2 consecutive years including the taxable
year. A total of no more than $15,000 per unit is to be taken
into account under the section. If an election is made to use
the 5-year depreciation period, only the straight line method
may be used, but no salvage value is to be taken into account. 59
The excess of accelerated

over straight line depreciation

allowed with respect to any real property improvements
54

CODE §§

(ex-

167(j) (2), 167(k) (3) (C).

55,Id. § 167(j) (1) (B).

56 Id. § 167 (j) (4).
57 Id. § 167(j) (5) (B).
Section 167(j) applies generally to new improvements the construction of which was begun after July 24, 1969 (§ 167(j)
(3) (A)), and to used improvements acquired after that date (§§ 167
(j) (4), (5)), but subject to various transitional provisions, (§§ 167(j)
(3) (B), 167 (j) (6)), and to a temporary liberalization of the provisions
relating to changes of depreciation methods for a particular improvement
(§ 167) (e)). The section does not apply to certain limited types of improvements which constitute "section 1245 property" rather than "section
1250 property," so that the prior rules continue in effect for such improvements (§§ 167(j) (1), 167(j) (4), 167(j) (5), 1250(c), 1245(a) (3)
(B), (C), (D)).
58 Act of Aug. 1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
9 CODE § 167 (k).
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cluding an improvement subject to section 1245) is treated as an
"item of tax preference" for purposes of the new "minimum
tax" on such items, a subject which will be discussed below.
C.

Gain on Sale
1. Depreciation Recapture - Section 1250

Although the real estate investor may claim current deductions from ordinary income for his interest, taxes, maintenance
and other current expenses, and for depreciation of improvements, his gain from a sale of his real estate will be taxed as
ordinary income only to the limited extent provided in Code
section 1250 with respect to so-called "depreciation recapture."
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, section 1250 provided
in general that if a real property improvement (excluding an
improvement subject to section 1245) were held for 1 year or
less and then sold at a gain, ordinary income treatment would
apply to the lesser of such gain or the sum of the depreciation
deductions allowed with respect to the improvement for all
periods after 1963.60 If, however, the improvement were held
for more than 1 year, then ordinary income treatment would
apply at most to the lesser of the gain or the depreciation allowed in excess of straight line depreciation for all the periods
after 1963 (reduced by any reverse excess, i.e., any excess of
straight line depreciation over the depreciation allowed for any
period after 1963).61 Moreover, even the amount of ordinary
income thus determined would be reduced by 1 percent for
each month the improvement were held in excess of 20
62
months.
The Act made lengthy additions to section 1250, but changed
the rules outlined above only by eliminating the 1 percentper-month reduction of ordinary income with respect to improvements held for more than 20 months, 63 while introducing
a new 1 percent-per-month reduction with respect to improvements held for more than 100 months and constituting residential rental property or property produced by rehabilitation expenditures depreciated under section 167 (k).164 The Act did not
Revenue Act of 1964, § 231(a), 78 Stat. 100, as amended, CODE § 1250 (a)
(1969); CODE §§ 1250(b) (1), 1250(b) (3), 1250(c).
61 CODE § 1250(b) (1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1250-2(b) (1), 1.1250-2(b) (6) ex.
(1), (2) (1971). When accelerated depreciation is used, the initial excess
60

over straight line is always replaced by the reverse excess after a cer-

tain time, and the reverse excess always equals the initial excess by the
end of the estimated useful life.
62 Revenue Act of 1964, § 231(a), 78 Stat. 100, as amended, CODE § 1250 (a)
6

8

64

(2) (1969).
CODE §§ 1250(a) (1) (A),

(B), (C) (v).

Id. §§ 1250(a) (1) (A), (B), (C) (iii), (C) (iv).

1972

FEDERAL INCOME TAXES AND URBAN SPRAWL

343

alter the basic rule of section 1250 that if an improvement is
held for more than 1 year, the ordinary income portion of the
gain from sale is never greater than the net excess of post1963 depreciation over straight line depreciation' 5 The rule
of section 1250 is to be contrasted to the rule of section 1245,
under which gain from the sale of personal property (or of a
real property improvement subject to section 1245) is generally
treated as ordinary income to the extent of all post-1961 depreciation allowed with respect to the property, including straight
line depreciation."6
The new section 1250 provisions introduced by the Act
apply generally to post-1969 depreciation (but subject to a
transitional rule)." The pre-Act provisions continue to apply to
depreciation from 1964 through 1969, with the new provisions
being applied first to any particular gain, and the pre-Act
provisions then being applied if a sufficient amount of the
gain remains."8 The mechanics of the two sets of provisions
and of the relationship between them can produce some results
which are quite liberal to the investor. For example, if the
gain is $100,000, the excess post-1969 depreciation is $120,000,
and the applicable percentage is 50 percent (because the improvements are residential rental property held for 150 months),
then the ordinary income portion of the gain is not $60,000 but
only $50,000, because the percentage is applied to the lower of
the gain or the excess depreciation." In this example, no portion of the remaining $50,000 of gain is subject to ordinary
income treatment on account of excess depreciation from 1964
through 1969 (even if there is such depreciation), because the
total gain of $100,000 is less than the total excess post-1969
depreciation of $120,000.70
The pre-Act provisions apply to post-1969 depreciation (as
well as to depreciation from 1964 through 1969) with respect to
improvements constructed, reconstructed or acquired before
January 1, 1975, in connection with certain government-spon65 Id. § 1250(b) (1).
66 Id. § 1245(a). In the case of property produced by rehabilitation expenditures depreciated under § 167(k), the excess depreciation taken
into account under § 1250 is the total of the amounts allowed under
§ 167 (k) cver the total of the amounts allowable using the straight line
method and the full estimated useful life (and also the full estimated
salvage value, according to Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1250-2(b) (4),
1.1250-2(b) (6)ex. (3), 36 Fed. Reg. 4391 (1971), although this is not
clear from the statute). CODE § 1250(b) (4).
67 CODE §§ 1250(a) (1) (A), 1250(a) (1) (C) (i).
68

Id. § 1250 (a) (2).

69 Id. §§ 1250(a) (1) (A), (B).
70 Id. § 1250(a) (2) (A).
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sored, limited return housing programs. 7' Assuming that the
housing in question is normally constructed within existing
urban areas in replacement of less desirable housing, this one
provision of section 1250 does not encourage the spread of
urban areas into the countryside, although the other provisions
72
of the section, in their general leniency, do have this effect.
2.

Capital Gain-

Sections 1201 and Following

Except to the limited extent provided by section 1250 with
respect to developed property, the gain realized by the investor
from a sale of his real estate held for more than 6 months
will be subject to favorable tax treatment as a long-term cap78
ital gain.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, an individual's net
long-term capital gain (as reduced by his net short-term
capital loss) for any year was taxed either by excluding half
of such gain from his income and computing the regular tax on
the other half, or by excluding all of such gain from his
income and multiplying such gain by 25 percent, whichever
alternative produced the lower tax.7 4 Thus, for example, an individual in the 40 percent marginal bracket would be taxed
under the first alternative at a rate of 40 percent of half of
such gain, i.e., 20 percent of the entire gain (assuming that the
inclusion of half the gain in his taxable income did not cause
his marginal bracket to increase), while an individual in the
60 percent marginal bracket would be taxed under the second
alternative at a rate of 25 percent of the entire gain. A corporation was generally taxed on such gain either by including
all of such gain in taxable income and computing the regular
corporate tax (generally 22 percent of the first $25,000 of taxable income plus 48 percent of the remainder), or by applying
71

Id. § 1250 (a) (1) (C) (ii).

In addition to the provisions described above, § 1250 contains various
complex provisions relating to improvements made and costs incurred
by lessees, non-recognized gains, holding periods, improvements treated
as consisting of more than one element, and other matters. These provisions will not be considered in detail in this article.
73 CODE §§ 1221, 1222, 1201, 1202.
74 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 1201(b), 1202, 68A Stat. 320,
as amended, CODE §§ 1201(b), 1202 (1969). "Net long term capital
gain" means the excess of the year's gains from sales or exchanges of
capital assets held ,for more than 6 months over the year's losses from
such sales or exchanges. CODE §§ 1222(3), (4), (7); Treas. Reg. § 1.12221(a) (1957). "Net short-term capital loss" means the excess of the
year's losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for 6 months
or less over the year's gains from such sales or exchanges. CODE §§
1222(1), (2), (6); Treas. Reg. § 1.1222-1(a) (1957).
72
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produced the lower tax.' 5
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alternative

With respect to individuals, the Act made no change at all
in the first alternative for taxing the net long-term capital
gain (less the net short-term capital loss), and no change at
all in the second alternative with respect to the first $50,000 of
such gain. 76 The only change (excluding the new "minimum
tax" discussed below) is that if such gain is in excess of $50,000,
the' second alternative consists of applying the 25 percent rate
to the first $50,000 and then adding the tax which would be
imposed on one-half of the excess over $50,000 if the first
alternative were used (but disregarding any reduction in such
7
tax which would result from any net ordinary loss). 7 Thus
even after the Act, an individual's rate on such gain (excluding
the new minimum tax) can in no event exceed one-half of the
rate which would apply if such gain were taxed in the same
manner as other income, and can often be substantially less
than half of such rate (either because the 25 percent maximum rate on the first $50,000 per year is 10 percent less than
half the maximum ordinary income rate of 70 percent, or because the deduction for half the gain removes this half from
higher brackets than remain to be applied to the other half).
With respect to corporations, the only change made by the Act
(excluding the new minimum tax) is to increase the alternate
rate from 25 percent to 30 percent, thus retaining an 18 percent
tax saving on the excess of net long-term capital gain over
net short-term capital loss of a corporation in the 48 percent
78
bracket.
The Act's changes described above apply to individuals for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1971, and to corporations for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1970,
7
A significant change
but subject to several transitional rules.
made by the Act in the direction of still more favorable treat-

75 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 1201(a), 68A Stat. 320, (is
amended, CODE § 1201(a) (1969); CODE § 11. The rates referred to do
not take account of the temporary tax surcharge imposed by CODE § 51.
76 CODE §§ 1201 (b) (1), 1201 (b) (2), 1201 (d) (3), 1202, 1222(11).
77
CODE §§ 1201(b) (1), 1201(b) (2), 1201(b) (3), 1201(c) (1), 1201(d) (3),
1222(11). The $50,000 figure is reduced to $25,000 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return. Id. § 1201 (d) (3).
This benefit to
78Id. §§ 1201(a) (1) (B), 1201(a), 1201(d), 1222(11).
corporations is retained despite the statement in the Senate Committee
Report that "as a realistic matter, a corporation's capital gains are more
in the nature of business income which is not essentially different from
its other income." S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1969).
9
§§ 1201(a) (1), 1201(b) (2), 1201(c) (2), 1201(d) (1), 1201(d) (2).
7CODE
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ment of an individual's net long-term capital gain (less his net
short-term capital loss) in any year is that if the first alternative for taxing such gain is used, the half of such gain which is
taxable may be taken into account for purposes of income
averaging.8 0 The Act has restricted capital loss deductions for
individuals by providing that each dollar of net long-term capital loss in excess of net short-term capital gain may offset only
$.50 of ordinary taxable income (computed without deductions
for personal exemptions) up to a maximum of $1,000 of such
income in the. taxable year or any future year (as contrasted
with the dollar-for-dollar offset up to $1,000 allowed under the
prior law).81 The excess of net short-term capital loss over net
long-term capital gain is still deductible under the dollar-fordollar rule, and may be deducted bfore the excess of net longterm capital loss over short-term capital gain is deducted under
the new dollar-for-$.50 rule.8 2 The Act has liberalized capital
loss deductions for corporations by allowing such losses generally to be offset against capital gains realized not only in
the current and next 5 succeeding taxable years (as previously
3
allowed) but also in the 3 preceding years.
The extraordinary tax favoritism for long-term capital
gains, which remains after the Act, not only induces individual
and corporate investors to purchase open land for sale to
developers or for the construction of buildings for rental and
later sale, but also strongly influences farmers and other landholders to accept offers for sales of their land to investors or
developers."For this reason, the capital gains favoritism may be
the single most important federal income tax factor which
is presently stimulating the conversion of open, rural land into
developed, urban land. 4
3.

New Minimum Tax-

Sections 56 .through 58

The complicated new "minimum tax" on items of tax preference, introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, restricts

so Id. § 1302 (applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1969). The second alternative may not be used together with income
averaging. Id. § 1304(b) (5).
81 Id. §§ 1211(b) (1) (C) (ii), 1212(b) (1) (B), 1212(b) (2) (B), 1212(b) (3)
(applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969).
82Id. §§ 1211(b) (1) (C) (i), 1212(b) (1) (A), 1212(b) (2) (A). The $1,000
limit per year with respect to either type of loss has been reduced to
$500 for a married individual filing a separate return. Id. § 1211(b) (2).
(applicable to capital losses ssutained in
83Id. §§ 1212(a) (1), 1212(a) (3)
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969).
84 See Prestbo, Sprawl of Cities Stirs Fears that Agriculture Will Run Out
of Space, Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1971, at 1, Col. 6.
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to only a very limited extent the tax benefits available to real
estate investors.8 5
An individual's "items of tax preference," as defined in
new Code section 57, include (among other items) the excess of
accelerated over straight line depreciation allowable for the
taxable year with respect to any real estate improvement (generally excluding an improvement subject to section 1245), and
also include one-half of the excess of net long-term capital
gain over net short-term capital loss for the year.86 However,
the tax itself, as provided for in new section 56, applies only
to the excess of all items of tax preference for the year over
the sum of the individual's regular income taxes (including the
tax on his capital gains) for the year plus an annual exemption of $30,000, and applies at a rate of only 10 percent.8 7 Thus,
for example, if a married couple has $28,000 of ordinary taxable
income (not reflecting any items of tax preference) plus a
$150,000 long-term capital gain from a sale of real estate held
for investment, the new tax does not apply at all, because the
item of tax preference is $75,000 (i.e., 1/2 of $150,000) and is exceeded by the sum of the regular taxes of $47,040 for the year
(computed by using the first alternative for the capital gain)
plus the $30,000 exemption, or $77,040. If the couple also had
$50,000 of accelerated over straight line depreciation with
respect to real estate improvements (such $50,000 being reflected in the $28,000 of ordinary taxable income), the amount
subject to the new tax would be only $47,960 (i.e., the items of
tax preference totaling $125,000 less the $77,040 of regular taxes
plus exemption), and the new tax would be $4,796 (i.e., 10
percent of $47,960), or less than 2.5 percent of the $200,000 of

capital gain plus accelerated depreciation. Since the tax savings to the couple from the special capital gains rate alone is
$48,780 (this being the additional regular tax the couple would
§§ 56, 57, 58 (applicable to taxable years ending after December
31, 1969, with a prorated tax for years beginning in 1969 and ending in
1970).
86Id. §§ 57(a)(2), 57(a)(9)(A). With respect to an improvement produced by rehabilitation expenditures being depreciated under § 167(k),
the item of tax preference is the excess of the depreciation allowable
under that section over the amount which would be allowable using the
straight line method with the useful life and (apparently) the salvage
value determined without regard to that section. Id. § 57(a) (2); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(b) (4) (i), 35 Fed. Reg. 19762 (1970). For
taxable years beginning before January 1, 1972, "excess investment interest" is included as an item of tax preference for an individual (or a
subchapter S corporation or personal holding company). CODE §§ 57
(a) (1) (including last sentence of § 57(a)), 57(b), 57(c).
87 CODE § 56(a). The $30,000 is reduced to $15,000 for a married individual
filing a separate return. Id. § 58(a).
85 CODE
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pay if the capital gain were treated like other income), the
new tax hardly represents a significant reduction in the benefits derived by the couple from the items of tax preference.
These examples illustrate the generally minor or negligible
effect of the new tax as applied to individual real estate
investors. 8s
A corporate real estate investor is even less likely to be
trouoled by the new tax than is an individual investor. Although accelerated depreciation with respect to a real property
improvement (excluding an improvement subject to section
1245) is included in a corporation's items of tax preference to
the same extent as in an individual's, the excess of net longterm capital gain over net short-term capital loss is included
to the extent of only 18/48 of such excess (such fraction being
determined under a formula whereby the denominator is the
combined corporate normal and surtax rate, presently 48 percent, and the numerator is the difference between such rate
and the alternate corporate capital gains tax rate, presently
30 percent).89 Moreover, since a corporation is likely to have
substantial regular income taxes if it is engaged in normal business operations as well as in real estate investments, it must
have large items of tax preference in order for such items to
exceed the regular taxes plus the $30,000 annual exemption
so that the new tax will apply. For example, if a corporation
has $100,000 of ordinary taxable income, a long-term capital
gain of $150,000 from a sale of real estate held for investment,
and $50,000 of accelerated over straight line depreciation with
respect to real estate improvements (such $50,000 being reflected in the $100,000 of ordinary taxable income), the corporation's items of tax preference total $106,250 (i.e., 18/48 of
$150,000, plus $50,000), which is less than the sum of the corporation's regular taxes of $86,500 (i.e., $41,500 on the $100,000 of
ordinary taxable income plus $45,000 on the capital gain), plus
the $30,000 exemption, or $116,500. Consequently, the new tax
is not payable at all, although the corporation's saving from
the favorable 30 percent rate alone is $27,000 (i.e., 18 percent
of $150,000) .90
88 The regular tax rates used in these examples exclude the possible effects

of income averaging.

89 CODE §§ 57(a) (2), 57(a) (9) (B). Special rules apply to the capital gains

90

of subchapter S corporations, life insurance companies, regulated investment companies, and other special types of corporations not subject to
the same income taxes as corporations generally.
A corporation's regular income taxes taken into account for purposes
of the new minimum tax do not include the accumulated earnings or
personal holding company taxes. Id. § 56(a) (2) (A). Subsequent to the
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Proposed Regulations under New Minimum Tax
As mild as the new tax may seem in the Code, the proposed regulations make it still milder with two liberalizing
provisions for which the statutory support is difficult to find.
First, although Code section 57(a) (9) (B) plainly provides for
18/48 of the excess of a corporation's net long-term capital
gain over its net short-term capital loss to be included as an
item of tax preference, proposed regulation 1.57-1 (i) (2) (i) permits the numerator of 18 to be reduced to such lesser figure
as may represent the rate of tax actually saved by the corporation from application of the alternate corporate gains tax to
the particular gain. As shown by the examples in this proposed regulation, an actual saving of less than 18 percent
can occur if (in the absence of the alternate tax) the gain
would have been partly taxed at 22 percent (or at 0 percent)
rather than at 48 percent because the corporation's ordinary
taxable income is less than $25,000 (or because the corporation
has a net ordinary loss). Presumably under the proposed
regulation the numerator is reduced from 18 to 0 (so that there
is no item of tax preference at all with respect to the gain)
if the alternate tax is not used (e.g., because the gain plus
the ordinary taxable income totals less than $25,000). Interest,ngly, the proposed regulation does not require the numerator
to be increased above 18 where the actual saving from the
alternate tax is more than 18 percent, e.g., where all or part
of the gain is taxed at the former alternate rate of 25 percent
pursuant to the transitional rule relating to binding contracts
entered into before October 10, 1969.Y
The second liberalizing provision is in proposed regulation
1.57-4, and consists of elaborate rules for disregarding an individual's or a corporation's items of tax preference which produce no tax saving, e.g., because there is zero taxable income
even before considering such items, and under the net operating loss carryover rules the items in question do not give rise
to such a carryover. Code section 56(b) does provide a limited
"no tax benefit" provision in the form of a deferral of the new
tax where there is a net operating loss carryover to a subse4.

Act, § 56 was amended to provide that the regular income taxes of
either an individual or a corporation for a given year, to the extent not
used to offset the items of tax preference for that year in excess of the
annual exemption, may be carried forward and used for such offsets for
seven subsequent years. Id. §§ 56(a) (2) (B), 56(c) (applicable to
regular taxes for taxable years ending after December 31, 1969, and to
regular taxes on a prorated basis for taxable years beginning in 1969 and
ending in 1970).
91 Id. §§ 1201(a) (1) (A), 1201(d) (1).
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quent year, but the proposed regulation goes far beyond this
92
Code provision.
5.

Installment Method-Section 453

Occasionally, a gain realized by an investor from a sale
of real estate may be subject to significantly higher taxes because of the Tax Reform Act provisions relating to depreciation
recapture, long-term capital gain tax rates, and the minimum
tax on items of tax preference. However, the investor can
often reduce or eliminate these higher taxes by careful use of
an installment approach. If the payments he receives in the
year of sale (exclusive of certain evidences of indebtedness of
the purchaser) do not exceed 30 percent of the selling price,
and if the price is to be paid in two or more installments over
two or more taxable years, then the investor may elect under
Code section 453 to use the installment method for reporting
the gain 3 Under the installment method, the gain is reported
pro rata as payments are actually received, i.e., each payment
when received is treated as consisting of gain in an amount
which bears the same ratio to the payment as the total gain
bears to the total contract price. 94 Special rules apply to the
disposition of installment obligations before they are paid in
full.9 5
Although all the gain reported under the installment
method will be treated as ordinary income from depreciation
92The proposed regulations also contain rules authorized by the CODE
relating to various special matters including the apportionment of items
of tax preference between such entities as subchapter S corporations,
regulated investment companies, trusts and estates, and their owners or
beneficiaries. Id. § 58; Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.58-1 to 1.58-8, 35 Fed.
Reg. 19772 (1970).
3
.1 CODE §§ 453(a) (1),
453(b) (1) (A), 453(b) (2),(A), 453(b) (3); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.453-1(b) (1966), 1.453-1(c) (1), 1.453-4, 1.453-5(a), 1.453-8(b)
(1958); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-462, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 107; 10-42 Corp.,
55 T.C. 593 (1971). The requirement of two or more installments over
two or more taxable years (as distinguished from two or more installments in a single year) is set forth in Rev. Rul. 69-462, although there
appears to be no other authority for this requirement.
94
CODE § 453(a) (1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453-1(b) (1966), 1.453-5(a) (1958).
Under a liberal regulation of long standing, the investor may apply
his basis against the amount of any mortgage liability which the purchaser assumes or to which the property remains subject, with only the
excess of such liability over such basis being treated as a "payment"
and as part of the "total contract price." Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958).
This regulation often permits the investor to report all or most of his
gain as he receives cash payments from the purchaser over a number
of years following the sale, even though the transfer of the mortgage at
the time of the sale may represent more than half of the total selling
price. It is not clear under what circumstances, if any, the mortgage
transfer may be treated as one of the two or more installments of the
selling price which is required in order for the installment method of
reporting to be available.
95 CODE

§ 453 (d).
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recapture until the full amount of such ordinary income has
been reported, ' the spreading of such ordinary income over
two or more taxable years may significantly reduce the rate
at which such income is taxed. In addition, the installment
method may permit an individual investor to avoid the increased alternate rate introduced by the Act for long-term
capital gains in excess of $50,000 in a given taxable year. For
example, if an individual realizes and reports in one year a
long-term capital gain of $250,000 from a sale of real estate
(and no other capital gains or losses), the alternate rate for
$200,000 of the gain will be the increased rate introduced by
the Act, while only $50,000 of the gain will be eligible for the
25 percent alternate rate. If, however, the individual reports
20 percent of the gain in each of 5 years under the installment method (and has no other gains or losses over the 5-year
period), the entire gain of $250,000 will be eligible for the 25
percent alternate rate. Similarly, either an individual or a
corporate investor may use the installment method to maximize the use of the $30,000 annual exemptions so as to reduce
the amount of gain subject to the new minimum tax. Thus
in the preceding example, if the individual has no other income
or loss over the 5-year period, the installment method will
provide him with five exemptions of $30,000 each to offset
against the $125,000 item of tax preference, thereby eliminating
the minimum tax on such item.
D. Examples
The following examples are intended to illustrate the tax
benefits of current deductions from ordinary income, followed
by favorable treatment of gain on sale, which are available to
real estate investors.
Suppose that an individual investor in the 40 percent marginal bracket borrows $100,000 in order to purchase a parcel
of open land for such amount, that he then pays interest and
real estate taxes totaling $25,000 over a 3-year period, and that
he then sells the property for $150,000. His current deductions
for the $25,000 of interest and taxes will save him $10,000 in
federal income taxes, while his long-term capital gain of $50,000
(i.e., $150,000 of amount realized less $100,000 of adjusted basis)
will be subject to a maximum tax rate of 25 percent (assuming
he has no other capital gains or losses for the year of the sale),
96

Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-1(c) (6) (1971); Dunn Construction Co. v. United
States, 323 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (upholding the corresponding regulation under CODE § 1245).
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for a maximum tax of $12,500. Thus the individual's net gain
of $25,000 (i.e., $150,000 of sales proceeds less $125,000 of total
expenditures) will be subject to a net tax of at most only
$2,500, representing an effective rate of only 10 percent, which
is 4 percent less than the minimum rate of 14 percent on an
individual's taxable income as provided for in Code section 1.
In addition, the individual will enjoy an interest-free loan of
$10,000 from the government between the times he saves this
amount on account of his deductions and the time he pays
the $12,500 capital gains tax.
Now suppose the above example is changed by assuming
a 60 percent rather than a 40 percent marginal bracket for the
individual. The $25,000 of current deductions will then save
him $15,000 in taxes, while the maximum capital gains tax will
remain at $12,500, with the result that his $25,000 net gain produces no tax at all but rather a $2,500 tax saving, plus a $12,500
interest-free loan until the capital gains tax is paid. The socalled "negative income tax," so often attacked as an incentive
for people not to work, is thus a reality for many high-bracket
individuals with respect to their real estate investments. If the
example is changed by assuming a corporation in the 48 percent bracket rather than an individual, the $25,000 of current
deductions will save $12,000 in taxes, while the capital gains
tax will be $15,000, for a net tax of only $3,000, or only 12
percent of the net gain of $25,000, as contrasted with the 22
percent minimum rate on corporate taxable income which is
provided for in Code section 11. In addition, the corporation
will enjoy an interest-free loan of $12,000 until the capital
gains tax is paid.
Now suppose that an individual investor in the 60 percent
marginal bracket borrows $500,000 in order to purchase open
land for $50,000 and build an apartment house on the land for
$450,000. Suppose that the loan provides for payment of interest
at 8 percent per year but no principal for the first 5 years,
that the average net rental income from the apartment house
(i.e., gross rents less all operating expenses including real
estate taxes) equals the $40,000 per year of interest expense,
that depreciation is claimed under the double declining balance
method using a 40-year useful life and a $50,000 salvage value,
and that at the end of 5 years the land and apartment house
are sold for $600,000 payable in five equal annual installments.
Despite the absence of a cash deficit in any year while the
apartment house is held, the individual may claim net deduc-
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tions from his ordinary income in amounts equal to each year's
depreciation allowance, which (in order of the five years) will
be $22,500, $21,375, $20,306, $19,291 and $18,326, for total net deductions of $101,798, and total tax savings of 60 percent thereof,
or $61,079. The individual's adjusted basis in the apartment
house will be reduced by $101,798 to $348,202, so that upon the
sale for $600,000 he will realize a gain of $201,798 (i.e., $600,000
of amount realized less $398,202 of combined adjusted basis
for the apartment house and the land). Under the depreciation
recapture rules, $51,798 of this gain will be taxable as ordinary
income (i.e., the excess of the depreciation deductions of
$101,798 over the deductions allowable under the straight line
method, which are $10,000 per year for a total of $50,000). The
tax on this $51,798 of income will be $31,079, while the remainder of the gain, totaling $150,000, will be taxable at the
25 percent alternate long-term capital gain rate for a tax of
$37,500 (assuming the individual makes an appropriate election
of the installment method and has no other capital gains for
the years of the installment payments). The total tax will thus
be $31,079 plus $37,500, or $68,579. The excess of this tax over
the $61,079 of tax savings from the depreciation deductions is
only $7,500, which represents a tax at a rate of only 7.5 percent
on the individual's economic net profit of $100,000 from the
investment. In addition to this extremely low rate (which is
only a small fraction of the individual's normal rate of 60
percent), the individual will enjoy interest-free loans from the
government totaling his $61,079 of annual tax savings, which
he will repay only as he pays taxes on the installment payments received in the years following the sale.
It should be noted that in none of the examples in this
series is the investor affected at all by the "reforms" introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 respecting disallowance
of investment interest deductions, increased capital gain tax
rates, and minimum tax on items of tax preference. This
assumes that in each case the investor has no investment
interest, capital gains or items of tax preference other than
as stated in the examples. For simplicity, the examples disregard possible increases or decreases in marginal rates and
possible effects of income averaging, and the third example
disregards the likely cash deficit and tax loss during the construction period (which in practice would usually be followed
by a positive cash flow and net pre-depreciation income after
construction, at least if some part of the land and building
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cost were furnished from the investor's own funds rather than
borrowed).
E.

Other Benefits
1. In General

In addition to current deductions for ordinary income, plus
long-term capital gain treatment of gains from sales, the law
of federal income taxation offers at least two other categories
of potential benefits to individual and corporate real estate
investors. First, if the investor finds that he lacks sufficient
income against which to offset all of his real estate deductions
for a particular taxable year, the law offers him several possible ways of using the deductions to offset income in other
years. Second, under various circumstances the law permits
the investor to dispose of his real estate at a gain without
paying any income tax at all at the time of such disposition,
and, in many cases, without ever paying such tax.
2.

Use of Deductions in Other Years

a. Optional Capitalization of Expenses - Section 266
One way to defer various real estate deductions is provided
by Code section 266, under which an investor (or other taxpayer) may elect to capitalize rather than deduct "such taxes
and carrying charges as, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, are chargeable to capital account
with respect to property . . . ."I' Capitalization means that the
items in question are added to the basis or adjusted basis of
the property, for use in future years either as depreciation
deductions (to the extent the items are allocable to depreciable
improvements) or as offsets in computing gain from sale.98
The regulations provide that in the case of "unimproved and
unproductive real property," the items to which the election
may apply are "[a] nnual taxes, interest on a mortgage, and
other carrying charges."9 In the case of real property in the
process of development (including already developed property
being additionally developed), the regulations permit the election for interest on a loan, taxes of the owner measured by
97 CODE
9

§ 266.

8Id. §§ 1016(a) (1), 1011, 167(g), 1001(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b)(1)
(1958).
99
Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b)(1)(i) (1958). It appears that the mortgage
must either have been placed (or left) on the property in connection
with the acquisition thereof, or have been placed on the property after
acquisition in order to secure a borrowing used to pay ccsts of retaining
the property. Queensboro Corp. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1943); Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.C. 364 (1946), rev'd, 162 F.2d 319
(1947).
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compensation to his employees, taxes of the owner on the purchase, storage, use or other consumption of "materials" (presumably including personal property as well as sales and use
taxes), and other necessary expenditures to the extent that any
of such items are paid or incurred for the development and

during the development period.'

The regulations also allow

the election for certain items in the case of personal property,
and for "[a]ny other taxes and carrying charges with respect
to property, otherwise deductible, which in the opinion of the
Commissioner are, under sound accounting principles, chargeable to capital account."''1
The regulations imply that (in the
absence of special approval by the Commissioner) the election
is not available in the case of improved or productive real
property other than with respect to the process of development.
However, a court has apparently determined that taxes and
mortgage interest on improved and rent-producing real property
not in the process of development are eligible for the election
(even without the Commissioner's approval) if the property is
02
held primarily for sale at an advantageous time.1
The essential benefit of section 266 to real estate investors
is that the section is entirely elective, thus permitting the investor to choose freely between current deductions or additions to basis according to which is more advantageous to him.
The election for each year must be filed with the original
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b) (ii)

(1958). It is unclear at what point unimproved and unproductive real property in the process of development
ceases to be "unimproved" so that the election ceases to be available for
the two categories of items cited above and becomes available only for
the second. It is also unclear whether the inclusion of "interest on a
mortgage" in the first category as contrasted with "interest on a loan"
in the second category means that interest on an unsecured loan incurred
to purchase or carry unimproved and unproductive real property is excluded from the first category (and hence not subject to the election),
or whether such interest may be included in the first category as
"other carrying charges."
101 Id. § 1.266-1(b) (1) (iv) (1958).
102 Smyth v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1955). The uncertainty respecting the court's determination arises because the taxable year to which
the determination relates was governed by a predecessor of § 1016 (a) (1)
which contained no express authority to the Commissioner to define in
regulations the items eligible for the election, although such predecessor
section itself (in language which the court seemingly overlooked by
quoting from a later, inapplicable section) seemingly implied that the
only eligible items were with respect to "unimproved and unproductive
real property." Section 113(b) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 [Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 113(b) (1) (A),
53 Stat. 44] was the applicable section, while the court quoted the same
section as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942 [Revenue Act of 1942,
Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 130(b), 56 Stat. 827]. For a case which (under
statutory language comparable to that of present § 266) upholds the
Commissioner's regulations denying the election for taxes and mortgage interest on a personal residence, see Megibow v. Commissioner, 218
F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1955).
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return for such year,'"' and an election for any "item" (evidently meaning interest on a particular loan, taxes of a particular kind, and so forth) with respect to real property in the
process of development must apply to all items of the same
type which are paid or incurred with respect to the same
development either in the year of election or in any subsequent year.'' 4 Otherwise, the election may generally be made
or not made separately each year for each eligible item. 0 5
It seems that if an item is not allowable as a current deduction
(disregarding a section 266 election), such item is not eligible
for a section 266 election.'"
b. Net Operating Losses- Section 172
Another approach to offsetting one year's real estate deductions against another year's income is offered by Code section
172, relating to net operating losses. In general, if an investor
(or other taxpayer) has total deductions in excess of total
income for any year (whether with respect to real estate or
otherwise), such net loss may be carried back 3 years and
forward 5 years under section 172 so as to offset net income
in any of such 8 years in order of time.10 7 One limitation
in the case of an individual (or other noncorporate taxpayer)
is that in computing such net loss, nonbusiness deductions are
generally taken into account only to the extent of nonbusiness
gross income.""' However, for this purpose the holding of real
estate for rental is usually treated as a business, so that deductions attributable to such real estate (including any losses from
the sale or other disposition thereof) are fully taken into
account.1'0 Another limitation is that the net loss of an individual (or other noncorporate taxpayer) is in effect reduced by
any deductions for (or in lieu of) personal exemptions, or for
any excess of capital losses over capital gains, or for one-half
of any net long-term capital gain over net long-term capital
loss. The reduction is for such deductions for the year of the
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(c) (3) (1958).
144Id. §§ 1.266-1(c) (1), 1.266-1(c) (2) (ii) (a)

(1958).
105Id. §§ 1.266-1(c) (1), 1.266-1(c) (2) (i) (1958).
106 Id. § 1.266-1(b) (2) (1958); Parkland Place Co. v. United States, 354
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966) (involving interest payable between related
parties and disallowed under CODE § 267. An unresolved question (raised
but not decided in Megibow v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1955)), is whether this rule bars the election for an item which cannot
be currently deducted because the standard deduction is claimed.
107 CODE §§ 172(a), 172(b) (1) (A) (i), 172(b) (1) (B), 172(b) (2), 172(c),

(d), (e).
108 Id. § 172(d) (4).
'o"'See, e.g., Peter S. Elek, 30 T.C. 731 (1958), acquiesced in, 1958-2 CUM.
BULL. 5.
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net loss, while any such deductions for any of the 8 years to
which such net loss may be carried will reduce the amount of
such net loss which may be carried to any subsequent year,
except insofar as such deductions for any of such 8 years have
reduced the net loss of any year earlier than the loss year in
question. 110
c. Tax Benefit Rule
If an investor finds that the limitations of section 172 prevent him from fully utilizing his real estate deductions of one
year against his income of another, he may be able to obtain
a similar result through use of the so-called "tax benefit" rule.
Briefly stated, this rule provides that if the deduction for a
particular expenditure or loss (or a portion of such deduction)
does not reduce income tax liability, then a subsequent recovery of such expenditure or loss (or of the portion thereof
which did not reduce income tax liability)
gross income."'

is excludible from

The regulations and most of the cases and rulings applying
the tax benefit rule seem to require that there be a very close
relationship between the expenditure or loss and the amount
said to constitute a subsequent recovery thereof, as where
losses are sustained on sales of stock purchased from a particular vendor and part of the purchase price is subsequently
recovered from that vendor, or where interest or taxes payable
to a particular person or government are later cancelled or
refunded by that person or government. :-' However, the rule
was extended markedly in Smyth v. Sullivan," 3 involving an
estate which derived no tax benefit from certain of its deducI" CODE §§

172(b) (2) (A), 172(c), 172(d) (2),

1.172(4)(a)(3)
1! CODE §

172(d) (3); Treas. Reg. §

(1956).

111; Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (1956); see, e.g., Dobson v. Commis-

sioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943)

(not disturbing tax benefit rule as applied

by several lower court decisions).
112 Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (a) (2) (1956); see, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489 (1943) (recovery of stock purchase price); Rev. Rul. 58546, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 143 (cancellation of interest); REV. RUL. 56-447,
1956-2 CUM. BULL. 102 (refund of taxes). A number of cases have held
that the expenditure or loss and the alleged subsequent recovery were
not sufficiently related to permit application of the rule. See, e.g.,
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (expenses incurred in performing contract not allowed to be offset against judgment
subsequently collected from other contracting party); Sloane v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1951) (loss on worthlessness of debt
owed by corporation not allowed to be offset against compensation subsequently received from "liquidating trust" for services in managing
and selling corpcration's property after corporation's liquidation; Allen
v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 180 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950) (bad debt loss not allowed to be offset against subsequent gain from sale of stock received in satisfaction of the debt).
133 227 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1955).
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tions for taxes and mortgage interest with respect to real estate
which it held for 8 years until it was able to arrange a sale
at a suitable price. The court held that the overall transaction
of holding and subsequently selling the property was sufficiently integrated to permit the estate to exclude from gross
income, under the tax benefit rule, a portion of the sales proceeds equal to the taxes and interest which had produced no
tax benefit. 14 Although the court stressed that the rental of the
property during the 8 years was merely incidental to the
objective of sale, there seems no logical reason why the tax
benefit rule, as interpreted by the court, would not permit an
investor to offset one year's taxes and interest against a later
year's net rental income if renting were the investor's objective. The regulations expressly exclude depreciation as an item
with respect to which the tax benefit rule applies,' 1 5 and this
is supported by the requirement of section 1016 that adjusted
basis be reduced by "allowable" depreciation deductions regardless of tax benefit, " ' but a different position might well
be adopted by a court which applied the tax benefit rule as
broadly as the court in Smyth v. Sullivan. That case thus
creates substantial untapped opportunities for real estate investors to offset one year's real estate deductions against a
subsequent year's income from the same real estate, where the
117
deductions would produce no tax benefit but for such offset.
3.

Deferral or Elimination of Tax on Gain

a. Exchanges of Real Estate-Section 1031
Code section 1031 is one of the important sections which
permit an investor to dispose of his real estate at a gain but
without "recognition" thereof, that is, without inclusion of
the gain in income for income tax purposes at the time of the
disposition. Under this section and the regulations interpreting
it, if real estate "held for productive use in trade or business
or for investment" is exchanged solely for other real estate
to be held for either of such purposes, complete nonrecognition
is provided for any gain realized on the exchange (i.e., any
excess of the fair market value of the real estate received over
114 The taxes and interest to which the tax benefit rule was applied were

in addition to taxes and interest allowed to be capitalized under a presection 266 code provision, as explained earlier.
115 Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956).
ll6CODE § 1016(a) (2).
117 For a case in which the court refused (without explanation) to consider
the broadened tax benefit rule of Snyth v. Sullivan, see Michael
August, 23 T.C.M. 24 (1964).
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the adjusted basis of the real estate transferred). 1s If any
money or property other than business or investment real
estate is received in the exchange, any realized gain is recognized only to the extent of such money plus the fair market
value of such other property. 11"' Although for this purpose the
section treats a transfer of liabilities by the investor as the
receipt of money by him, 12' the regulations permit such liabilities to be reduced by any liabilities transferred to him or
by any cash or other property transferred by him. 21 Section
1031 is expressly inapplicable if the real estate transferred or
received constitutes "stock in trade or other property held
primarily for sale," 1 2 -2 but the regulations again adopt a liberalizing approach by declaring that "Unproductive real estate
held by one other than a dealer for future use or future realization of the increment in value is held for investment and not
primarily for sale."' ' -13 And although the section requires that
the property transferred and received be of "like kind," the
regulations explain that open land and developed land are of
1 24
"like kind" because both are real estate.
Various holdings under section 1031 have generously allowed its nonrecognition of gain benefits in cases of multiparty
transactions where the party acquiring the investor's real estate
is different from the party who owned the real estate acquired
by the investor, and in cases where a contract of sale for cash
is altered (before being carried out) to provide for a section
25
1031 exchange.'
Section 1031 provides for nonrecognition of
loss on exchanges to which it applies (whether or not money
118 CODE §
9

CoDE §
120 CODE §
11

21

122

1031(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i
1031(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-i

(1967).
(1967).

1031 (d).

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1031(b)-1(c) (1956), 1.1031(d)-2 ex. (2) (1956). Any
cash or other property received by the investor (other than a transfer
of liabilities by him) may not be offset by any liabilities transferred
to him (Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 ex. (2), and Coleman v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1950)) but evidently may be offset by
any cash or other property transferred by him (Sayre v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.W. Va. 1958)). In this discussion, a liability is
considered "transferred" from one party to another when the second
party either assumes the liability personally or acquires property subject
to it.
CODE §

1031 (a).

Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b) (1967). Apparently investors have been found
to hold property "primarily for sale" only where they acquired the
property for immediate resale. See, e.g., Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942).
1 24
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1031(a)-1(b), 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2) (1956).
125 See, e.g., W.D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948)
(four-party transaction); Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 394 (1969), acquiesced
123

in 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 5 (sale for cash changed to multi-party transaction involving a § 1031 exchange); Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 CuM. BULL.

247 (three-party transaction).
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or other property in addition to business or investment real
estate is received) ,12, and provides in general for the business
or investment real estate received to have a basis equal to the
adjusted basis of the real estate transferred (with an increase
under section 1012 for the amount of any other consideration
paid for the real estate received). 127 The broad nonrecognition
provisions of section 1031 for business or investment real estate
exchanges also apply to "like kind" exchanges of certain other
types of business or investment property, excluding, in particular, stocks or securities, exchanges of which are generally subject to nonrecognition treatment only if the far stricter requirements of the Code's corporate reorganization sections are
128
satisfied.
b.

Compulsory or Involuntary Conversions- Section
1033

Code section 1033 provides liberal nonrecognition rules for
cases where real estate "held for productive use in trade or
business or for investment" (but not constituting "stock in
trade or other property held primarily for sale") is "compulsorily or involuntarily converted" as a result of "its seizure,
requisition, or condemnation, or threat or imminence thereof."'1 29
If the conversion is directly into other business or investment
property of "like kind," the section provides for automatic nonrecognition of any gain realized, 130 while if the conversion is
into money or other property and within a specified period of
time other business or investment property of "like kind" is
purchased as a replacement, the section permits nonrecognition
of gain except to the extent such money plus the fair market
value of such other property exceeds the purchase price of
the replacement property.' 3' As for purposes of section 1031,
the original and the replacement properties are considered of
"like kind" as long as both are real estate (even if one is
1031 (a), 1031(c).
§§ 1031(d), 1012. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1031(d)-l(b), 1.1031(d)-l(c)
(1967) contain examples where the basis of the real estate received is
less than the adjusted basis of the real estate transferred because the
amount of money plus the fair market value of the other property received exceeds the realized gain, but in these examples all the gain is
recognized so that § 1031 really has no application at all. Where money
and other property are received and a loss is sustained, the basis of the
real estate received is the adjusted basis of the real estate transferred
less the sum of the amount of money and the fair market value of the
other property received.
128 CODE §§ 1031 (a), 354, 355, 356, 368.
129 Id. §§ 1033 (a), 1033 (g).
130 Id. §§ 1033 (a)(1), 1033(g).
131 Id. §§ 1033(a) (3)(A), 1033(a) (3)(B), 1033 (g).
126 CODE §§

127Id.
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developed and the other is open land), and unproductive real
estate held for appreciation is apparently not considered held
"primarily for sale."1 3- The specified replacement period begins
with the date of conversion (or any earlier date of its threat
or imminence) and ends 2 years after the close of the first taxable year in which any portion of the gain from the conversion
is realized, but permission for extension may be obtained under
certain circumstances." ' : Special rules for extension of the
statute of limitations on deficiency assessments apply if nonrecognition is elected under section 1033.134
The nonrecognition provisions of section 1033 with respect
to the conversions described above appear even more liberal to
the investor than the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031,
for at least the following three reasons: (1) where the conversion is into money or other property, the investor is free
to choose recognition rather than nonrecognition of gain if this
is favorable to him, e.g., because he will obtain greater depreciation deductions from a cost basis for his replacement real
estate (this being his basis if the gain is recognized 3 5 ) than he
will from a "carry-over" of the converted real estate's adjusted
basis to the replacement real estate (this being the rule if the
gain, or any part of it, is not recognized"'); (2) nonrecognition
of gain may be chosen if the money or other property is reinvested in the acquisition of 80 percent control (as defined) of
a corporation which owns real estate "similar or related in
service or use" to the converted real estate; 3 7 and (3) no provision is made for nonrecognition of loss. In addition to its
above-described provisions, section 1033 contains provisions for
nonrecognition in cases of complete or partial destruction, or
theft, or various kinds of conversions involving property other
than business or investment real estate, but subject to the general requirement (plainly stricter than the "like kind" requirement) that in any of these cases the replacement property
must be "similiar or related in service or use" to the property
138
converted.
132 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1033(g)-1(a) (1960), 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1956).
133 CODE § 1033(a) (3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c) (3) (1963). If the

replacement property is purchased before the conversion, it must be
held on the date of the conversion. CODE § 1033 (a) (3) (A) (i). Replacement property is considered "purchased" only if (but for § 1033) its
basis would be its cost. Id. § 1033 (a) (3) (A) (ii).
134 Id. §§ 1033(a) (3) (C), 1033(a) (3) (D).
135 Id. § 1012.
136 Id. § 1033 (c).
137 Id. §§ 1033(a) (2), 1033(a) (3)(A).
138 Id. § 1033(a).
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Other Rules Regarding Deferral or Elimination of
Tax on Gain

Code section 1039, introduced by the Tax Reform Act of
1969, permits owners of certain federally assisted low-income
housing projects to elect nonrecognition of gain realized from
a federally approved sale or other disposition of such project
to the tenants or occupants or to a nonprofit organization for
the benefit of the tenants or occupants, if the sales proceeds
are reinvested in a similar project within a specified period
of time. 1311 The structure of section 1039 is quite parallel in
a number of respects to that of section 1033.
One exception to the nonrecognition provisions of sections
1031, 1033, and 1039 is that section 1250 "depreciation recapture"
income realized with respect to transferred real property improvements is recognized to the extent that such income exceeds the cost (or, in certain cases, the fair market value) of
acquired real property improvements, or to the extent that
nonrecognition would otherwise be provided only under the
provisions of section 1033 relating to reinvestment of conversion
proceeds in stock of a corporation owning the replacement
property.'" 1 As permitted by section 1031, 1033, or 1039, the
remainder of the section 1250 recapture income is not recognized, but complex special rules are provided for allocation of
basis, determination of excess depreciation and determination
of holding period, with the evident objective of causing realization of the nonrecognized recapture income if and when the
1 41
acquired improvements are sold.
The "carry-over" basis provisions of sections 1031, 1033,
1039, and 1250 which are summarized above are intended to
result in deferral rather than permanent elimination of income
taxes on gains realized in section 1031, 1033, or 1039 transactions. However, section 1014 provides that upon an individual's death, his real estate (and almost all his other property)
acquires a new basis equal to its fair market value at the date
of death, or at the alternate federal estate tax valuation date
if elected. Thus, income taxes are permanently eliminated on
real estate appreciation which the individual has succeeded in
protecting from income taxes during his life, either by not
disposing of the real estate or by disposing of it only in trans1319

Id. § 1039 (applicable to dispositions after October 9, 1969).
§§ 1250(a), 1250(d) (4) (A), 1250(d) (4) (B), 1250(d) (4) (C),

140Id.
141

1250

(d) (8) (A), (B).
Id. §§ 1250 (d) (4) (D), 1250(d) (4) (E), 1250(d) (8) (C) to (F), 1250(e)
(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(d)

(1971).
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actions qualifying for nonrecognition of gain. In such a case,
the income tax benefits from the real estate in question consist not merely of current deductions from unrelated ordinary
income followed by favorable treatment of the gain on disposition, but rather of current deductions from unrelated ordinary income followed by no tax whatsoever on the gain on
disposition. With benefits as attractive as these, it is easy to
understand why real estate investments are considered among
the finest of "tax shelters."

II. TAX TREATMENT OF REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENTS

BY

PARTNERSHIPS

A. Introduction
A number of additional federal income tax advantages are
available when a partnership is formed by individual or corporate partners (or both) for the purpose of making investments
in open land for sale to developers or for the construction of
rent-producing buildings. For example, a partnership may allocate its losses, i.e., its excess of current deductions over current income, in such a way that the largest portions of such
losses may be deducted by those partners who are in the highest income tax brackets. Careful planning may enable a partner to deduct such losses in amounts larger even than the sum
of his contributions to the partnership plus his potential liability for the partnership's debts. A further advantage is that
a partner who is a dealer in real estate may obtain capital
gain treatment for his share of the partnership's income from
a sale or sales of real estate, if the partnership is not a dealer.
Still another advantage is that a "promoter" who receives a
profits interest in exchange for his services of organizing and
managing the partnership may treat his share of the profits
as capital gains to the extent that these profits are capital
gains to the partnership, even though compensation for services is normally treated as ordinary income. Finally, and of
great current importance, a limited partnership may be used
to obtain the legal and organizational benefits of a corporation
together with the tax benefits of a partnership. The following
discussion will consider each of these advantages in detail.
Allocation of Losses
The Code provides for a partnership not to be subject to
142
but rather for the partnership to compute its taxable
tax,
income or loss in the same manner as an individual (with
B.

142 CODE

§ 701.
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certain exceptions), 143 and for the partners then to report
separately their distributive shares of such income or loss
(including the particular items reflected therein, such as capital
gains and losses, "section 1231" gains and losses, charitable
contributions, etc.) .144 Subject to one exception explained below, the partners' distributive shares are determined by the
partnership agreement.'" This agreement may be either written or oral, and may be amended either in writing or orally
with respect to any taxable year, provided that the amendment
is adopted by the time (without extensions) for filing the
partnership's information return for the taxable year and is
either agreed to by all the partners or is adopted in such
other manner as may be provided by the partnership
1 46
agreement.
Suppose that individual A, in the 60 percent bracket, and
individual B, in the zero bracket, decide to form a partnership
to which each is to contribute $50,000, that the partnership is
to borrow $400,000 and invest $500,000 in the purchase of open
land and the construction of an apartment house thereon, and
that the partnership is expected to sustain substantial "losses"
in its early years (i.e., an excess, in each year, of interest,
taxes, depreciation, and other allowable deductions over gross
rental income). In accordance with the rules outlined above,
the A-B partnership agreement may provide for all of the partnership's losses to be allocated to A so that he may deduct
them all, even though only half the losses are attributable to
A's contribution and share of the borrowings. In effect, the
use of the partnership form enables B to transfer his net current deductions to A, thus doubling the deductions which A
could claim against his high-bracket income if he invested individually. If A and B understand that they are to be equal
partners in an economic sense, their partnership agreement
may reflect this by providing for profits to be allocated entirely to A until all losses are recovered, and then to be allocated equally between A and B. To the extent that the losses
are recovered through a capital gain from a sale of the partnership's property, A will enjoy a doubling not only of his
current deductions from year to year, but also of the amount
of his ordinary income which is converted into capital gain
on account of the project as a whole.
The Internal Revenue Service might advance at least two
143
144
45

Id. § 703.
Id. § 702.

Id. § 704(a).
146 Id. § 761(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(c) (1956).
1
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arguments for allocating all losses (and profits) of the A-B
partnership in equal amounts to A and B, but it appears that
careful planning by A and B would enable them to defeat
these arguments.
First, the Service might rely on Code section 704(b) (2),
which sets forth the one significant exception to the general
rule in section 704(a) that a partner's distributive share of the
partnership's taxable income or loss (including each item
reflected therein) is determined by the partnership agreement.
Section 704(b) (2) states that a provision in the partnership
agreement respecting a partner's distributive share of an "item
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit" is to be disregarded
if the "principal purpose" of such provision is "the avoidance
or evasion" of federal income tax.1 7 The problem, however,
is that section 704(b) (2) rather plainly applies not to a taxmotivated provision for allocating taxable income or loss generally (i.e., taxable income or loss as described in section
702 (a) (9)), but only to a tax-motivated provision for allocating
a particular item in a manner different from the allocation of
taxable income or loss generally. This is shown by the fact
that the section refers specifically to an "item" of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit (while the general rule in section 704(a) omits the word "item"), and also by the fact that
if the tax-motivated provision is disregarded, the consequence
is an allocation of the particular item in accordance with the
allocation of taxable income or loss generally. If the provision
in the agreement respecting the allocation of taxable income
or loss generally is itself disregarded as tax-motivated, the
statute makes no sense, because it provides no alternate to
such allocation. 48 Thus, assuming that the A-B partnership
147 CODE §§ 704(a), 704(b) read in full as follows:
(a)
EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.-

A partner's dis-

tributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall,
except as otherwise provided in this section, be determined by
the partnership agreement.
(b)
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE DETERMINED BY INCOME OR Loss
RATIO.-A partner's distributive share of any item of income,

gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall be determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable income or loss of
the partnership, as described in section 702(a) (9), for the taxable year, if (1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the
partner's distributive share of such item, or
(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement with respect to the partner's distributive share of such item is the avoidance or evasion of any
tax imposed by this subtitle.
148 There is some dicta in Smith v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1964), which may be read as implying that § 704(b) (2) can be applied
to a provision respecting taxable income or loss generally, but the later
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agreement clearly allocates the total loss for each year to A,
rather than just particular items reflected therein such as
depreciation or interest expense, the allocation should withstand an attack under section 704(b) (2).
A second argument which the Service might advance is
that although the allocation of losses in the A-B partnership.
agreement is determinative for tax purposes, the true nature
of this agreement is that any actual losses are to be borne
equally by A and B rather than all by A. Suppose, for example, that the partnership actually loses $125,000, and thus
at liquidation has $375,000 of assets and $400,000 of liabilities.
Can one really believe (the Service might ask) that B will
then receive back his full contribution of $50,000 (so that he
will sustain no loss), while A will contribute $75,000 so that
the indebtedness may be fully repaid (and so that A will bear
the full loss of $125,000)? The simple way for A and B to
defeat the Service's argument is to provide in the partnership
agreement for an express and unambiguous "yes" answer to
the foregoing question. The necessary provisions are that all
losses or profits allocated to a partner will be charged or
credited to his capital account, that all distributions to him
during the term of the partnership will be charged to his
capital account, and that, upon liquidation, he will be entitled
to distribution of any amount remaining in his capital account
or will be required to contribute the amount of any deficit in
his capital account. A need not oppose this approach, because
the large losses allocable to him in the partnership's early
years are very likely to be only paper losses deductible for
tax purposes rather than genuine declines in the partnership's
net worth. The value to A ,"f his current tax deductions for
these losses will probably exceed substantially the after-tax
cost of any actual loss of the partnership which he might
eventually have to bear, and the tax deductions are certain
and immediate while the actual loss is at most a future
contingency.

case of Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970),

while not ruling specifically on the issue, finds the better view to be that the section cannot
be so applied, and this conclusion is confirmed by both the legislative
history and the regulations interpreting the section. The House and
Senate Committee Reports both use the term "particular item," and the
Senate Report expressly excludes taxable income or loss generally from
the term "item" for purposes of § 704(b) (1), thus implying the same
exclusion for purposes of § 704(b) (2) since the term "item" appears in
the introductory language of § 704(b) for application in both §§ 704(b)
(1) and 704(b) (2). H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. A223 (1954);
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
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Two Recent Cases Regarding Allocations

Two recent Tax Court cases illustrate the difficulties faced
by the Service in the area of allocations of profits and losses
among partners. Although both cases were won by the Service, both appear to have been won on account of planning
errors which could have been avoided by the partners.
In Jean V. Kresser,14 1' the dominant partner of a loosely
managed, oral real estate partnership caused one year's taxable
income of the partnership to be allocated entirely to him so
that he could use it to absorb nearly expired net operating
loss carry-overs from earlier years. The court disregarded this
allocation and required the year's income to be allocated as in
prior years, partly on the ground that the change in allocation
constituted an amendment to the partnership agreement which
was neither approved by all the partners nor adopted in any
other manner provided by the partnership agreement (as required by Code section 761(c)), and partly on the ground that
the proposed change in allocation was unreal in view of the
dominant partner's apparent undertaking to restore to the other
partners their shares of the current year's income either from
future income of the partnership or from his own funds. It
seems probable that if the proper formalities for amending the
partnership agreement had been followed, and if the right of
the other partners to restoration had been expressly limited
to the allocation of future partnership profits (if any), the
change in allocation for the current year would have been
accepted under Code sections 704(a) and 761(c).
In Stanley C. Orrisch,1 5 (' an amendment to a partnership
agreement between four equal partners provided for all subsequent depreciation deductions on the partnership's two apartment houses to be allocated to two of the partners (they having large taxable income and the other two having no taxable
income), and for any gain from sale of the partnership property to be allocated to the first two partners to the extent of
such depreciation. This amendment was disregarded by the
court under section 704(b) (2), to a large extent on the ground
that there was no evidence of an agreement to decrease the
first two partners' distributions from the partnership (or increase their liability to the partnership in the case of a deficit
in their capital accounts) by the amount of any excess of the
subsequent depreciation deductions allocated to them over any
14!54T.C. 1621 (1970).

1511
55 T.C. 395 (1970).
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gain on sale. If the partners had expressly recorded such an
agreement, this ground for the court's decision would have
been removed, while if the new allocation had been of taxable
losses as a whole rather than just depreciation deductions,
there would probably have been no ground at all for applying
section 704(b) (2).
Amount of Deductions for Losses
A partner may deduct his share of his partnership's loss
a
given partnership taxable year only to the extent of his
for
adjusted basis in his partnership interest as of the end of such
year (with the nondeductible amount being deductible at the
end of any subsequent year to the extent of his adjusted basis
at that time)."' A partner's adjusted basis for his partnership
interest reflects not only the amount of his cash contributions
to the partnership (plus the adjusted basis of any property he
has contributed), but also his share of the partnership's indebtedness, and for this purpose such indebtedness is normally
allocated among the partners in the same proportions as losses
are allocated among them. ' 2'- Thus, in the A-B partnership
described above, the entire $400,000 of partnership indebtedness will be allocated to A, giving A an initial basis of $450,000
in his partnership interest (i.e., a $50,000 cash contribution plus
a $400,000 share of indebtedness), and enabling him to deduct
up to $450,000 of partnership losses (assuming no changes in
his adjusted basis other than decreases for the losses).
Suppose that partnership indebtedness is of the "nonrecourse" variety, i.e., indebtedness for which no partner has
any personal liability. For basis purposes, such indebtedness
is allocated in proporation to the partners' shares of profits,
rather than losses, ' --, which in the A-B partnership would presumably mean half to A and half to B (in view of the partners'
agreement to share profits equally after A has recovered his
losses). Thus A will have an adjusted basis of $250,000 in his
partnership interest (i.e., a $50,000 cash contribution plus a
$200,000 share of indebtedness), and will be able to deduct up
to $250,000 of partnership losses, even though the nonrecourse
character of the indebtedness effectively protects both A and B
from sustaining any losses in excess of their contributions
totaling $100,000.
Nonrecourse indebtedness is particularly important to a
D.

15 CODE § 704(d): Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d) (1956).
CODE §§ 722. 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
IZ,Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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limited partnership because of the special rule for allocating
such indebtedness among the partners for basis purposes. In
general, any indebtedness of a limited partnership for which
the general partners have personal liability is allocated entirely
to the general partners, presumably because the general partners will bear the full amount of any losses resulting from a
decline in the value of the partnership's assets below the
amount of such indebtedness.' 5 4 However, any nonrecourse
indebtedness of a limited partnership is allocated among all the
partners, limited as well as general, in the same proportions
as profits are allocated among them. 155 Thus the partnership's
use of nonrecourse indebtedness may enable the limited partners to increase the adjusted bases of their partnership interests substantially above their contributions (both made and
pledged). The effect is to permit the limited partners to deduct
shares of the partnership's losses substantially in excess of
their contributions (both made and pledged), although as
limited partners they can under no circumstances be required
be bear any losses in excess of such contributions.
E.

Capital Gains for Dealer-Partners
The partnership form may often be used by a dealer in
real estate to convert ordinary income from real estate sales
into capital gains.
Although partners must report separately their distributive shares of their partnership's taxable income or loss, the
tax character of each item reflected in such income or loss is
determined by its character to the partnership as though the
partnership were a separate entity. 15, For example, it has
been held that a partner must report as ordinary income his
share of the gains realized by his partnership from real estate
sales if the partnership as an entity is a dealer in real estate,
without regard to whether the partner is a dealer. 57 Similarly,
it has been held that a partner who is a dealer in real estate
should report as a "section 1231" loss his share of a loss sustained by his partnership from a sale of real estate constitut154

Id. The one exception in this regulation is that the limited partners may
share in the allocations of such indebtedness to the extent of any contributions which they have pledged to make but have not yet made to
the partnership. Presumably the indebtedness is allocated entirely to
the limited partners to the extent of such pledges, while the remainder
of the indebtedness is allocated entirely to the general partners.

155

Id.
§ 702(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (1962).
See, e.g.. Barham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Ga. 1967),
aff'd per curiar, 429 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970); Hyman Podell, 55 T.C. 429
(1970); Clyde W. Grove, 54 T.C. 799 (1970).

156 CODE
157
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ing section 1231 property to the partnership.15 Thus, if a dealer
becomes a partner in a partnership which conducts its affairs
so as to avoid dealer status (e.g., by investing in only one
parcel of real estate and later selling that parcel to one buyer
in one transaction), the dealer's share of the partnership's
sales gain will be treated as capital gain, although such gain
if realized directly by the dealer would be treated as ordinary
income.
There seems no reason why a dealer may not participate
in two or more partnerships so as to obtain capital gain treatment for the gains from two or more real estate sales. Perhaps
if the multiple partnerships have substantially the same partners and partnership interests, the Service could treat them
as a single partnership which is a dealer because of its multiple sales. Perhaps if any one partnership has only partners
who are dealers, or has one or more dealer-partners who participate actively in management of the partnership, the Service
could treat the partnership as itself a dealer, or could ignore
the partnership entity. However, even in these most favorable
situations for Service attack, careful attention to the formalities
of separate partnership entities may defeat the attack, as is
shown by the taxpayer victory in a recent case involving
multiple trusts having a dealer in real estate as a primary
beneficiary. 5 9
F.

Capital Gains for Promoter-Partners
1. In General

The partnership form may also be used by the "promoter"
of a real estate investment venture in order to convert ordinary
income into capital gain. The term- "promoter" refers to the
individual or corporate organizer who conceives the plan for
the venture, seeks out investment real estate and arranges
158 Rev. Rul. 67-188, 1967-1 Cum.

BULL. 216.
159 Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. 20 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 1361
(9th Cir. 1970). A grantor established 20 nearly identical trusts for his
son and daughter-in-law and their issue, the son being a dealer in real
estate, and the trusts being used principally to purchase and sell real
estate, often from or to enterprises in which the son was interested.
Because each trust was formally maintained as a separate entity, both
the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
trusts as separate entities for tax purposes, despite the Tax Court's
express finding that the primary purpose for creation of the trusts was
tax avoidance through the splitting of income and the conversion of
ordinary income into capital gains. In addition to offering significant
benefits to real estate dealers through the use of multiple trusts, the
Estelle Morris Trusts case supports (by analogy) dealer use of nondealer partnerships even in situations high in tax motivation (since the
applicable CODE sections suggest no more ground for ignoring tax-motivated partnerships than for ignoring tax-motivated trusts).
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for its purchase, solicits the various investors and negotiates
their entry into the partnership, supervises any construcd'ion
of improvements on the real estate, and generally manages the
partnership after it has been formed. Quite commonly the
promoter will himself become a partner (in the case of a
limited partnership he will often be a general partner), and
will receive a profits interest, e.g., 15 percent or 20 percent of
the partnership's profits, as compensation for the services
which he has rendered and will render to the partnership.
If the partnership realizes a capital gain from an eventual sale
of its property or from any other source, the promoter's share
of such profit will be taxed to him as a capital gain in accordance with the general rule (discussed above) that the character of each partner's share of the partnership's income is
determined at the partnership level as though the partnership
were a separate entity. Thus, the promoter will succeed in
obtaining capital gain treatment for income which is given
to him as compensation for his services, even though the payment to him of such compensation in almost any other form
would be treated as ordinary income to him. 160
The other partners are unlikely to object from a tax viewpoint to the compensation of the promoter by means of a
profits interest. Although the partnership (and hence all the
partners) might be able to deduct compensation paid to the
promoter in a form constituting ordinary income to him,16 ' it
is likely that such compensation would have to be capitalized
to the extent (probably substantial) that the promoter's services were for the organization of the partnership or the purchase of its property. 16 2 Under the profits interest approach,
any share of the partnership's capital gains or ordinary income
which is taxed to the promoter will reduce the shares taxable
1 3
to the other partners. 6
2.

Problem of Immediate Income

One problem for the promoter is that the value of his
160Although CODE § 707(c) provides that a partner realizes ordinary income if he receives payments which are for services and are "determined without regard to the income of the partnership," this section can
be avoided by providing precisely in the partnership agreement that
the promoter-partner's interest is a right to share in "income" (presumably meaning net or taxable income) rather than in "gross proceeds,"
"cash flow," or other amounts. A further precaution might be to provide
that no distributions (e.g., from "cash flow") will be made to the promoter-partner in excess of his share of income actually received and
reported by the partnership.
161 CODE §§ 707(c), 162(a).
162Id. § 263; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-1 (1969), 1.263(a)-2 (1958).
163 CODE § 702 (a).
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profits interest (as distinguished from his share of the partnership's actual profits when realized) may be taxed to him as
ordinary income at the time he receives it. One common approach to this problem is to provide clearly in the partnership
agreement that the promoter's interest is solely in profits and
not at all in capital, so that reliance may be placed on regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1), which appears to provide that the transfer of
a profits interest (as distinguished from a capital interest) to
a partner as compensation for his services does not constitute
income to such partner.34 A second frequently used approach
is for the promoter to form the partnership with one investor
and to receive his profits interest at that time, before any
other persons have agreed to enter and invest in the partnership. Then even if the promoter is deemed to realize income
when he receives his partnership interest, he can claim that the
value of this interest (and hence the amount of his income) is
quite small, because the only partnership assets capable of
producing profits are the investment made by the one investor.
This approach is similar to that used successfully in Bruce
Berckmans'6 5 by the promoter of a new corporation who
acquired initially issued stock for a low price (equal to the
stock's then fair market value) at a time when a sale of additional stock to the public at a much higher price was still
contingent, and whose stock then increased sharply in value
(without the realization of income by him) when the sale to
the public was actually made 7 weeks later.
The first of the two approaches outlined above (i.e., reliance on regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) appears to have been weakened
by new Code section 83 (introduced by the Tax Reform Act
1 66
Section 83
of 1969), and by the recent case of Sol Diamond.
provides various rules under which a person realizes income
if he performs services and (in connection therewith) receives
''property," a term which may include a partnership profits
interest (although the committee reports accompanying section
104 This regulation is under CODE § 721, which provides for nonrecognition
of gain or loss upon the contribution of property to a partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest. The key sentences of the regulation
are as follows:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his
right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a
share in partnership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensation for
services constitutes income to the partner under section 61.
165 20 T.C.M. 458 (1961).
166 56 T.C. 530 (1971).
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83 do not state an intention to overrule the implication of
regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) that receipt of such an interest as compensation for services does not constitute the receipt of in6
come'1
). The Sol Diamond case holds that even before section
83, regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) did not prevent an individual from
realizing income under section 61(a) (1) and, regulation 1.61-2
(d) (1) when he received a partnership profits interest as compensation for services (although this seemingly strained interpretation of regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) may have resulted from
the court's desire to find some way to impose ordinary income
treatment on the individual because he sold his interest for
cash less than 3 weeks after he received the interest).
The second approach outlined above (i.e., valuation of the
profits interest upon formation of the partnership between the
promoter and one investor) may remain stronger than the
first, provided the two-member partnership is formed as a
bona fide, functioning entity before the promoter performs
the services which cause the other investors to commit and the
promoter's interest to rise in value (e.g., the services of seeking
and acquiring investment real estate for the partnership, and
of seeking and negotiating with the prospective investors). 1 68
In any event, even if both approaches fail, the amount of the
promoter's compensation income will almost certainly be equal
to the value of his profits interest at or before the time all
the investors have made their contributions, rather than at a
later time when appreciation in the partnership's property
and/or the realization of partnership profits may have caused
the value of the profits interest to have increased very substantially. 119 Presumably any compensation income realized by
H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-89 (Part I), 61-64 (Part II)
(1969); S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119-24 (1969); H.R. Rep.
No. 782 (Conference Comm. Rep.), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303-04. Section
83 applies to transfers of property after June 30, 1969, subject to various
transitional rules.
168 See William H. Husted, 47 T.C. 664 (1967) acquiesced in, 1968-1 Cum.
BULL. 2, appeal dismissed, (2d Cir., April 7, 1969). Stock purchased by
a corporate promoter for a low price in advance of a public offering
was valued by the court in part by reference to the much higher public
offering price, so as to cause the promoter to realize "bargain purchase"
compensation income. In justifying its approach (which differs markedly from that used in Bruce Berckmans, 20 T.C.M. 458 (1961)) the
court stressed that the promoter had already performed substantial
services and created a valuable plan which was reflected in the value
of his stock when he purchased it, and that in view of various circumstances his purchase was not really completed until the settlement date
on which all the transactions (including the public offering) were
completed.
169 If the partnership agreement (or applicable partnership law) restricts
transfer of the profits interest and creates a substantial risk of forfeiture
thereof (e.g., for nonperfcrmance of future services by the promoter),
§ 83(a) may cause the profits interest to be valued and taxed (if at all)
'6
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the promoter on account of his profits interest will be matched
by a corresponding deduction to the partnership (subject to
any required capitalization) and by a corresponding basis to
the promoter for his interest, with the promoter then reporting
his share of partnership income as and when realized by the
partnership, and with partnership capital gains retaining that
character to the promoter even though the only consideration
furnished by him is services.
G.

Limited Partnerships
1. In General

The limited partnership form provides nearly all the significant legal and organizational advantages of a corporation
plus all the tax advantages of a partnership, and therefore has
become a popular vehicle for investments in open land either
for sale to developers or for the construction of buildings for
rental, particularly where large numbers of high-bracket investors and large sums of money are involved.
The key corporate characteristic of centralized management,
so important to a larger venture, is achieved by designating the
intended managers as general partners and the other participants (usually a considerable majority) as limited partners,
since the general partners will have virtually exclusive power
to manage the partnership 170 (and thus will actually be much
more independent of the limited partners than corporate directors are of corporate shareholders). Limited liability is the general rule for limited partners just as for corporate shareholders, 171 while a considerable degree of de facto limited liability can be achieved for the general partners by causing them
to be corporations (so that only the corporation's assets and not
the shareholders' assets are exposed to the partnership's liabilities), by nonrecourse borrowing by the partnership, and/or
by various forms of liability and casualty loss insurance. Continuity of life may be achieved by establishing several general
partners and providing that upon the retirement, death or insanity of any one, the remaining ones may continue the partnership, 172 or (still more effectively) by establishing a corpoupon the lapse or removal of either the transfer restrictions or the forfeiture provisions. However, in this situation the promoter can cause
the interest to be valued and taxed (if at all) upon his receipt of the
interest, by filing a protective election under § 83(b) within 30 days
after such receipt.
170 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9, 10.
171

Id. § 7.

172 Id. § 20.
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rate general partner with full authority to continue the partnership for as long as such partner continues in existence. Free
transferability of interests may be given to the limited partners
(who are normally the ones primarily interested in this corporate characteristic) by permitting their assignees to become
substituted limited partners, 173 although for tax reasons (as
explained below) the formality of approval by the general
partners is often made a requirement for such substitution.
2.

Tax Treatment of Limited Partnerships

In view of the obvious resemblance of a limited partnership to a corporation, one might suppose that a limited partnership would be treated as a corporation for tax purposes, so that,
for example, losses sustained in the early years could not be
deducted by the partners but could only be carried forward
for deduction from future profits of the enterprise in accordance with the loss carryover rules of Code section 172.174 The
Code section defining a "corporation" indicates that the term
includes "associations,"' 17" and the Code sections defining a
"partnership" indicates that such term does not include any
entity falling within the "corporation" definition, 1'7 6 thus suggesting that a limited partnership could be treated as an "association" (and hence taxed as a corporation) because it more
nearly resembles a corporation than it does an ordinary partnership. Such an approach finds support in the Supreme Court
case of T. A. Morrissey,'7 7 which holds that an "association" is
an organization not necessarily identical to an ordinary corporation, but only resembling an ordinary corporation more
nearly than it resembles some other type of entity. At least,
one might expect that a limited partnership would be treated
as an association (and hence as a corporation) if the limited
partners owned a high proportion of the partnership interests,
since it is the relationship between the limited partnership
173 Id. § 19.
174 Another major consequence of corporate status might be taxation of

later years' profits first to the enterprise and then again to the individuals upon distribution of such profits or upon sale of the enterprise.
CODE §§ 11, 61, 301, 331, 1001. Another consequence would be possible
exposure to the accumulated earnings or personal holding company
penalty tax. Id. §§ 531-37, 541-47. A "subchapter S" election enables
a corportion to be treated substantially like a partnership, but there are
obstacles to the effectiveness of such an election, notably the general
rule that not more than 20% of a subchapter S corporation's gross receipts may consist of rents or other "passive investment income." Id. §§
1371-79.
175 Id.§ 7701 (a) (3).
6
17 Id. § § 761(a), 7701 (a) (2).
177 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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and the limited partners which so plainly resembles that between a corporation and its shareholders.
The suggested approach is logical and reasonable, but a
virtually impregnable obstacle to it is presented by the applicable regulations, which are drafted in such a way that an
ordinary limited partnership can almost never be classified
as an association and hence as a corporation for tax purposes. 178
The regulations were adopted in 1960 (and amended in 1965)
with the aim of preventing various organizations from qualifying as corporations so as to be entitled to adopt pension, profitsharing, and other employee benefit programs available to
corporate employees but not to partners (an aim which has
been thwarted to a considerable degree through successful
use of the "professional corporation" device by lawyers, doctors,
and other professionals 179 ). The Service can now scarcely prevent use of the regulations as a splendid shield behind which
large, corporate-like limited partnerships conduct real estate
ventures with all the tax advantages of ordinary partnerships.
The regulations indicate that in choosing between association (and hence corporation) status or partnership status for
an organization, association status will generally be chosen only
if the organization has at least three of the following four
characteristics which normally distinguish a corporation from
a partnership: continuity of life, limited liability, free transferability of interests, and centralization of management.') The
regulations then proceed to define each of these characteristics
so restrictively that an ordinary limited partnership will almost
always be considered to have either none or, at most, one of
them, even though as a practical matter (as explained above)
a limited partnership can attain all of these characteristics to
the same or nearly the same degree as an ordinary corporation.
For example, the regulations provide that "a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act [lacks] continuity of life" because of
the provisions of such Act respecting dissolution of the partnership upon the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner,1 8 even though de facto continuity of life can be achieved
178 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1965), 301.7701-3 (1960).
179 See, e.g., United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967), acquiesced in, REV. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 278. The regulations
are sometimes known as the "Kintner" regulations because they
were drafted in response to United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th
Cir. 1954), in which a medical group succeeded in being held an
"association."
180 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (1965).
1s Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).

1972

FEDERAL INCOME TAXES AND URBAN SPRAWL

377

by permitting the remaining general partners to continue the
partnership, or by using a corporate general partner. Similarly,
the regulations indicate that a limited partnership subject to
the Act lacks limited liability because the general pdrtners have
personal liability for the obligations of the limited partnership,'8 2 even though the limited partners (who may own substantially all the interests in the limited partnership) have no
personal liability and even though the general partners may
be corporations and/or may be completely or almost completely
protected by insurance plus nonrecourse financing. 8 3 Again
according to the regulations, a limited partnership lacks free
transferability of interests if the limited partners cannot substitute others for themselves as limited partners unless they
obtain the consent of the general partners,'14 a formality which
can rarely be expected to impede transfers since the general
partners will rarely have any reason to withhold their consent. 8 5 Centralization of management is the only one of the
four characteristics which is likely in some instances to be
attributed to a limited partnership by the regulations, since
this characteristic is treated as "ordinarily" present "if substantially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the
limited partners."'"" Of course, the attribution of this one characteristic to a limited partnership is nearly always academic,
since the lack of the other three characteristics effectively bars
corporate classification.
3.

Ruling Tests for Limited Partnerships

Stymied by its own regulations, the Service has developed
various special tests which a limited partnership must satisfy
if it has a corporation as its sole general partner, and wishes
the Service to consider its request for an advance ruling holdId. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
In an apparently meaningless paragraph, the regulations indicate that a
general partner does not have personal liability "when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership) which could
be reached by a creditor of the organization and when he is merely a
'dummy' acting as the agent of the limited partners," although in that
situation the limited partners are considered to have personal liability
so that the limited partnership still lacks limited liability. Id. § 301.77012(d)(2) (1960).
184 Id. §§ 301.7701-2(e) (1), 301.7701-3(b) (2)ex.(1) (1960).
185 Under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1) (1960), even if the limited partners can substitute others for themselves without the consent of any
other partners, the inability of the general partners to substitute others
for themselves without the consent of all the limited partners (UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (1) (e))
will prevent the limited partnership from being considered to have free transferability of interests if
the limited partners own less than substantially all the partnership
interests.
S';
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960).
182
183
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ing that it (the limited partnership) will be taxed as a partnership rather than as a corporation. B7 One of these tests is that
the net worth of the corporate general partner (taking account
of the current fair market value of its assets, but disregarding
its limited partnership interest and any accounts or notes receivable from or payable to the partnership) must at all times at
least equal the lower of $250,000 or 15 percent of the total contributions to the limited partnership (if such contributions are
less than $2,500,000), or 10 percent of such contributions (if
such contributions are $2,500,000 or more).188 If the corporate
general partner has "interests in more than one limited partnership" (apparently meaning interests as either a general or
limited partner), the foregoing net worth test must be met for
each such limited partnership (apparently in order for any such
limited partnership to have its ruling request considered, if it
has the corporation as its sole general partner).189 In addition,
the net worth of the corporate general partner (taking account
of the current fair market value of its assets, but disregarding
any interest in any limited partnership and notes or accounts
receivable from or payable to any limited partnership in which
the corporate general partner has any interest) must at all
times at least equal the sum of the amounts of net worth
required wtih respect to each separate limited partnership. .)(
Another test is that the limited partners in total must not own
more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate general
partner or of any member of an affiliated group of corporations
(as defined in Code section 1504(a)) to which the corporate
general partner belongs, with the attribution of ownership rules
of Code section 318 applying for purposes of determining the
stock owned by the limited partners."" The remaining tests
are that the purchase of a limited partnership interest by a
limited partner must not entail "either a mandatory or discretionary purchase or option to purchase any type of security
of the corporate general partner or its affiliates, "192 and that
187
188

Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1971-2
Id. §§ 2.02, 2.04.

INT. REV. BULL.

26.

189 Id. § 2.03.

190 Id. §§ 2.03, 2.04. The aggregate test is stricter than if the various limited
partnerships were treated as one. For example, if there are three limited
partnerships involved, each of which has total contributions of $1,000,000,
the required net worth under the aggregate test is three times 15%
of $1,000,000, or $450,000, and not 10% of $3,000,000, or $300,000. In applying either the separate or the aggregate test, any interest of the corporation as a limited partner (as well as any interest of the corporation as
a general partner) in the limited partnership or partnerships involved
must apparently be disregarded in determining net worth.
191 Id. § 2.01.
192

Id. § 2.05.
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the limited partnership must be organized and operated in
accordance with the applicable state statute relating to limited
193
partnerships.
There is no basis in the regulations for the special tests
described above, and the Service has neither proposed any
changes in the regulations to reflect the tests nor begun a
campaign of audit challenges to limited partnerships which fail
to satisfy the tests. These factors indicate strongly that at least
for the present the tests are being applied only for advance
ruling purposes, and not as rules of substantive law. In any
event, many limited partnerships having corporations as their
sole general partners will be able to satisfy the tests, while
other limited partnerships will be able to avoid the tests altogether by having at least one noncorporate general partner.
The tests thus represent only a small cloud on the horizon to
real estate limited partnerships, many of which yield more
valuable tax benefits from their partnership status than nontax returns from their investments.
III. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES

A.

Introduction
The foregoing discussion has depicted the undue bias of
existing federal income tax law in favor of investments in open
land, either for sale to developers or for the construction of
rent-producing buildings. The tax inducements to such investments include large current deductions from ordinary income
unrelated to the investment, capital gain, or nonrecognition
treatment for all or a substantial portion of the gain realized
upon disposition, and the extension and enlargement of the
various benefits through use of the partnership (and particularly the limited partnership) form. The following paragraphs
will set forth recommended changes in the law which are
designed to eliminate the special tax advantages of open land
investments, so as to create tax neutrality in this area.
B.

Current Deductions

1. In General
In the case of "unproductive" land held for investment,
i.e., land (whether open or developed) which neither yields nor
is reasonably expected to yield any current gross income but
which is held for gain on an ultimate sale, the interest, real
estate taxes, and other expenses of acquiring and retaining the
land should be capitalized as part of the investor's basis. These
193

Id. § 2.06.
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expenses (together with the remainder of the investor's basis)
would then be subtracted from the ultimate sales proceeds in
computing the investor's taxable gain or loss from the sale.
Since these expenses are incurred for the sole purpose of earning a profit from the sale, it is appropriate to offset these
expenses against such profit rather than against other income
which is totally unrelated to the investment. This approach is
already mandatory for certain of these expenses (e.g., attorney's and broker's fees for acquiring the land and attorney's
fees for defending title to it), and is already optional under
Code section 266 for most of the other expenses in the case of
open land and for certain of the other expenses in the case of
land in the process of development. The approach should be
made mandatory for all of these expenses so as to produce a
realistic measuring of the overall gain or loss from the investment as a whole, as opposed to an artificial mismatching of
certain costs of the investment with income from other sources.
In the case of open land which does yield or is reasonably
expected to yield current gross income, any current expenses
of earning or attempting to earn such income should be deductible even if they exceed the amount of such income, since
presumably such expenses produce no benefit lasting beyond
the taxable year. Real estate taxes should probably be included
in these expenses, but only to the extent that such taxes bear
a reasonable relation to the amount of current income and
hence can fairly be treated as incurred in order to earn such
income rather than to retain the land so as to earn a profit
from its future sale. Thus an appropriate rule might be for
each year's taxes to be deductible to the extent they do not
produce a loss in excess of 20 percent of the year's gross
income from the land, and for the remainder of such taxes to
be added to the land's basis. However, even though the land
is yielding or is reasonably expected to yield some current
gross income, interest on funds borrowed for the purpose of
purchasing (or retaining) the land still represents part of the
cost of such purchase (or retention) and should be added to
the land's basis rather than allowed to be deducted currently.
There is no more reason to allow such interest to be deducted
when paid, or when accrued over the period of the borrowing,
than there is to allow attorney's or broker's fees for the land's
acquisition (or attorney's fees for a subsequent title defense)
to be deducted when paid, or when accrued over the period that
the attorney or broker renders his services.
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In the case of developed land which is yielding or is reasonably expected to yield current gross income, each year's
current expenses of earning or attempting to earn such income
(including that portion of each jear's real estate taxes which
bears a reasonable relation 'i the amount of such income)
should be allowed as curre, . deductions. The remaining portion of the taxes, plus the total interest expense incurred on
borrowings used to purchase (or retain) the land or to construct (or retain) the developments, constitute, in a real economic sense, part of the cost incurred for the purpose of earning income from the land and developments over the period
they are held. Accordingly, these amounts should be allocated in a reasonable manner between the land and the
developments, and added to the basis of each. The amounts
added to the basis of the developments should then be allowed
to offset income in the same manner as the remaining cost
(or other basis) of the developments.
The question of how and when to allow such offset for the
total cost of the developments is fundamental to determining
the proper federal income tax treatment of real estate investments. Since the developments (unlike the land) have a limited
useful life, an offset of portions of such cost over such useful
life is appropriate. However, the present system, which allows
deductions for the interest and tax elements in such cost as
and when the interest and taxes are paid or accrued, plus
accelerated depreciation in many or most instances for the other
elements in such cost, is plainly inappropriate because it allows
an excessive concentration of the deductions for such cost in
the early years of the useful life. The results are the bloated
and artificial "tax losses" which are so fondly emphasized by
promoters, but which almost never correspond in a reasonable
way either to the times that gross income is earned from the
developments, or to any decline in the real economic value
of the developments.
Two alternatives suggest themselves, either of which would
be more rational in theory and more equitable in practice
than the present system. The first alternative is for the total
cost of the developments (less anticipated salvage value) to be
deductible from the net income produced by the developments
(computed before the deductions for cost) dollar for dollar as
such net income is earned. Since the cost of the developments
is incurred solely for the purpose of earning net income from
them, it is eminently reasonable and fair for such cost to be
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offset against such net income rather than against income from
other sources, at least until it is clear that the developments
will yield no further net income. The investor can hardly complain that his deductions for cost would not be rapid enough
under this alternative, for if his net income from the developments exceeded his cost, he could deduct his cost (less anticipated salvage value) against the earliest such income to be
earned.
The second alternative is for the total cost of the developments (less anticipated salvage value) to be depreciable by the
straight line method over the useful life of the developments,
on the ground that income is likely to be earned evenly over
such useful life, and that the removal of anticipated salvage
value from the depreciable amount represents an adequate
matching of part of the cost with ultimate sales proceeds. The
first alternative is preferable because it produces a more precise offset of cost against related income, but either alternative
is clearly preferable to the present system. As the ultimate in
fairness to the investor, he might be permitted to choose between the two alternatives by means of an irrevocable election
made on his return for tha taxable year in which the develop.nents are placed in service.
2.

Cost Attributable to "Nonrecourse" Indebtedness

A remaining question is whether deductions should ever be
allowed for that portion of the cost of real estate developments
which does not exceed the amount of "nonrecourse" indebtedness secured by the developments (i.e., indebtedness which can
be collected only through foreclosure of such security interest,
without personal liability to the investor). Such deductions
should be barred under the traditional concept of salvage value,
since the developments will always have a salvage value to the
investor at least equal to this portion of their cost. For example, if an investor furnishes $100,000 and incurs $400,000 of
nonrecourse indebtedness in order to construct an apartment
house for $500,000, and the apartment house secures the indebtedness, the apartment house has an automatic salvage
value of $400,000, in that the invester can always realize that
amount simply by ceasing payments of principal and allowing
the creditor to foreclose. In this example, the investor's deductions with respect to his cost should be limited to $100,000, this
being the only portion of his cost which he can possibly lose.
As the investor makes payments of principal on the nonrecourse
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indebtedness, such payments should increase the portion of his
cost for which deductions are allowed.
As a corollary to the recommendation in the preceding
paragraph, nonrecourse indebtedness of a partnership should
not be treated as an increase in the bases of the partners in
their partnership interests (and hence as an increase in the
amounts of the partnership's losses which the partners may
deduct), since such indebtedness in no sense represents either
an investment made or a risk of loss assumed by any partner.
This new rule would go far towards eliminating large, artificial
"loss" deductions by limited partners of highly "leveraged"
limited partnerships in which the investments and risks of the
limited partners are relatively small.
3.

Demolitions

If real estate developments are demolished for the purpose
of constructing new developments, the adjusted basis of the
old developments (determined without regard to the intent to
demolish) plus the costs of demolition should be allowed as
additions to the basis of the new developments (so as to be
subject to depreciation deductions if the other requirements
for such deductions are satisfied), rather than (as under the
present general rule) allowed only as additions to the basis of
the land (so as never to be depreciable). This would remove
an existing incentive to develop open land instead of redeveloping already developed land, an incentive which tends to encourge the spread rather than the improvement of urban areas.
C.

Gain on Disposition
1.

In General

Earlier portions of this article set forth various rules which
provide for highly favorable tax treatment of gains realized by
individuals, corporations, and partnerships from dispositions of
real estate held for investment. A number of these rules are
inconsistent with the tax treatment of other types of gains,
and should be eliminated.
2.

Depreciation Recapture

One such rule is that a gain from the sale of most types
of depreciable real property held for more than one year is
taxed as ordinary income under the "depreciation recapture"
provisions only to the extent (at most) that the depreciation
allowed with respect to the property exceeds the depreciation
allowable under the straight line method. This rule contrasts
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with the rule applicable to depreciable personal property, under
which the gain is generally taxed as ordinary income to the
extent of all depreciation which has been allowed with respect
to the property. The personal property rule should be applied
as well to real property, since the reason for this rule is the
same for both types of property, namely, that all depreciation
allowed with respect to the property has been deductible from
ordinary income, and hence should generally be taxed as ordinary income when recovered upon a sale. The Senate committee report accompanying the real property recapture section
justifies the different rule for real property by saying that the
amount of gain which corresponds to allowable straight line
depreciation is likely to reflect a general rise in prices rather
than a lack of decline in the property's value.'14 The fallacy
in this is that the equivalent gains from sales of personal
property, and indeed most other kinds of gains or income, either
reflect or are reduced in value to a certain extent by inflation.
There is no general rule (nor would there be any precise way
to apply a general rule) that to this extent gains or income are
not to be taxed or are to be taxed on a favorable basis, and
there should be no special rule to this effect for gains on the
sale of depreciable real estate.
3. Exchanges and Involuntary Conversions
Another rule inconsistent with general tax principles is
that business or investment real estate may ordinarily be exchanged for other business or investment property of "like
kind" (i.e., any other business or investment real estate) without the recognition of gain. In most circumstances, a gain
realized from a voluntary exchange of property for other property of like kind (e.g., an exchange of stocks or bonds of one
corporation for stocks or bonds of another corporation) is fully
recognized for tax purposes, and there seems no reason for
applying a more favorable rule for like kind exchanges of
business or investment real estate.
Another special rule is that no gain is recognized upon an
involuntary conversion of business or investment real estate
as a result of an actual or threatened condemnation, if the conversion is into other business or investment property (or into
proceeds used to purchase other such property) which is of
"like kind" with the converted property (i.e., any other business or investment real estate). The general rule is that no
gain is recognized upon an involuntary conversion only if the
194 S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 et seq. (1964).
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new property is "similar or related in service or use" to the
converted property, an obviously stricter requirement than the
"like kind" requirement. As no adequate justification appears
for the special rule for real estate condemnations, this rule
should be eliminated and all involuntary conversions of real
estate should be subject to the same "similar or related in service or use" requirement which applies to involuntary conVersions of all other types of property.
4.

Dealer-Partners and Promoter-Partners

As indicated earlier, a dealer in real estate may achieve
capital gain treatment for his share of the gain from a real
estate sale made by a partnership in which he is a partner but
which is not a dealer in real estate. The law should be changed
so as to require a partner to report as ordinary income his
share of any gain from a sale or exchange of partnership property with respect to which either the partnership or the partner is a dealer. This would be consistent with the existing rule
that an amount realized by a partner from a sale or exchange
of his partnership interest is considered realized from the sale
or exchange of property other than a capital asset, to the extent
such amount is attributable to substantially appreciated partnership property with respect to which either the partnership
or the partner is a dealer. 9 5
As also indicated, the promoter of a partnership who receives a profits interest in exchange for his services to the partnership may realize capital gains rather than ordinary income
for such services to the extent that the partnership's income
constitutes capital gains at the partnership level. The law
should be changed to provide that if a partner receives a profits
interest in exchange for his services, any partnership profits
allocable to him on account of such interest will be taxable
to him as ordinary income. This approach is consistent with
the usual rule that income derived from the rendering of services is taxable as ordinary income, not as capital gains. The
suggested approach is preferable to taxing the promoter on the
value of his partnership interest when received, since it avoids
the problem of valuing the profits interest before profits are
realized, and causes all the promoter's profits to be taxed to
him as ordinary income in accordance with the economic fact
that all such profits are given to him as compensation.

195 CODE

§§ 751 (a) (2), 751 (d) (1), 751 (d) (2) (A), 751 (d) (2) (D).
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Capital Gains for Any Sales

There remains the question of whether capital gain treatment should be allowed at all for any portion of the gains
realized from sales of real estate held for investment. Here it
cannot be said that present law treats real estate more favorably than other property, since nearly all types of property
may qualify for capital asset and hence capital gain treatment,
and if anything the cases establish that a taxpayer becomes a
dealer (and hence loses his right to capital gain treatment) with
respect to real estate more readily than with respect to other
types of property, notably corporate stocks. However, the
magnitude of the tax benefits resulting from capital gain treatment for real estate gains, as illustrated by the examples set
forth in this article, should focus attention on the general question of whether such treatment should be available for any
type of income or gain. No really satisfactory answer has ever
been given to the question of why a dollar of income earned
from investments in real estate or other property should be
taxed more favorably than a dollar of income earned from
work. When one considers that this distinction not only discriminates against working as opposed to investing, but also
provides strong incentives to rapid and widespread real estate
development which may be harmful to the environment, the
case for an urgent reconsideration of the whole capital gains
question becomes compelling.
6.

"Stepped-up" Basis

A final point is that neither real estate nor any other property held by an individual should receive a "step-up" in basis
to the property's fair market value at the death of the individual (or at the alternate federal estate tax valuation date, if
elected). This "step-up" rule arbitrarily exempts large amounts
of appreciation in the value of property from ever being subject
to income taxation, and arbitrarily encourages individuals to
invest in real estate and other property which is expected to
appreciate rather than to yield a current return.
D.

Partnerships
Most of the special problems in the area of real estate
investments by partnerships would be eliminated by adoption
of the reforms proposed above. Thus, for example, the allocation of the partnership's "tax losses" to high-bracket partners
would be sharply curtailed by the reforms aimed at curtailing
the current deductions which create these "losses," and the
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special capital gain advantages to the partnership form would
be eliminated by the reforms respecting the treatment of dealer
and promoter partners.
One remaining question is whether a limited partnership
should continue to enjoy the various tax benefits of a partnership despite its obvious resemblance to a corporation. It is submitted that in view of the many significant ways in which a
typical limited partnership constitutes a separate entity to at
least the same extent as a corporation, a limited partnership
should be taxed in the same manner as a corporation. At most,
the items of gain or loss allocable to the general partners might
be reportable directly by them rather than by the limited
partnership, to reflect the lesser degree of separation which
may exist between the general partners and the limited partnership than between the limited partners and the limited partnership. The taxation of limited partnerships as corporations
would eliminate the present special incentives for the use of
such partnerships as real estate investment vehicles, particularly for high-bracket individuals.
CONCLUSION

This article has discussed in detail the federal income tax
incentives for real estate investments, especially the purchase
by investors of open land for future sale to developers or for

the construction of rent-producing buildings. These incentives
are, however, only one illustration of the wide variety of incentives whereby current federal income tax laws encourage

the development of open land.
Another important illustration is the rule that the owner
of a home may deduct his interest expenses and real estate

taxes with respect to his home, even though he uses the home
exclusively for personal and not for business purposes. This
rule helps to finance the extensive subdividing of open land
near cities and the construction of single-family homes on this
land. The construction of single-family homes rather than

apartment houses (which normally use far less land per resident than single-family homes) is encouraged by the contrasting rule which denies deductions to apartment dwellers for any

portion of their rent. An individual may deduct interest and
taxes not only with respect to the home which is his primary
residence, but also with respect to one or more weekend or
vacation homes which he may own. This rule offers strong encouragement to the residential development of scenic rural
areas which might otherwise be preserved in their natural state
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for use by the general public. Whatever justification there may
be for tax incentives to home ownership, there surely is no
justification for tax incentives to the ownership of more than
one home per family.
Another illustration is the rule that long-term capital gain
treatment applies to any net gain (i.e., an excess of gains over
losses) realized and recognized during the taxable year from
certain transactions including the sale or exchange of real property used in the trade or business and held for more than 6
months, while ordinary loss treatment applies to any net loss
sustained and recognized during the taxable year from such
transactions. 116 It is difficult to conceive of the rationale for
allowing this "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" approach by owners
of business real estate, with the consequent encouragement of
the development of open land for business purposes. Other illustions include the accelerated depreciation allowed with respect
to new business real estate, ' the current deductions allowed
for interest on funds borrowed to acquire or retain new or used
business real estate, 98 the capital gain treatment allowed to
99
and
subdividers of real estate under certain circumstances,
"real
on
tax
income
corporate
all
nearly
the elimination of
estate investments trusts" although such trusts are substantially identical to corporations in legal and organizational
2 00
characteristics.
At a time when the spread of our cities and the disappearance of our countryside is a recognized national problem, there
can be no excuse for federal income tax laws which create a
series of special incentives for the development of open land.
The appropriate changes should be made which will place
these laws in a posture of neutrality with respect to the basic
policy question of whether the rapid urbanization of the nation
should or should not continue.
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INTRODUCTION

H

IGH speed police pursuit of motorists attempting to evade
apprehension is a highly controversial topic bound up
in the broader issue of what constitutes effective law enforcement. From a sizable and influential police viewpoint, freedom
to pursue law violators is a vital measure of police deterrent
capability-not only in terms of their traffic supervision mission,
but also in relation to their broader crime control responsibilities. The basic argument advanced is that if police were
forbidden to engage in hot pursuit, or unduly restricted, then
chaos on the highways would be the result. In contrast, an
equally influential group from the traffic safety community,
particularly physicians, maintain that high-speed hot pursuits
result in an unacceptable number of casualties and that life
is too valuable to be jeopardized in the maintenance of what
they regard as an unproven assertion.
One of the basic reasons for this divergence of opinion is
the almost total lack of reliable information on the nature of
the hot pursuit situation. In an attempt to resolve some of
the basic questions of fact concerning the hot pursuit problem,
the National Highway Safety Bureau [now the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ] commissioned
a national study of this problem by the Center for the Environment and Man, Inc., which was supported by the Indiana
University Institute for Research in Public Safety.
The study was conducted to determine the nature and
magnitude of the hot pursuit problem nationally and to prepare guidelines to assist policymakers in dealing with it. Specific objectives were to answer the following questions:
*President, Edmund F. Fennessy Associates, Hartford, Conn., a public
safety consulting firm; formerly Director of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Studies at the Center for the Environment & Man (an
affiliate of the University of Connecticut), Hartford, Conn.; B.A., University of Hartford, 1965; graduate studies in systems analysis at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Trinity College, Case-Western Reserve
University, and the University of Connecticut.
*Director, Institute for Research in Public Safety, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Ind.; B.S., Union College, 1957; J.D., Albany Law School,
Union University, 1960.
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* What is the law regarding hot pursuit and how has it
been interpreted by the courts?
* How have police agencies translated the law into operational policy and training operations?
* How many high-speed pursuits occur nationally and
what are the operational characteristics, consequences,
and risks of such incidents?
" What existing and potential countermeasures are available and what are their merits and deficiencies?
The year long research project was completed in June 1970
and it is the purpose of this article to briefly summarize the
1
major findings of that investigation.
I. THE

NATIONAL STUDY

A. The Hot Pursuit Situation
The most commonly accepted definition of "hot pursuit" is:
[a]n active attempt by a law enforcement officer on duty in
a patrol car to apprehend one or more occupants of a moving
motor vehicle, providing the driver of such vehicle is aware
of the attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining
or by ignoring the law officer's ator increasing his speed
2
tempt to stop him.
A thorough definition is more complex. It can also refer to

the pursuit of an offender across a
or of a motorist who is unaware that
though the police officer must attain
to catch up with him. 4 The primary
however, is on those instances where
attempts to evade apprehension.

3

jurisdictional boundary
he is being chased, even
very high speeds simply
emphasis of this study,
the violator consciously

A common sequence of events leads to hot pursuit and
its several possible outcomes. First, a driver commits a traffic
violation or is engaged in some other activity that requires
police intervention. Second, a police officer observes this action

and decides to intervene or he is directed, usually by radio,
to apprehend a specific motorist. Third, the suspect driver
becomes aware of the officer's intention to stop him. Fourth,

the suspect driver decides to evade arrest-the first significant
1 E. FENNEssY, T. HAMILTON, K. JOSCELYN & J. MERiTT, A STUDY OF THE
PROBLEM OF HOT PURSUIT BY THE POLICE, Final Report to the National

Highway Safety Bureau, [Contract FH-11-7220], The Center for the

Environment & Man, Inc. [hereinafter cited as FENNESSY & JOSCELYN].
2 Credited to Major E. W. Jones of the North Carolina Highway Patrol.
It is clear, however, that the term has been implicitly understood to
have this meaning for years.
3 This is more precisely called "fresh pursuit."

4 This type of "pursuit" is quite frequent, as the officer must attain high
speeds (90-100 m.p.h.) simply to catch up with the speeder.
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event in hot pursuit. Fifth, the police officer decides to pursue
-the decisive event in hot pursuit. Alternatively, the officer
might decide to let the suspect go, or to attempt some other
strategy which would avoid hot pursuit. After the chase
begins, there are few possible outcomes: the pursued driver
may elect to stop, resulting in apprehension; the police officer
may elect to stop, resulting in escape; or if neither driver
chooses to terminate the chase, the third possible outcome will
be a crash involving the offender, the police, an innocent
bystander, or some combination of the three.
The pursued driver's action may be the result of a rational decision. For example, the risks of pursuit might be of
less importance to him than the penalties of apprehension
because he is a wanted felon or because his license is under
suspension. The decision may result, however, from a less
rational impulse. For example, he might be a teenage driver
who panics; he might invite a chase for the "thrill;" or he
may simply be too intoxicated or otherwise impaired to understand the consequences of his decision.
Although elements of irrationality such as the personal
challenge, a test of courage, or a hatred of criminals, might
enter into an officer's decision to pursue, his decision is usually
of a complex and rational nature. It will be influenced by the
characteristics of the area, the performance characteristics of
his vehicle, the type of road, the weather, the road conditions,
other traffic, his estimate of the risk of the pursuit, the seriousness of the initial violation, the probable risks to the public of allowing the suspect driver to continue his evasion
attempt, and a host of other factors that are a function of
the particular incident. Other influences such as the stated
and implied policy of his department, his training, the attitude
and practices of his fellow officers, and his previous pursuit
experiences, will also modify his decision.
All of these factors must be evaluated by the officer as
he makes a decision, which under the best circumstances will
result in the successful apprehension of the suspect vehicle
without a crash. Under the worst conditions, the decision
could result in death or serious injury to the officer or to
others, as well as a lawsuit and departmental discipline if it
is determined that the officer failed to exercise "due care."
The law has attached to the events in a typical hot pursuit
various rights and duties. The authority of a police officer
to engage in hot pursuit stems from his duty to apprehend
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those persons who have committed or are committing a crime.
Often the initial offense may be a traffic violation, but in all
hot pursuit cases the pursuee's behavior constitutes the failure
to obey the command of a law enforcement officer to stop.-5
The pursuee is not relieved of any duties to obey normal
traffic laws, but the pursuer is if he drives an authorized
emergency vehicle (as statutorily defined), and if he exercises due care (privileged status theory) 6 or due regard for
the safety of others (right of way theory). 7 In addition to
pursuing, the police may use roadblocks in order to apprehend a fleeing motorist.8
If a collision occurs during hot pursuit, the pursuing officer and his employer will be exempted from civil liability if
the officer has complied with the statutory standard of due
care or due regard." Even when the pursuing officer has not
met the statutory standard, the fashioning of a remedy for
an injured third party may prove futile: most policemen
have limited financial resources; liability of the police agency
may be defeated by sovereign immunity; or, where there
is no bar, the claims process may be unduly burdensome to
the third party. Furthermore, if the negligent pursuee is uninsured or judgment proof, the third party must look to his
own insurance coverage for compensation because the pursuee's negligence will not be imputed to the pursuer.10
B. The Study Design
The initial objectives of this study as stated by the National Highway Safety Bureau required the research team to
obtain primary study data from a sample of representative
U.S. police departments. Their records were to be the basic
source of data, but it was found that police agencies simply
5 Either failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer or fleeing a
police officer is a crime in all states. See, e.g., UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE
§§ 11-103, 11-904 (Supp. 1969); FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1,
app. D, for a comprehensive list of state statutes.
6 For cases construing "due care" see Torres v. Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 2d 35;
22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 372 P.2d 906 (1962); Parker v. Knox, 147 Me. 396, 87
A.2d 663 (1952); Altenberg v. Sears, 249 Md. 298, 239 A.2d 569 (1968);
Varlaro v. Schultz, 82 N.J. Super. 142, 197 A.2d 16 (1964). See also UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-106 (1967).
7 UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-405. See also FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra
note 1, app. B, for a comprehensive list of state statutes.
s Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963).

9 E.g., United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959); Pagels v.
San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (1955); City of Miami
v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1967).
10 See generally Pagels v. San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d 152, 286 P.2d 877
(1955); Draper v. Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 2d 315, 205 P.2d 46 (1949);
Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952); Staton v.
State, 29 App. Div. 2d 612, 285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
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were unable to provide us with valid historical data. Thus,
a modified study design was implemented: a comprehensive
survey of the law as it relates to hot pursuit was accomplished through a review of state statutes and associated case
decisions," seven sample sites were visited; a survey questionnaire was sent to 130 police departments serving cities of
over 100,000 and to 48 state-level police agencies; previous
research on the subject was reviewed; and after an initial
analysis indicated that data from these sources was inadequate to meet the needs of the study, a 1-month, "real time"
field study was developed.
C.

Previous Studies

Our literature search identified almost 100 documents
dealing directly or indirectly with hot pursuit. While many
of these reports were useful in providing interesting descriptive or conceptual background material, we found only three
documents that had quantitative substance. Unfortunately,
each of these three reports had serious technical flaws.
A North Carolina Highway Patrol Study 12 of the problem
was well conducted but is unreliable because of the very
small (1 week) data sample. In addition, not enough detail is
provided on quality control of the data to make any firm
judgment as to the validity of its results. A Michigan State
Police study was reported in a journal article, 13 but despite
numerous attempts on our part, the original study could not

be located. The referenced article contained excellent detail
on pursuit characteristics but almost no concrete information
on study methodology or pursuit consequences.
The only national estimate of pursuit crash data we found
was a 1968 report prepared by an organization known as the
Physicians for Automotive Safety (PAS). 14 This report attracted serious attention and received nationwide circulation
by the news media. The dramatic nature of the PAS findings

IIInterested

readers are referred to FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note
1, where over 100 pages are devoted to this particular approach. Commencing with a description of the legal parameters surrounding the
emergency vehicle, the analysis discusses appropriate situations for
operation, mode of operation, degree of care legally required by the
operator, and the liability involved, such as the sanctions associated with
"fleeing a pclice officer" and their possible deterrent effect on potential
offenders.
12North Carolina Highway Patrol, Pursuit Survey, North Carolina, 1968
(mimeo.).
13 Frazier, High Speed Pursuit, 1961 POLICE CHIEF 38-40.
14 Physicians for Automotive Safety, Rapid Pursuit by the Police: Causes,
Hazards, Consequences: A National Pattern is Evident, Springfield, N.J.,
1968 (mimeo.).
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(which were generally accepted at face value) provoked considerable editorial comment-much of it critical of the police.
The basic conclusions of the study were:
* One out of five pursuits end in death.
* Five out of 10 pursuits end in injury.
" Seven out of 10 pursuits end in accidents.
* One out of 25 killed is a policeman.
* More than 500 Americans die each year as the result of
15
rapid pursuit by the police.
[There are] grave doubts on the payoff in rapid pursuit. The
costs in deaths and injuries hardly sustain the risks involved,
especially for the police and injured bystanders. The whole
paramount concern is public health, we have no conflict in
judging the value of human life before all other considera6

tions.1

Closer examination of the PAS study by concerned law
enforcement researchers disclosed some serious technical deficiencies. The primary area of criticism of the study surrounded
the ratio statistics presented which were based on a 3-month
sample of newsclippings. The number of pursuit accidents,
the number of fatalities, and the number of injuries-serious
and minor-were tabulated and extrapolated by PAS to obtain
an annual estimate of the size of the problem. This data sample contains obvious biases; for example, pursuits where no
crash occurred generally would not be reported. 17 The fatality
and injury totals, however, are reasonably reliable. The study
indicates that 500 deaths and 1,200 injuries per year can be
expected as the result of rapid pursuit.
D. Police Records
To determine the current state of affairs regarding pursuit policy, a request for material on such policies was sent
to 130 cities with populations over 100,000 and the 48 statelevel police agencies within the continental United States.
A response rate of 40 percent (52 cities) was obtained from
the city sites. At the state level, 22 replies were receiveda response of about 46 percent.
The findings of this phase of the study indicate that existing police pursuit policy consists of three basic types:
* Officer Judgment Model: All basic decisions to initiate,
15 Id. at 14.

16 Id.at 15.
17

See FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1, where numerous technical defects are pointed out; the most serious is the lack of reliable data on
pursuit frequency.
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conduct, or terminate hot pursuit are made by the street
officer. His decisions are subject to internal review and
possible legal action, depending on "due care" provisions.
0 Restrictive Policy Model: There are certain restrictions
on the officer's decision to initiate, conduct, or terminate
a pursuit. Examples are: only pursue for felonies; no
speed above 20 m.p.h. over posted limits; stop at intersections.
* Pursuits Discouraged: Officers are cautioned or discouraged from engaging in hot pursuit. None of the
agencies, however, expressly forbids pursuit if there is
no other choice and if it is an extreme emergency.
The officer judgment policy was by far (80 percent of the
responses) the most predominant type in U.S. police agencies.
A much smaller number of agencies (about 15 percent) subscribe to the restrictive model. Less than 5 percent of the
police agencies responding to this survey have a formal written policy discouraging rapid pursuit.
Information on pursuit training was concurrently requested of the agencies, and project staff members attended
pursuit driver training programs presented by the California
Highway Patrol and the North Carolina Highway Patrol.
These agencies are generally considered to conduct the most
advanced training in this area. After reviewing the information obtained from the mailing, supplemented by detailed interviews with training experts, we can safely conclude that
less than 25 percent of the nation's police officers with road
patrol responsibilities have completed an adequate formal
pursuit driving or emergency vehicle operations course.
Sixteen of the 74 responding agencies also provided us
with quantitative data on hot pursuit problems. The quality
of the data varied widely. In some cases, all we were given
were pursuit-related fatalities; in others, the agency purported to supply us with complete information on the phenomenon.
Thus, inadequate, inconsistent, and sometimes suspicious
records proved to be the first major obstacle to the study.
After visiting the sample sites, analyzing the mail survey, and
reviewing the literature, we concluded that defining the national implications of hot pursuit with a historical data collection approach was unworkable. The basic reasons for the
deficiencies were:
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" There is no universally understood terminology or law
defining "hot pursuit," and a wide spectrum of confusing
definitions exists. Without precise definition, it is impossible to equate the pursuit problems of one jurisdiction with those of another.
" There are no hard and fast standards in existence for
charging violators who are apprehended as the result
of a high-speed pursuit. Our preliminary study indicated that charges placed against such violators may
often include the violation for which the pursuit was
initiated, prior felonies, or acts committed or discovered at the point of capture. In short, the offender could
be charged with almost anything, and often the specific act of fleeing the officer would not be included.
• Isolation of pursuit incidents or pursuit-related crashes
through historical records analysis is exceedingly difficult because most police records systems are organized
around names rather than offense types. Thus, if an
offender is arrested for a pursuit-related incident, the
record of this offense will be filed by his name. Retrieving this case from a manual records system would
require an examination of all records to isolate the hot
pursuit event.
* Pursuit events in which the offender eludes the police
are seldom, if ever, permanently recorded.
" Records of pursuit are filed primarily for self-defense
in the event there is adverse public reaction or civil
lawsuit.
* Confusing and inconsistent practices prevail in the reporting of the pursuit-related accidents."5
Based on this analysis, it was clear that none of the departments could supply us with data that would enable us to
18 In two separate but similar accidents that occurred in a major city one

charged the pursuing officer and the other the pursued violator. Both
events began when an officer observed a violator drive through a red
traffic signal. In both incidents the officer had the green traffic signal,
so he immediately followed the violator. In each case, following standard operating procedures, the officer used his warning light and siren,
and in each case, the violator stopped. No high speed chases, or any
other acts that would endanger any motorist or pedestrians, were involved in the resulting "pursuit" accidents. In the first, the pursuing
officer clipped the front bumper of a parked vehicle as he was attempting to park behind the violator. In the second, the violator, endeavoring
to stop for the officer, drove over a small wooden plank which flipped
onto the hood of the police car doing minor damage. In neither incident
was the damage of sufficient amount to require the filing of an official
state accident report. Both accidents, however, were recorded by the
police department as "pursuit" accidents, because a police vehicle was
attempting to stop a violator.
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make a reliable determination of the total number of pursuits
that occurred during the time period specified for the study.
The Field Study
With the inadequate data sources we found in the police
records survey, it was impossible to validate and supplement
these findings without a substantial and costly data collection program. Within the scope of this study, such an approach
was infeasible. As an alternative, it was decided to embark
upon a small field study which might lead to some results
or conclusions that could be combined with other available
data to provide a reasonably valid estimate of the national
dimensions of the problem.
E.

A program for data collection under controlled operational conditions was designed and four agencies agreed to
participate: the North Carolina Highway Patrol; the Fairfax
County, Virginia Police Department; the South Bend, Indiana
Police Department; and the Bloomington, Indiana Police Department. A special collection form was designed and a staff
member of the research team spent considerable time at each
agency training the officers in its use. Following the training
period, a full month's data were collected at each site. Followup quality control visits were also made to each agency to
resolve any problems. Over 1,400 police officers participated
in this study. The combined data from the four sites produced the following results:
* Forty-six pursuits were recorded by the 1,400 officers.
" One out of nine pursuits ended in a crash.
* One out of 15 pursuits ended in a minor injury.
* Eight out of 10 pursuits ended in the successful (no
crash, no escape) apprehension of the offender.
* No fatal pursuit crashes were reported.
* Alcohol played a role in more than half of the pursuits.
" One out of 10 chases resulted in the offender escaping.
* Most pursuits occurred at night, and particularly during weekends.
* The apprehended drivers, as a group, had a significantly
higher than "average" number of prior accidents, violation convictions, and suspensions.
" One out of seven chases involved vehicles that were
"modified" to attain high speeds.
* Over 95 percent of the apprehended drivers were males
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and were predominantly
24 and under).

(75

percent)

youthful

(age

* One out of seven apprehended drivers, for whom records were available, was driving without a valid license
(suspended, revoked, or no license at all).
" The longest chase distance reported was 15 miles, the
shortest less than 1 mile.
• Twenty-eight percent of the chases took place in predominantly residential areas; the remainder occurred
under primarily rural conditions.
" The average pursuit speed was 85 m.p.h. The average
of the highest speeds attained during the 46 pursuits
was 98 m.p.h. The maximum chase speed reported was 135
m.p.h. The lowest was 30 m.p.h. (during heavy traffic).
It is evident that these results are almost totally contradictory to those obtained during the PAS study. We do not
make any claims that these results provide us with anything
more than some initial quantitative suggestions, with respect
to national conditions. We are convinced, however, that our
findings are highly accurate in terms of the conditions existing at our test sites. These data were collected under controlled conditions and, as such, represent the only data of
this type available. Thus, this brief field collection effort
provides us with a stable baseline against which we will compare the data collected in other phases of this study.
F. Extrapolating the Data
The following findings are supported by a detailed examination of previous studies, data available from police agencies, and our 1-month field rtudy:
* The majority of pursuit-related fatalities and injuries
are incurred by the fleeing driver, his passengers, or
uninvolved bystanders.
" The event that initiates the pursuit is a traffic violation in more than 90 percent of the cases.
" Young (under age 24) male drivers with relatively poor
driving records are most likely to attempt to flee from
a police officer.
" Alcohol plays a role in more than half of the cases.
" A significant number of known offenders (roughly 15
percent) were driving without a valid driver's license
at the time they tried to evade apprehension.
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* About 50 percent of the apprehended offenders had at
least one prior license suspension or revocation on their
records.
* Only a relatively small number (3 to 8 percent) of hot
pursuits involve stolen vehicles.
" The majority of pursuits occur at night and particularly
on weekends.
These findings, however, do not necessarily accurately
characterize the scope of the hot pursuit problem on a national basis. With insufficient, vague, and unreliable data, the
only reasonable way to define the national dimensions of the
problem was to use careful estimation procedures based on
extrapolation from the available data.' Such estimates could
not, of course, be precise. The best we could hope to achieve
was a scientifically defensible estimate of the order of magnitude of the problem. With criteria developed and applied
rigorously to the data, we arrived at "most probable or likely
ranges" for pursuit, crashes, fatalities, and injuries. In a
casual examination, the resulting ranges may seem too indefinite to be of value. Although imprecise, the estimates are the
most accurate that can be expected at this time, and unless
there is a pressing need for more statistically precise information, we believe them to be adequate for most conceivable
decisionmaking purposes.
Our summary conclusion, based on all of the available
evidence, indicates that each year, between 50,000 and 500,000
hot pursuits occur in the United States, and between 6,000
and 8,000 of these pursuits result in crashes. In pursuit-related
crashes, we estimated that from 300 to 400 people are killed
and from 2,500 to 5,000 people are injured. These values represent the "most likely" ranges, and were developed by means
of extrapolation from all available evidence. The figures
should not be converted to ratios (e.g., one in 20 pursuits end
in a crash) because of the lack of precise definition of the
pursuit event and the variability and uncertainty of the area.
For each of these estimates, there are boundary conditions that represent conceivable, but extremely unlikely,
values. For example, it is quite unlikely that less than 20,000
or more than 600,000 pursuits occur per year. Comparable
"boundary" ranges are: for pursuit crashes, 2,000 and 25,000;
for pursuit crash injuries, 2,000 and 15,000; for pursuit deaths,
19) See FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1, for a detailed discussion of the
methodology utilized in developing these estimates.
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100 and 1,000. We emphasize that these are extrapolations of
the available data, which are scanty at best.
II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our primary recommendation is that local police agencies
adopt a hot pursuit control program consisting of five components:
(1) The development of a hot pursuit data base: Without knowledge of the nature of the hot pursuit problem within
a jurisdiction it will be impossible to formulate a rational
policy or to avoid the misallocation of resources. The inability
of the majority of agencies to supply us with any data on
pursuits in their jurisdictions is disheartening and should be
remedied. Thus, we strongly recommend the collection and
analysis of a large seasonal sample of data on the incidence,
characteristics, and consequences of hot pursuit and the collection and analysis of a representative sample of data on
fleeing offenders' characteristics. Careful investigation should
also be made of the reasons that underlie the decision to
evade arrest and police officer pursuit motivation. 0 The collection of these data is a countermeasure that can be undertaken immediately and which will allow improved police
training and policy formulation.
(2) Limiting the number of hot pursuits: A reduction
in the number of hot pursuits will result in a reduction of
the number of related crashes. The adoption of this policy
should be dependent on the analysis of pursuit data by each
police agency. This measure will not be appropriate if the
pursuit crash experience is negligible.
(3) Police hot pursuit driver training: Training officers
for hot pursuits is a matter of life and death. To be effective
it must contain, as a minimum, 50 hours of: formal classroom
training, practical driving instruction at a well-designed facility, skid-pad practice, and defensive driving instruction similar
to the National Safety Council program.
(4) Equipment to minimize risk: The police vehicle is
vital to the pursuit control program; it should be the best
and safest available; but proposed equipment changes must
provide benefits proportionate to the costs. As a minimum,
it is recommended that police vehicles that are likely to
engage in hot pursuit have sufficient speed to overtake any
20 Although most of the officers in the field study sample who engaged
in a pursuit were under 30, one 48-year-old officer accounted for four
of the 46 chases.

A NATIONAL STUDY OF HOT PURSUIT

stock vehicle manufactured in the U.S. and be equipped with
the latest in safety features recommended by NHTSA. In
addition, supporting communications and warning devices
should be given the same attention.
(5) Development of an increased capability to keep unlicensed drivers off the road: The available evidence indicates that drivers whose licenses are suspended or revoked
are involved in a disproportionate number of pursuits. The
present system of suspension enforcement is simply not
working. Thus, the development of an increased level of spot
checks, surveillance, and investigation by the police will add
some real deterrent to the existing system and should keep
a number of suspended drivers off the road. The net result
should be fewer hot pursuits.
Although hot pursuit is a problem that must be managed
at the local level, it is clear that it is of national scope, and
federal response is in order. A national agency should assist
and encourage a representative sample of state, county, and
municipal jurisdictions to engage in the hot pursuit data collection we have earlier recommended. The federal agency
should prepare a data collection manual specifying definitions, procedures, and methods of reporting. The pursuit survey form used in the field study portion of this project is
recommended as the collection instrument. Data subsequently
obtained should be analyzed and disseminated to the widest
possible audience in a continuing program that will identify
trends and test countermeasures.
The data reviewed by this study indicate that individuals
who attempt to flee from the police have a significantly
higher number of accidents, a greater number of arrests and
convictions for moving violations, and a much higher number
of suspensions than "normal" drivers. A detailed national
study should be made to determine the significant personality
variables associated with these offenders so that appropriate
screening, adjudication, and treatment programs can be developed. To provide for the development of treatment programs,
it is recommended that the NHTSA encourage and assist state
and local agencies in the implementation of an education program aimed specifically at high-risk drivers in order to provide them with knowledge of the personal risk, legal penalties, and social costs associated with hot pursuit.
It is also recommended that the NHTSA and other concerned federal agencies encourage and assist the states in

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

the development and construction of hot pursuit training facilities. The initial cost of each such facility should be in the
neighborhood of $250,000. The use of deactivated military
bases should be explored.
We make two recommendations to state legislatures: First,
increased penalties for the offense of fleeing a police officer
should be studied. Second, each state should establish a compensation system funded from gasoline or highway use fees
to provide financial relief to innocent third parties who are
injured in the course of a hot pursuit and who are without
recourse under the present system.
Numerous technical countermeasures, which could be
useful in reducing the need for and the consequences of hot
pursuits, have been suggested. 21 None, however, is a panacea.
Each will be costly to develop, and most of them will be
alterable by a determined mechanic. Although detailed technical and operational studies will be required before any
serious consideration be given them, the concepts are these:
(1) Low-frequency remote ignition shut-down system:
A receiver unit, installed as an integral part of a vehicle's
spark plugs, could be triggered from a pursuing vehicle and
render the fleeing vehicle inoperative. It should be possible
to produce these devices in large quantity for under $1.00
per unit.
(2) Speed limiting devices: Design changes could be required in all new vehicles available to the public, or governors could be required on all new and used vehicles.
(3) Vehicle identification system: Passive transmitters
that could be triggered either by units in police vehicles or
by detectors imbedded in roadways could be installed in all
vehicles. This system would enable the police to track an
automobile without the need to maintain line-of-sight view
of the fleeing driver.
(4) Bystander warning systems: A number of technical
measures have been suggested to protect third-party drivers,
and pedestrians. Improved sirens, visual signals, officer-activated traffic lights, and radio-interrupt devices present some
initial possibilities.

21

supra note 1, lists and describes in detail all the
proposed technical countermeasures.
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CONCLUSION

Although an estimated 400 hot pursuit-related deaths per
year represent less than 1 percent of all motor-vehiclerelated fatalities, it is a significant absolute number. This
study demonstrates that hot pursuit is a problem of national
scope, and it suggests that hot pursuit is not an isolated phenomenon. It is closely related to other critical aspects of traffic safety, namely: alcohol abuse and driving, the problems
of youthful drivers, ineffective enforcement of license suspension, and high speed driving. Thus our findings not only
recommend the implementation of policies directly affecting
the causes and consequences of hot pursuits but also strengthen
the case for the development of integrated traffic safety
measures dealing with many related problems.

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE AND

DUE PROCESS FOR THE POOR MAN
FANTASY OR REALITY By

SAMUEL J.

-

RICHARDSON v. BELCHER
SMITH*

Richardson v. Belcher bars the extension of the developing
fundamental rights doctrine from encompassing social security
disability insurance benefits. The motivation for Mr. Smith's
critical evaluation of the Supreme Court's decision derives from
his experience in social security law and his representation in
social security disability insurance claims of coal miners and
other low income families in West Virginia -people of the sort
who will feel more directly the impact of Belcher. What follows is a uniquely practical and personal analysis of a decision
of broad implication.
INTRODUCTION

AYMOND Belcher was a 53-year-old southern West Virgina coal miner, married, with two children. He was an
employee of the Pccahontas Fuel Co. at Lynco, West Virginia,
where his yearly earnings totaled approximately $6,600.' On
March 25, 1968, Belcher received a broken neck during the
course of his duties as an employee of Pocahontas. On May 20,
1968, Belcher filed an application for social security disability
benefits, 2 alleging that he became unable to work as a result
of the above-mentioned accident. His wife and children also
applied for benefits under the Act. Belcher, his wife and children were granted social security disability benefits effective
in October 1968, in the sum of $329.70 per month. Furthermore, since his employer had chosen to establish a workmen's
compensation fund, Belcher lecame entitled to workmen's compensation from the State of West Virginia in the sum of
$203.60 per month.
In January 1969, Belcher's monthly social security disAssociate, Hindry & Meyer, P.C., Denver, Colorado; A.B., Marshall
University, 1958; J.D., Washington and Lee University, 1964.
1 Facts in personal knowledge of writer, as well as facts contained in
Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (S.D.W. Va. 1970)
and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
2 Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), codified
(with subsequent amendments) as 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970). Parallel citations will be given in all subsequent footnotes, since the Act has
been codified in Title 42 of U.S.C., but that title of U.S.C. has not been
enacted into positive law. References in text are to Statutes at Large
denominations, which are in popular usage.

*
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ability payment was reduced from $329.70 per month to $225.30
under the reduction and offset provisions of section 2243 of the
Social Security Act upon a finding that Belcher was receiving
workmen's compensation from the State of West Virginia.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Belcher instituted
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, 4 challenging the offset and reduction
provision of section 224 as a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
The district court held for Belcher, granting the full social
security benefits and holding the reduction in benefits to be
unconstitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the holding
of the district court was reversed.5
I. DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

During recent years much has been written concerning
due process as it relates to a poor person charged with a crime.
However, comparatively little has been written concerning civil
due process as it relates to the poor man and social justice.
Furthermore, in connection with the poor man and other persons comprising the lower income families classification, the
social security laws, their administration, and court interpretation have all but escaped the scrutiny and quills of judges,
lawyers, and legal scholars."
This article will briefly examine the nature and purpose
of the Social Security Act as it relates to the provision of disability benefits. An analysis of Richardson v. Belcher will follow, with the object of identifying the problems with respect
to social security disability insurance benefits which the deciSocial Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 335, 79 Stat.
406, amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1970) (popularly known as a "Section 224
Reduction").
4 Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
The Act
provides for review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Eduthe
which
cation, and Welfare by the United States judicial district in
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(g), 53 Stat. 1370, amending
Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 205, 49 Stat. 624 (1935), codified as 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
5 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), rev'g 317 F. Supp. 1294
(S.D.W. Va. 1970).
6 Social security disability benefits have been discussed in the following
articles: Abraham & Walkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the
Social Security Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1055
(1963); Myers, Disability Benefit Provisions Under the Social Security
Act--An Early Report, 16 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 5 (1952); Samuels,
Deduction for Benefits Received, 119 NEW L. J. 228 (1969); Sharp,
Social Security Disability Cases, 55 A.B.A.J. 141 (1969); Note, Social
Security Disability Benefits: Three Current Problems, 52 MINN.
3

L. REV. 165 (1967); 40 U. CiN. L. REV. 408 (1971).
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sion creates for the poor working man or woman who is injured
d'uring the course of employment and suffers permanent, total
disability.
A.

General Provisions

Generally speaking, the Social Security Act encompasses
numerous programs which all appear to have the basic objectives of keeping individuals and families from becoming destitute due to loss of earnings, protecting the elderly against the
rising costs and expenses of illnesses that could otherwise
exhaust their savings, keeping families together, and hopefully
giving children the opportunity to grow up in health and
security. 7 These basic programs can be summarized as follows:
A. Retirement insurance.
B. Survivors insurance.
C.

Disability insurance.
D. Hospital and medical insurance for the aged.
E. Unemployment insurance.
F. Public assistance and welfare services.
It should be noted that although the Social Security Act is a
federal law, the federal government operates only the retirement, the survivors, the disability, and the hospital and medical
insurance programs listed above, while the unemployment and
public assistance and welfare programs are operated by the
states with federal cooperation.'
B.

Disability Insurance Benefits
One of the purposes of the Social Security Act is to keep
families from becoming destitute due to loss of earnings by the
family bread winner in the event that he or she becomes disabled. To that effect the Social Security Act provides a disabled
worker with monthly cash disability insurance benefits beginning with the first month in which all the following conditions
have been met: 9
A. He or she is under a disability as defined in sections
216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act.'
7 U.S.

DEPT. OF

HEALTH,

MINISTRATION, SOCIAL

EDUCATION

AND WELFARE,

SECURITY HANDBOOK

SOCIAL

SECURITY

AD-

2 (4th ed. 1969).

s Id. at 3.

9 See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 103, 70 Stat. 815,
amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1) (1970).
")The
term "disability" is defined in sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act, as amended, to mean:
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
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He or she has filed an application for disabled workers
benefits in accordance with section 223 (b) of the Social
Security Act. 1
12
He or she has the requisite disability insured status.

He or she has completed a 6-month waiting period or
1 3
he or she is exempted from this requirement.
E. He or she has not attained age 65.
Additional monthly benefits, commonly referred to as auxiliary benefits, are normally payable to the other family members (husband or wife and children) on the earnings record of
the disabled worker.' 4 The amount of the monthly disability
payments which the disabled worker and his family receives
is based upon the amount of contributions which the worker
has made to the social security fund. Thus a worker whose
income averages approximately $6,500 per year and who makes
social security contributions on that amount would receive a
higher monthly disability payment than another worker whose
income might average approximately $4,500 per year.
D.

Section 224 Reduction
The disabled worker, however, may not be entitled to the
full amount of monthly cash disability benefits described above
if he is also receiving monthly benefits pursuant to a federal
C.

impairment which can be expected to result in death or has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months ....

The 1968 amendments of the Act imposed the additional requirement that
(A) an individual . . . shall be determined to be under disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b), 81 Stat. 868, amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935),
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970).
11 Section 223(b) of the Social Security Act provides for the filing of
an application, which is a prerequisite for obtaining social security
disability benefits.
12 Section 223(c) of the Social Security Act defines insured status, which
for most means that he or she must have not less than 20 quarters of
coverage during the 40-quarter period which ends with a quarter in
which a person becomes disabled.
13 Section 223 (c) (2) of the Social Security Act provides that a disabled
person must wait a period of 6 months after onset of the disability
before monthly benefits can be paid.
14 Section 202 of the Social Security Act provides auxiliary benefits for
the wife and children of a disabled worker.
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or state workmen's compensation law or plan. Section 224 of
the Social Security Act provides, in part:
(a) If for any month prior to the month in which an individual attains the age of 62 (1) such individual is entitled to benefits under section
223 of this title, and
(2) such individual is entitled for such month, under a
workmen's compensation law or plan of the United States
or a State, to periodic benefits for a total or partial disability (whether or not permanent), and the Secretary
has, in a prior month, received notice of such entitlement
for such month,
the total of his benefits under section 223 of this title for such
month and of any benefits under section 202 of this title for
such month based on his wages and self-employment income
shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount by
which the sum of (3) such total of benefits under sections 223 and 202 of
this title for such month, and
(4) such periodic benefits payable (and actually paid)
for such month to such individual under the workmen's
compensation law or plan,
exceeds the higher of (5) 80 percentum of his 'average earnings,' or
(6) the total of such individual's disability insurance
benefits under section 223 of this title for such month and
and of any monthly insurance benefits under section 202
of this title for such month based on his wages and selfemployment income, prior to reduction under this section.
In no case shall the reduction in the total of such benefits
under sections 223 and 202 of this title for a month (in a continuous period of months) reduce such total below the sum
of

-

(7) the total of the benefits under sections 223 and 202
of this title, after reduction under this section, with respect
to all persons entitled to benefits on the basis of such
individual's wages and self-employment income for such
month which were determined for such individual and
such persons for the first month for which reduction
under this section was made (or which would have been
so determined if all of them had been so entitled in such
first month), and
(8) any increase in such benefits with respect to such
individual and such persons, before reduction under this
section, which is made effective for months after the first
15
month for which reduction under this section is made.

The final effect of such reduction may be a total or partial
loss of social security disability benefits. At first glance there
does not appear to be anything contained in section 224 which
15 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 335, 79 Stat.
406, amending Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620
(1935), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1970).
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seems unfair or unconscionable. However, further review and
study of the Social Security Act does not reflect other provisions providing for a similar reduction in monthly social
security disability benefits where a disabled worker is receiving,
in addition to social security disability benefits, the following
federal or private benefits:
A. Civil Service Retirement Act.1"
B. Railroad Retirement Act Annuity.17
C. Veterans Administration Disability Benefits.1 8
D. Coverage under a private disability insurance policy.
E. Damages received in action in tort arising from the
disabling injury.
Thus, it becomes very clear that the offset or reduction
found in the disability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act applies only to a federal social security recipient who is
also receiving workmen's compensation payments.19 Clearly,
section 224 singles out recipients of workmen's compensation
for the reduction and offset treatment. The question which
logically follows, then, is whether section 224 is not arbitrary
and does not lack a rational basis in that it discriminates between those disabled workers who receive workmen's compensation and those who receive compensation from other
sources set out above. This is the question presented by the
plaintiff in Belcher.
II.

Richardson v. Belcher

The District Court Opinion
In September 1970, United States District Judge Sidney
L. Christie 20 issued a memorandum decision 21 in which he
A.

16 Employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act are entitled
to disability annuity after 5 years of civilian service. 5 U.S.C. § 8337
(1970). In fiscal 1970, there were 184,000 disabled annuitants. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (1971). See also Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85 (1971).
17 The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 provides disability benefits for
railroad workers with 10 or more years of covered service. 45 U.S.C.
§ 228a (1970). See also 404 U.S. at 85-86 n.3.
18 The Veterans Administration provides disability benefits for serviceconnected as well as nonservice-connected disabilities. In fiscal 1970,
over 2,000,000 veterans received service-connected disability benefits.
See also 404
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (1971).

U.S. at 85 n.1.

19 Concerning disability insurance benefits the only offset or reduction

provisions are contained in § 224 of the Social Security Act.
Honorable Sidney L. Christie has been a distinguished United
States federal district judge for both the northern and southern district of West Virginia since his appointment in 1964. Judge Christie
has probably reviewed more social security disability cases than any
other active federal judge and was recently appointed to the chief
judgeship for southern West Virginia.
Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).

20The

21
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held that the facts and circumstances of Raymond Belcher's
case were such that the section 224 reduction could not be constitutionally applied. To apply section 224, he reasoned, would
deprive Raymond Belcher of due process and equal protection
of the law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In
arriving at his conclusion, Judge Christie cited the Congressional Record in its characterization of the nature of the Social
Security Act:
"Social Security is not a handout; it is not charity; it is not
relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and
earnings of the individual. As an earned right, the individual
22
is eligible to receive his benefit in dignity and self-respect."

The government sought to justify the discriminatory provisions of the section 224 reduction by arguing that its purpose
was to avoid the duplication of public benefits. Judge Christie
rejected this argument on the grounds that the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Fund is supported solely by premiums and other funds paid by employers and could not be
treated as a public benefit.
Judge Christie acknowledged Flemming v. Nestor,23 which
held that the old-age benefits of an alien deported for cause
could be lawfully terminated without offending the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. However, Judge Christie felt
that Raymond Belcher was not entitled to such cavalier treatment, especially in view of the more recent case of Goldberg
v. Kelly 24 which in essence elevated the receipt of welfare
benefits to the equivalent of a property right, also entitled to
the safeguards of due process. Judge Christie concluded:
Therefore, since the Court in Goldberg appears to have determined that entitlement to welfare is in the nature of a
property right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, by the same rationale it must be determined that one who has made direct contribution to the soocial
security fund and becomes entitled to disability benefits thereunder should and ought to be accorded equal status and protection. For it seems to us to be patently unfair for the welfare recipient, under Goldberg, to have a 'property right status'
with all the procedural safeguards of due process, while the
social security recipient, Under Nestor, is deprived of such
is not only completely
status and protection. The distinction
25
illogical, but is grossly inequitable.

22
23
24
25

Id. at 1298, citing 102 CONG. REC. 15, 110 (1956) (emphasis added by
court).
Id. at 1297; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
317 F. Supp. at 1297.
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The Supreme Court Opinion
On direct appeal, 26 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed (4-3) the judgment entered by Judge Christie and upheld the constitutionality of section 224 of the Social Security
27
Act.
In an opinion that is more curious than compelling, Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that the classification contained in section 224 of the Social Security Act
was based upon legitimate purposes and goals established by
Congress that were "rationally based and free from invidious
B.

discrimination."

28

In reaching his conclusion, Mr. Justice Stewart discussed
the legislative history which prompted Congress to enact section 224 in its present form and found that certain data presented to congressional committees tended to show that in
approximately 70 percent of the states, a typical worker injured
during the course of his employment and eligible for both
social security disability benefits and state compensation received combined benefits in excess of his normal take-home
pay immediately prior to his disability. Mr. Justice Stewart
further indicated, again relying on the same data, that this
2
situation reduced the incentive of workers to return to work. "
Mr. Justice Stewart all but ignored the "property theory"
espoused in Goldberg, but did indicate that the Goldberg rationale was not applicable to Belcher. Instead, it was held that the
"rationally based and free from invidious discrimination"
rationale as set out in Dandridge v. Williams3 1 was the proper
test to apply in Belcher:
A statutory classification in the area of social welfare is
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it is "rationally based and free from invidious
.. While the
discrimination." Dandridge v. Williams .....
present case, involving as it does a federal statute, does not
directly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec28 The Judiciary Act of 1948 provides:

- Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of
the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitu-

tional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the
United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee
thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1970).
27 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
28 Id. at 81.
29 Id. at 83.
30 397 U.S. 471 (1970). It should be noted that Dandridge involved an
interpretation by the Court of a statutory classification under the laws
of the State of Maryland. It now appears that the Dandridge doctrine
or test has been extended to statutory classifications under federal law.

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE
tion Clause, a classification which meets the test articulated
in Dandridge is perforce consistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
31
U.S. 497, 499 ....
Applying the Dandridge test to the legislative intent and
goals of Congress in establishing the section 224 reduction, Mr.
Justice Stewart concluded:
The original purpose of state workmen's compensation laws
was to satisfy a need inadequately met by private insurance or
tort claim awards. Congress could rationally conclude that this
need should continue to be met primarily by the States, and
that a federal program which began to duplicate the efforts of
the States might lead to the gradual weakening or atrophy of
32
of the state programs.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF Richardson v.

Belcher

Dandridge involved an interpretation by the Supreme Court
of a statutory classification under the law of the State of Maryland. Since the Dandridge rationale has been applied to Belcher,
it seems clear that the Dandridge doctrine has been extended
to statutory classifications under federal law. Furthermore,
since the Court rejected the Goldberg "property theory" in
Belcher, the Court has in essence revitalized and given new life
to Flemming v. Nestor.
Another writer commenting on the district court decision
in Belcher suggests that the "property theory" espoused in
Goldberg could not be applied to Raymond Belcher since he "is
not a hard-core unemployable caught up in the cycle of poverty." 3:1 It should be pointed out that the coal fields of southern
West Virginia, the area in which Raymond Belcher lives, is one
of the most improverished areas in the entire United States
and has been so judicially recognized." Raymond Belcher was
disabled due to a crippling coal mine injury, as opposed to a
person who is unemployed. Upon what rational theory or
basis can a disabled workingman's right to be subservient to
those of an unemployed person on welfare? Is it not illogical
that a welfare recipient who has made no direct contribution
to the fund from which he receives benefits has a recognizable
"property right" which is protected by all the due process safeguards and that Raymond Belcher, who has worked all his life
and made direct contributions to the social security fund from
:31404 U.S. at 81.
32 Id. at 83-84.
3
See 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 414 (1971).
34 See Morton v. Gardner, 257 F. Supp. 67, 74 (S.D.W. Va. 1966).
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which he receives benefit, is without a "property right" sufficient to grant him due process safeguards? Such treatment of
the workingman is simply not consistent with the due process
and equal protection guarantees afforded by the Constitution.
Considered in another light, it is clear that the majority
opinion in Belcher has accorded the Social Security Act the
traditional presumption of validity characteristic of the "old"
equal protection cases, and dropped in "new" equal protection
cases.3 5 Mr. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by
Mr. Justice Brennan, responded to the majority opinion, which
applied the presumption, in two ways. First, he asserted that
the presumption of validity should not be applied:
In opposing this course, I adhere to my dissenting views
in Dandridge v. Williams. I continue to believe that the "rational basis" test used by this Court in reviewing business regulation has no place when the Court reviews legislation providing
government funds to profundamental services or distributing
36
vide for basic human needs.

Assuming, arguendo, that the presumption of validity was applicable, Mr. Justice Marshall went on to point out that no
rational basis existed for the distinction:
[E]ven under the Court's "rational basis" test, the discriminatory offset provision here cannot be sustained. There simply is
no reasonable basis for singling out recipients of workmen's
compensation for a reduction of federal benefits, while those
kinds of disability compensation are not
who receive other
37
similarly treated.

The discrimination caused by section 224 is further clarified
by Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Belcher, wherein
he states:
Thus, had Belcher's supplemental disability payment come
from a Veteran's Administration program, a Civil Service Retirement Act or Railroad Retirement Act Annuity, a private
35 Equal protection has traditionally been couched in terms of reasonable
classifications. A classification is not unreasonable if it is related to the
police power of the state. If the court can conceive of any set of facts
that would sustain the reasonableness of the classification, the burden
is on the party challenging the statute to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the classification is arbitrary and without reasonable
basis. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). In a
series of recent cases involving certain interests, however, the burden
of proof has been shifted. In cases involving "fundamental rights,"
the presumption of validity is not applied, the effect of which is to presume the invalidity of statutes adversely affecting a fundamental right.
In such a case, the burden is on the state to show reasonableness by
clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Kramer v. School District, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), right to vote; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), right to travel, or right to receive welfare, or both; Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), distinction based on race; Douglas V. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), right to counsel on appeal.
36 404 U.S. at 90.
7

3

Id. at 91.
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disability insurance policy, a self-insurer, a voluntary wage
contribution plan, or the proceeds in an action in tort arising
from the disabling injury, there would have been no reduction
in his social security benefits. The offset under § 224 applies
only to federal social security disability beneficiaries also receiving workmen's compensation payments, a group which in
1965 totaled only 1.4% of all social security disability beneficiaries. Yet, of the 849,000 disabled workers who in 1965 received social security disability benefits, over sixteen percent
also received overlapping veteran's benefits, and almost fourteen percent received benefits from prviate insurance main38
tained under the auspices of an employer or a union.

In short, the presumption of validity applied in Belcher presents an obstacle which may well prove to be insurmountable,

and the due process safeguards as they relate to the acts of
Congress may well be a myth.39
CONCLUSION

One of the most astounding aspects of Belcher is the Court's
was taking a substantial

complete disregard of the fact that it
amount of badly
family.

needed income

from

Mr. Justice Marshall makes

the Raymond

Belcher

this point very clear

by

pointing out that Raymond Belcher was earning approximately

$6,600 per year prior to his disabling injury.

Had Raymond

Belcher been able to keep the full measure of social security
benefits totalling $329.70 per month in addition to his workmen's
compensation benefits of $203.60 per month, his income would
have totalled almost $6,400 per year, some $200 less than he
had earned before his disabling injury.

4

1

Because of the section

224 reduction, however, Raymond Belcher's social security benefits were reduced to $225.30 per month, the effect of which
was a reduction of his annual income to almost $5,100 per year,
a net loss of approximately $1,300 per year.
The full impact of the Belcher decision will be felt by the
lower income families who cannot afford to purchase disability
insurance to protect themselves from the sudden loss of income,
such

as

the

Belcher

family,

which

must

now

live

on

sub-

stantially less per year due directly to the section 224 offset.
Id. at 85-87.
39 In the area of economic regulation, the Supreme Court has typically
given a presumption of validity to state laws challenged as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note
35 supra. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), represents a rare, if not
solitary, instance in which the Court has recited the Williamson v. Lee
Optical language defining the application of the presumption, and then
gone on to find the statute discriminatory. Morey probably stands as a
warning to the legislature only that it should make an effort to avoid
discriminatory classifications so blatant as that in the Illinois statute
which Morey invalidated.
40 404 U.S. at 88.
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This decision affects the coal miners, farm hands, custodians,
sanitary removal personnel, laborers, and street cleaners, just
to mention a few. The effect of this decision will not be felt
by the blue collar worker who has more substantial financial
resources from which he can purchase disability insurance
which is not subject to the section 224 offset. But, this
decision will also be felt by the minority groups throughout
America, who comprise the majority of lower income families.
It seems grossly unfair that these people must suffer the possibility of further discrimination.
To the practical-minded federal district judges who are
being called upon with increased frequency to interpret the
social security laws, to the lawyer who is involved on a day-today basis representing the poor workers having social security
disability claims, and to the poor disabled workers who look to
the social security and workmen's compensation laws for
assistance, to say that the section 224 offset of the Social Security Act is not discriminatory and violative of the fifth amendment is exalting fantasy over reality.

COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION v. School District
School Desegregation -Keyes
Number One, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972) (No. 507).
INTRODUCTION

T

HE 1969 electoral race for positions on the Denver School
Board centered almost entirely on the issue of whether
students should be bussed to achieve racial balance in the
city's public schools. Earlier in that year the Board had adopted
three resolutions1 containing busing plans which were to go
into effect the following fall. The candidates who ran in opposition to these resolutions were elected, and the newly constituted Board moved quickly to replace mandatory busing with
a voluntary transfer system.2 The plaintiffs in Keyes v. School
District Number One' thereupon filed a class action alleging
that the State of Colorado, acting through the Board, had violated their constitutional rights by treating them unequally in
regard to public school education. Through various requests
for preliminary and permanent relief, the plaintiffs sought an
order compelling the Board to cure the condition of segregation
alleged to exist in Denver schools.
Although the rescission of the busing resolutions seems to
have precipitated the Keyes litigation, the complaint was
pitched in terms ranging far beyond this single act. From the
standpoint of legal theory, the allegations fall basically under
two related headings. First, plaintiffs maintained that the
Board's decisions respecting school construction and attendance
boundaries had historically been made pursuant to a segregative
policy of which the rescission was but an obvious example.
Such action was alleged to violate the equal protection rule
established in Brown v. Board of Education.4 Second, the court
1Denver Board of Education Resolutions 1520, Jan. 30, 1969; 1524, Mar.
20, 1969; 1531, Apr. 24, 1969.
2
Denver Board of Education Resolution 1533, Jun. 9, 1969.
3 Due to the unusual number of opinions generated by this case, a traditional citation could only be confusing. The opinions of interest here
are 303 F. Supp. 279, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969), and 313 F.
Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) from the trial court (the separate opinions
of the trial court are treated in the text as one) and 445 F.2d 990 (10th
Cir. 1971) from the appellate court. Cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3329
(U.S. Jan. 17, 1972) (No. 507).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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was asked to find that Denver schools showing high concentrations of minority students offered an inferior educational
opportunity; that segregation, whatever its cause, was responsible for this inferiority; and that the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment would not permit segregation to
continue under the circumstances presented.
These arguments were accorded varying receptions in the
trial and appellate courts - a situation which always invites
comment. But this case is of more than usual interest. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will at last speak
directly to the question of school segregation in states where
no officially segregated school system has ever existed. Given
the overwhelming social importance of this forthcoming decision, it is especially crucial that every relevant legal argument
be thoroughly aired and its soundness assessed. In furtherance
of this end, the discussion to follow treats the opinions of both
the trial and appellate courts as they relate to each of the
theories described above. Conclusions drawn from the discussion are combined to form a recommended judicial approach for
any litigation involving school segregation.
THE Brown PER SE RULE
of the fourteenth amendment
clause
protection
The equal
is, of course, the fountainhead of the legal issues involved in
school desegregation cases. The basic prohibition is that no
state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. ' '5 Early cases involving the application
of this prohibition to public schools concerned officially separate school systems in which there could be no doubt that the
state was denying minority children the right to attend schools
on a nonsegregated basis. The question was whether this segregation was a denial of equal protection.
The initial judicial response was to apply the "separate-butequal" doctrine developed in regard to transportation facilities
0
Under that theory, segregation of the
in Plessy v. Ferguson.
races was not a denial of equal protection so long as the facili7
ties provided each were substantially equal. The Plessy Court
explicitly rejected the idea that separation implied inferiority.
In several cases following Plessy, minority plaintiffs were
able to force admission to all-white educational institutions by

I.

DE JURE SEGREGATION

5U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1.

6 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7 E.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cumming v. Board of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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proving that the facilities provided for their race were not in
fact equal to those available to whites.8 The Supreme Court
proved willing to consider not only tangible differences such as
faculties and libraries, but also important intangibles such as
the prestige of the institution in the community and the promi9
nence of its alumni.
The culmination of this trend toward increasing concern
for the welfare of minority students was the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.' The question there presented
was whether "segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"' 1
The Court answered in the affirmative, concluding that
12
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.'
Other aspects of Brown are treated in more detail in Part
II of this comment. For present purposes it is sufficient to say
that Brown established the principle that any state-imposed
segregation is unconstitutional per se. And it was early recognized that this prohibition was not limited to segregative
statutes passed by state legislatures. Any state agency taking
intentionally segregative action has violated the fourteenth
amendment. 13 Therefore, if the Keyes plaintiffs could substantiate their claim of de jure segregation, they would need
14
show no more.
Although the de jure route leads most directly to a finding of unconstitutionality, it is by far the most difficult to
negotiate. The plaintiff is saddled with the often prohibitive
burden of proving intent through circumstantial evidence. He
must lay before the court school board actions so rotten with
segregative intent that even the judicial nose cannot mistake
the odor.
In order to understand the proof of intent offered by the
Keyes plaintiffs, it is necessary to review quickly the recent
history of racial housing patterns in Denver. 15 Prior to 1950
s Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332

U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
9 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 493.
12

Id. at 495.

1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
14 Id.
15 The summary to follow in the text is taken from a segment of the trial
court's opinion in 303 F. Supp. at 282.
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the black population was centered around an area of the core
city known as "Five Points." Through the intervening years
the black community has expanded eastward along a corridor
having relatively stable boundaries on the north and south.
By 1960 this expansion had reached Colorado Boulevard, a
large north-south thoroughfare which the trial court referred
to as "a natural dividing line," and by 1969 had moved on eastward well into the fashionable Park Hill area. As the trial
court noted, the trend of population movement had become
quite apparent long before it reached Colorado Boulevard.
The plaintiffs catalogued the significant Board decisions
with regard to attendance boundaries and school construction
which were made during this period and superimposed them
on the state of expansion current when each was made. 16 The
effect of theFe decisions had been to prevent the gradual influx
of minority students into formerly all-white schools. Attendance zone boundaries tended to follow housing patterns and to
keep minority students concentrated in certain schools. When
these schools became intolerably overcrowded, boundaries were
shifted so as to attach another school to the minority neighborhoods and exclude the still-white areas which that school
formerly served. Optional zones around schools in transition
allowed white students to "escape" to still-white schools.
As previously mentioned, the Board in 1969 adopted Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 which were designed to achieve racial
balance primarily in the Park Hill schools.1 7 However, in
response to what was considered a voter mandate, these resolutions were rescinded in June of that year, just after two new
members were elected to the Board.
The trial court considered the evidence adduced in regard
to the Park Hill schools, including the rescission of Resolutions
1520, 1524, and 1531, separately from that relating to the schools
in the older core-city area. Judge Doyle found segregative
intent in the Board actions affecting the former, but refused
to find de jure segregation in the core city. It is submitted that
a careful analysis of the construction and attendance decisions
in the two areas will not reveal factual distinctions suffizient
16 The broad-brush review of the facts set out in the text is a condensation of the trial court's factual analysis in 303 F. Supp. at 290-94 and 313

F. Supp. at 69-73. The reader is urged to go to the opinions themselves
and form an independent judgment as to the validity of the conclusions

reached in the text.

17 These resolutions did affect some schools west of Colorado Boulevard.
True racial balance could not be achieved by dealing only with schools

in Park Hill proper.
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to account for this result." Granted, there was in the core
city no "legislative action similiar to the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531,"''" but this factor cannot have been
crucial. Judge Doyle repeatedly indicated that the rescission
was not necessary to his finding of a constitutional deprivation:
"The policies and actions of the Board prior to the adoption of
Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 . . . constitute de jure segregation. 212 Indeed, the circuit court found it unnecessary to even
consider the rescission once it had affirmed the finding quoted
above.

21

The true source of Judge Doyle's seemingly inconsistent
findings is not the facts, but his approach thereto. He undertook to justify this difference when he turned to the core-city
schools:
The evidentiary as well as the legal approach to the remaining schools is quite ditferent from that which has been outlined
above. For one thing, the concentration of minorities occurred at
an earlier date and, in some instances, prior to the Brown decision by the Supreme Court. Community attitudes were different, including the attitutes of the School Board members.
Furthermore, the transiticns were much more gradual and less
22
perceptible than they were in the Park Hill schools.

Unfortunately, Judge Doyle did not indicate just exactly
how the judicial approach should change in response to these
factors or, for that matter, why these factors necessitated any
change at all. Some insight may be gained by examining the
court's treatment of the two points which it felt the plaintiffs
and causation.
had failed to prove in the core city -intent
The standard for finding purposeful action in the Park Hill
area is reflected in the following language:
We do not find that the purpose here included malicious or
odious intent. At the same time, it was action which was taken
with knowledge of the consequences, and the consequences were
not merely possible, they were substantially certain. Under
2 "
such conditions the action is unquestionably wilful.
Yet when the court considered the core-city schools, something more was evidently required:
In examining the boundary changes and removal of optional
zones in connection with the several schools which are discussed
Is The opinions themselves must be studied to fully appreciate the extent
of the similarity between the two sets of facts. If anything, the evidence
relating to the core city schools seems stronger. 303 F. Supp. at 290-94;
313 F. Supp. at 69-73.
19 313 F. Supp. at 69.
211303 F. Supp. at 295 (emphasis added).

445 F.2d at 1002.
313 F. Supp. at 69.
23 303 F. Supp. at 286 (footnote omitted).

21

22
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above, we do not find any wilful or malicious actions on
part of the Board or the administration (in relationship to
mentary schools). As to these schools, the result is about
same as it would have been had the administration pursued
criminatory policies, since the Negroes and, to an extent
24
Hispanos as well, always seem to end up in isolation.
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The court attributed this result to the failure of the Board to
take integrating action and to the already established housing
patterns. However, it is evident just from the text of these two
quotations that the Park Hill standard would have dictated a
de jure finding in the core city. The evidence clearly showed
that the segregative effects of each proposed core-city decision
were brought forcefully to the attention of the Board. Apparently the court would be satisfied here with nothing less
than proof of malicious intent.
This notion that time somehow renders intent constitutionally harmless reappears throughout the opinion. For example, the following statements were made after a review of the
Board actions affecting core-city schools:
It should also be kept in mind that prior to Brown v. Board of
Education, supra, it was apparently taken for granted by everybody that the status quo, as far as the Negroes were concerned,
should not be disturbed because this was the desire of the
majority of the community. Time and again the Board members
testified to the fact that in making decisions they held hearings
and finally bowed to the community sentiment. Thus, they say
they did not intend to segregate or refuse to integrate. They just
found the consensus and followed it.25
The same argument was accorded much different treatment
when advanced in relation to the Park Hill schools:
The defendants have alluded to the fact that Resolution 1533
represents the will of the people, and that any action taken by
this Court which would adversely affect the Resolution would
frustrate that will. But as we have seen Brown v. Board of Ed.
and all of the subsequent cases hold that equal protection of the
laws is synonymous with the right to equal educational opportunities and that segregated schools can never provide that
equality. The constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment were designed to protect
fundamental rights, not only of the majority but of minorities
as well, even against the will of the majority. The effort to accommodate community sentiment or the wishes of a majority of
desirable, cannot justify
voters, although usually valid and
26
abandonment of our Constitution.

The distinction seems to center around the timing of the
313 F. Supp. at 73.
25 Id.
26 303 F. Supp. at 287-88.
24

1972
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acts in relation to the Brown decision.2 7 In effect, the court
excuses decisions made in the 1950's on the basis that school
authorities were not then aware of the extent of their responsibilities. They assumed that their decisions were constitutional
and given this legal purity of heart it would not now be fair
to attribute to them an unconstitutional intent. But what relevance can this possibly have? Were not the defendants in
Brown equally true to what everyone regarded as the mandate
of the fourteenth amendment? From a legal standpoint, the
factors mentioned cannot possibly justify the different standards used to gauge intent.
The second requirement which received inconsistent application with respect to the two school areas was causation. In
order to support a finding of de jure segregation, the plaintiffs
must prove that there is "a causal connection between the acts
of the school administration complained of and the current
condition of segregation. '28 Judge Doyle found no such causal
connection in the core city since the housing trend had passed
completely beyond these schools, and they would have become
segregated regardless of the actions of the Board. The court
felt that, even assuming intent, "it would be inequitable to
conclude de jure segregation exists where a de jure act had no
more than a trifling effect on the end result which produced
the condition.""2
On its face this argument has considerable
merit. It does seem a bit absurd to hold the Board responsible
when the present situation would be no better had it behaved
differently. But the assumption here is deceptive. Who can say
what would have happened if the Board had not made decisions
which abruptly changed the racial character of each school
in the line of eastward expansion from predominantly white
to predominantly minority? As the plaintiffs pointed out in
their appellate brief,30 these sudden shifts in racial composition
may well have been a powerful force in driving white families
out of the neighborhood3 1 At the least, the Board actions must
have been a contributing cause. A finding of no causation,
which allows continued segregation, cries out for more convincing support than it was given here.
It is interesting to note that all save one of the acts complained of
were post-Brown. 313 F. Supp. at 69-73.
28 313 F. Supp. at 73.
29 Id. at 74.
30 Opening brief for cross-appellants at 46, Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d
990 (10th Cir. 1971).
3 1 See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecktenburg Case -Its
Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
27
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The most interesting point arising out of the causation question concerns the lack of consistency with which it was treated
in the core city and Park Hill areas. As with the core-city
schools, several of the Park Hill schools are considerably behind
the forefront of current black expansion. Yet Judge Doyle's
findings do not exempt them from the de jure category on the
basis of lack of causation. As though aware of this incongruity,
a footnote to the causation discussion 2 indicates that even noncausal segregative acts may be probative of the intentionally
segregative nature of later decisions and gives as an example
several Park Hill schools which were discussed in connection
with the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531. However,
the footnote fails to mention that in a prior opinion it was
specifically held that the construction and attendance boundary
decisions affecting these schools constituted de jure segregation.33 It was this finding, rather than that relating to the
rescission, which was later affirmed by the circuit court.
In sum, there are two glaring discrepancies in the court's
treatment of the core city and Park Hill areas. By applying
different standards of intent and causation, different conclusions were reached on essentially identical facts. The only
apparent justification was that attitudes had radically changed
since the core-city decisions N._,e made. Upon looking at the
more recent Board decisions in Park Hill, one wonders
just how
34
great the change has been.
35
The district court decision was appealed by both sides.

313 F. Supp. at 74-75 n.18.
303 F. Supp. at 295.
34 It might be appropriate at this point to question the trial court's separation of the core city and Park Hill schools. If, as the court freely admitted, the process of black expansion was a single continuing trend,
what possible reason could there be for dividing it at Colorado Boulevard and viewing the resulting areas separately? The reason is very
possibly to be found in the court's heavy reliance on the recission of
the resolutions designed to integrate the Park Hill Schools. Having
treated only the areas covered by those resolutions in the original
opinion, the core city formed a "residue" which could be treated
separately if for no other reason than that the Park Hill area had
already been disposed of.
But why does this separation justify different treatment? As a
matter of pure speculation, it may have been that Judge Doyle, as a
resident of Denver, was aware of the more dramatic nature of the
black expansion into Park Hill- dramatic not so much because of its
speed, but because of the socio-economic status of the Park Hill residents. As Judge Doyle pointed out, Colorado Boulevard serves as a
natural dividing line. Park Hill had always been insulated from the
core city by this wide six-lane thoroughfare. When the barrier was
breached, the white panic so common to transitional neighborhoods
set in with a vengeance. Racist thoughts were blooming where none
had grown before. Perhaps these recent events strengthened the impression of intent when the evidence relating to Park Hill was reviewed.
35 Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
32

33

COMMENTS

The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Hill, approved the trial
court's treatment of the de jure question. Applying the clear
error rule, 30; Judge Hill saw sufficient evidence in the record
to support a de jure finding in Park Hill and a finding of no
intent in the core city. He did not mention the inconsistency
in the intent and causation standards applied below. It is obvious that if Judge Doyle was in error in applying these different
standards, Judge Hill's use of the clear error rule was inappropriate. For until the proper legal standard has been determined, it is impossible to determine whether a particular
factual finding is supportable. For example, what would be
clear error under a malicious intent standard might be perfectly acceptable if a man is deemed to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his acts.
The appellate court's failure to deal with this legal issue
leaves unanswered the most pressing question in de jure
cases-what is necessary to prove intent? In purely practical
terms, any standard more rigorous than that applied by Judge
Doyle in the Park Hill area would limit the modern applications of Brown to unimaginably blatant cases of purposefully
segregative state action. Given the importance of what potential plaintiffs have at stake, it is hardly in keeping with the
protective spirit of Brown to require concrete proof of maliciousness.
Another solution to the problem of proving intent was
offered by plaintiffs on appeal. They argued that once they
had objectively demonstrated the segregative effect of the
defendants' actions, a presumption should have arisen and the
Board should have had the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the resultant segregation was not intended. In support
of this proposition, plaintiffs cited two cases-United States
v. School District 1513- and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority.

38

In School District 151 Judge Hoffman made the following
conclusion of law:
The contemporaneous existence, within one system, of some
schools whose faculties and student bodies are almost exclusively
white and other schools whose faculties and student bodies are
almost exclusively Negro creates a presumption of discriminatory faculty assignments which requires the school authorities
39
to demonstrate the constitutionality of their procedures.
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
37286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), permanent injunction granted, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
38 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.1969).
39 286 F. Supp. at 797.
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In Gautreaux, a case involving alleged discrimination in site
selection for public housing, the court said:
The statistics on the family housing sites considered during the
five major programs show a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites were vetoed on the basis of the racial
composition of the site's neighborhood. In the face of these figures, CHA's failure to present a substantial or even speculative
indication that racial criteria were not used entitles plaintiffs
40
to a judgment as a matter of law.

Realizing that, even with this case support, a showing of
segregative effect might not be considered sufficient to raise a
presumption, the plaintiffs added another factor: the "traditional doctrine often repeated by the courts . . . that where
facts pleaded by one party lie peculiarly in the knowledge of
the adversary, the latter has the burden of proving it."' 4I This
doctrine seems particularly appropriate in the present case. It
is virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of intent. On the other hand, evidence of a lack of
segregative purpose should be within ready reach of the Board
whch presumably keeps records of its actions and the data upon
which they were based. If these records fail to disclose a
realistic and rational justification for its decisions, it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that the Board intended what it
accomplished.
Judge Hill did not agree.
Where, as here, the system is not a dual one, and where no
type of state imposed segregation has previously been established, the burden is on plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the racial imbalance exists and that it was
caused by intentional state action. Once a prima facie case is
made, the defendants have the burden of going forward with
the evidence. They may attack the allegations of segregatory
intent, causation and/or defend on the4 2grounds of justification
in terms of legitimate state interests.

Besides being insensitive to the problems of circumstantial
proof, this standard is palpably erroneous. State imposed segregation is unconstitutional per se, and no question of justification arises once it has been shown. Witness Judge Hill's earlier
statement of the applicable law:
We begin with the fundamental principle that state imposed
unequal and
racial segregation in public schools is inherently
43
violative of the equal protection clause.

Although this inconsistency in legal theory was not crucial
40

296 F. Supp. at 913.

41 C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

445 F.2d at 1006 (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 999.
42

§ 318 (1954).
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to the outcome of this portion of the case, it serves to reemphasize the prevailing confusion as to the proper standard
for proving de jure segregation. Until clear guidelines are
supplied, plaintiffs will continue to receive irreconcilable judgments which have little apparent relation to the facts presented.
II. NEW EQUAL

PROTECTION

The second major branch of the plaintiffs' case involves a
far more sophisticated equal protection argument designed to
achieve the same end as a finding of de jure segregation but
without the necessity of proving intent. In order to put this
theory in perspective, it is necessary to undertake a brief
review of the development of the doctrine of equal protection.
A.

Equal Protection in General

Any law necessarily establishes classifications in the form
of conditions precedent to its application-the elements of a
crime, the requirements to obtain a license, etc. The concern
of equal protection is that these classifications be rationally
related to the end which the law is designed to serve. 44 However, the standard originally applied to judge rationalitypopularly styled "old equal protection"- was minimal indeed.
If the classification might be rational under any conceivable
state of facts, the courts would uphold the law. 4 The plaintiff in such a case had an almost conclusive presumption of
validity to overcome.
It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish
some inequality of treatment that resulted from the state
action of which he complained. In the normal case this requirement created no problem. The court was faced with a
statute which accorded benefits or imposed punishments depending upon the presence or absence of certain traits. Persons
who possessed these traits were quite obviously treated differently, in terms of the purpose of the statute, from those
who did not. The court could easily judge whether the statutory criteria upon which the distinction was made formed a
rational basis for the inequality of treatment received.
However, in the separate-but-equal cases, the inequality
was not nearly so apparent. No matter what the student's race,
he went to school. A Plessy-minded court could see no inequality there. The major departure in Brown was that sep44 E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
45 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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arate schools were seen as inherently unequal. This finding for
the first time gave legal recognition to the inequality of educational opportunity suffered by the victims of segregation.
It is absolutely crucial to fully understand the causal relationship between the statutory classification in Brown (race)
and the constitutional inequality found by the Court (an unequal educational opportunity). The inequality complained of
was not the direct statutory consequence of the possession of
the trait upon which the application of the statute depended.
The immediate effect of the statute was segregation. But the
ultimate "real-world" effect, in terms of the purpose of the law,
was inequality of educational opportunity. Since the immediate
effect had a causal connection to the ultimate effect, the inequality complained of was sufficiently the result of the statutory classification to entitle the plaintiffs to a judicial determination as to the rationality of the relation between classification and purpose.
Unfortunately, the Court did not undertake an assessment
of rationality after it found inequality. It can only be assumed
that in 1954 no one even bothered to make the gesture of arguing that race was a proper criterion upon which to decide educational matters. Be that as it may, the failure of the Court
to complete its equal protection analysis has been the cause of
much confusion. Courts have had to speculate as to what other
considered but unmentioned factors in Brown were crucial to
the decision. However, the nature of equal protection at that
time is sufficiently clear to allow a reconstruction of the
omitted steps. 4 ' The classification established by the statute
was race. The purpose of the law was to provide public education. The ultimate effect of the classification was inequality
in the educational opportunity offered. This inequality was
constitutionally permissible only if the criterion upon which
it was based bore some rational relation to the provision of
public education. Since there could be no rational connection
between a student's race and the education he should receive,
the law providing separate schools was unconstitutional.
Brown, then, may be seen as embodying two principles.
Generally, a classification which has the ultimate effect of
producing inequality must be based on criteria which are
rationally related, in terms of the purpose of the act, to the
46 As will subsequently be seen, the relegation of Brown to the

realm of

the old equal protection with its minimal review standard may do it an
injustice. The Court dwelt at length on the importance of education in
terms quite familiar to the new equal protection ear.
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difference in treatment which flows from their application.
More specifically, where the facts are as they were in Brown,
i.e., where race is the classification, there is always a constitutional violation since segregation always results in inequality
and race is never rationally related to the purpose of a
public education statute or the unequal treatment in which
it results. This latter is the per se rule of Brown upon which
the plaintiffs in Keyes relied in the portion of the case first
discussed herein. But this rule is not the limit of Brown, nor
of the fourteenth amendment. As indicated by the more generally applicable first principle, the court is not relieved of its
obligation to examine the classification that was used simply
because it finds that a racial classification was not used, i.e.,
that there was no intentional segregation.
At the risk of being repetitive, this last idea will be restated, for in it lies the key to understanding Brown. The inquiry into intent is simply a judicial effort to fix the classification which was in fact used. A finding of intent to segregate
means that the state differentiated on the basis of race, an
inherently impermissible classification, either overtly or in the
guise of some otherwise neutral classification such as the
neighborhood school system. Lack of intent means only that a
racial classification was not used-it does not mean that the
classification that was in fact used, e.g., the neighborhood
school system, is necessarily valid. That cannot be known until
47
the full equal protection analysis has been completed.
The preceding discussion has assumed that a "rational
relation" between classification and purpose is all that the
equal protection clause requires. In a line of cases beginning
even before Brown, the Supreme Court has indicated that in
certain situations a far more rigorous test will be applied. This
"new equal protection" doctrine is called into play where the
classification is based on "suspect" criteria or adversely affects
a "fundamental" right. Such a classification will receive "strict
scrutiny" from the bench and must be justified in terms of a
"compelling state interest. ' 48
The birth of new equal protection can be traced back to
1942 and the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.4 9 The Court was
there asked to declare unconstitutional a statute requiring the
47 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
49 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals. The statutory
classification "habitual criminal" was defined to include any
person with a record of two or more convictions for felonies
involving moral turpitude who was thereafter convicted of
another such felony and sentenced to an Oklahoma prison. An
exception to this classification provided that certain offenses,
including embezzlement, would not be considered in applying
the statute.
The Court first acknowledged that the actions of state
governments carry an impressive presumption of validity. Even
so, it felt that the statute could not stand:
[T]he instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which
the rule . . . requires. We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights cf man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur50
vival of the race.

After discussing the potential for abuse inherent in the power
to sterilize and the irretrievable loss of liberty which followed
its exercise, the Court continued:
We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the
police power of the States. We advert to them merely in
emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification
which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
against groups or types of individuals in violation of the con51
stitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.

In strictly scrutinizing the Oklahoma statute, the Court
discovered, by reference to other state criminal laws, that, e.g.,
the difference between larceny by fraud (a felony involving
moral turpitude) and embezzlement (a felony excepted by the
statute) might turn on the timing of the formation of the
felon's intent to appropriate the property of another to his own
use. The Court could find no basis upon which to infer that
such timing had any genetic significance. Therefore, the classification was insupportable.
Skinner appears to have been a significant departure from
the traditional equal protection approach. Rather than imagining situations in which the classification might be rational, the
Court made a detailed search for irrationalities. It looked not
only at the statute in question, but also to the other laws which
might affect its operation. This special approach where funda50 Id. at 541.

(emphasis added). The italicized word "unwittingly" is certainly
inconsistent with the notion that a violation of the fourteenth amendment requires intent.

51 Id.
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mental rights are involved was to become the cornerstone of
the new equal protection.
Although Brown contains no reference to Skinner, a cursory
glance at the two opinions makes it clear that the Court's view
of the nature of the right involved in each was essentially
similar. For example:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments ....
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship....
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
52
equal terms.

It would not seem a distortion of this language to say that the
Court considered education a fundamental right. The holding in
Brown cannot be divorced from the embryonic new equal protection notion in Skinner, and it is therefore doubly unfortunate
that

the full equal

protection

analysis

was

not

supplied.

A

clear indication of the effect which the Court's special regard
for education had upon its approach

to the case

might have

avoided much confusion.
Since these early beginnings the growth of new equal protection has been startling. The process has consisted of the incorporation of an increasing number of individual interests into
the category of "fundamental rights""

and the development of

the idea that certain classifications are inherently suspect and
should

be

the object

right involved.5

4

The

of strict
following

scrutiny

no matter

language

from

what

the

McDonald v.

5-347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
5 See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of
the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 743-44
(1969), where the following "basic rights" are listed as having received
new equal protection treatment since Skinner:
(1)
voting [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)];
(2)
marriage [Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)];
(3)
fairness in the criminal process [Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)];
(4)
education [Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), with
additional support from Brown];
(5)
interstate travel [Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)];
and
(6)
the intimate familial relationship between parent and child
[Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)].
.4 See Karst, supra note 53, at 740-43. Mr. Karst considers wealth, Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and race, Brown, to be firmly established
as suspect classifications and indicates that sex and student status may
receive similar treatment in future cases.
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Board of Election Commissioners55 summarizes these developments in regard to voting rights:
[W]e have held that because of the overriding importance of voting rights, classifications "which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined" where those
rights are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause ....
And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race . . . two
factors which would independently render a classification highly
5
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. "

The Court has not insisted that the suspect classification
be explicitly set out in the statute. It is enough that the harsh
effect of the law falls on some class for which the law has a
57
special solicitude. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois the Court

considered a statute which allowed appellate review in criminal
cases as a matter of right, but required that the defendant
furnish certain documents to the appeals court which sometimes
could not be prepared without a stenographic transcript of the
trial. Because of the cost of obtaining such a transcript, the
effect of this statute was to discriminate against the poor when
they attempted to exercise the right to appeal criminal convictions. The Court treated the statute exactly as though it had
58
established a classification based on wealth, and required the
state to devise some means of providing appellate review to
those who could not afford a transcript. Thus, even a techmay be traced in its
nically nondiscriminatory classification
59
falls.
burden
the
where
see
to
effect
The growth of the new equal protection has not been confined to the factors which give cause for its application. It
has recently become apparent that the Court is no longer satisfied with the Skinner approach of strictly scrutinizing a classification to see if any irrationality exists in its relation to the
purpose of the statute. The focus has shifted to the effects of
the classification. That is, the Court will require that the state
demonstrate some "compelling state interest" which is furthered
55394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Id. at 807 (citations omitted). The language is essentially dicta since the
Court found that the facts presented did not fulfill either of the requirements for the application of the new equal protection standard.
57 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5is The Court here was considering the wealth classification to judge its
rationality in relation to purpose rather than as a factor calling for the
new equal protection approach. However, Griffin is generally considered to have established a principle which is fully applicable in the
latter context. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967),
modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 506-07 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub
no'm. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

56
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by the classification in order to justify the infringement on
0
the rights of the plaintiff.
This approach is well illustrated in Shapiro v. Thompson. 1
The fact situation involved statutes imposing a 1-year residency
requirement on eligibility for welfare assistance. The Court
held that there is a constitutional right to travel interstate
and that this residency requirement chilled the exercise of that
right. Defendants offered as justification four governmental
objectives which were allegedly served by the 1-year requirement. All four were administrative or economic concerns.
Before assessing their merit, the Court had this to say:
At the outset, we reject appellants' argument that a mere
showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period
and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suf[A]ppellees were exercisfice to justify the classification ....
ing a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconsti62
tutional.

In examining the justifications offered, the Court made it
clear that the term "compelling" was used advisedly. Each
of the four was rejected either because the classification did not
in fact promote the proffered objective or because there was a
less onerous alternative for accomplishing the same end.
The net effect of new equal protection is to strip state
action of its presumptive validity. If the plaintiff can show
some harm in the form of unequal treatment under a suspect
classification or in respect to a fundamental right, the state
must show that the public benefit flowing from the classification established is great enough to justify the harm suffered by
the plaintiff. It becomes a balancing exercise - individual harm
(most often a whole class of individuals) v. public benefit.
B. Equal Protection in Keyes
With this background in general equal protection theory,
we may proceed to examine the second portion of the Keyes
opinions. The plaintiffs first sought to establish a legal injury
for which relief could be granted. They introduced evidence
that the Denver schools with high concentrations of minority
students offered an educational opportunity which was inferior
to that available at the predominantly Anglo schools. Each
6oKramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
62

Id. at 634.
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school was rated on five indicia of quality: (1) average scholastic achievement of pupils; (2) teacher experience; (3) teacher
turnover; (4) dropout rates; and (5) age and size of school
facilities.6 3 The trial court found that schools with 70 to 75
percent black or Hispano students consistently rated below
Anglo schools in each of these categories and that this was
sufficient proof that an inferior educational opportunity was
being offered in the minority schools.
Plaintiffs then introduced expert testimony which persuaded the trial court that the correlation between inferiority
64
Judge Doyle
and minority concentrations was not fortuitous.
is a major
cause,
its
of
regardless
"segregation,
that
concluded
educational
factor in producing inferior schools and unequal
opportunity. '" ;5 "Many factors contribute . . . but the predominant one appears to be enforced isolation imposed in the name
66
of neighborhood schools and housing patterns."
Having found the requisite factual inequality, the court
proceeded to a discussion of the traditional equal protection
standard still applicable to economic regulation, and then introduced the new equal plotection theory:
The courts ... have jealously guarded the rights of disadvantaged groups such as the poor or minorities, and have held
that where state action, even if non-discriminatory on its face,
results in the unequal treatment of the poor or a minority group
as a class, the action is unconstitutional unless the state provides a substantial justification in terms of legitimate state interest .

. .

. This general principal of constitutional law is fully

67
applicable to school segregation cases.

Already the court has accomplished two important tasks.
First, and foremost, it recognized that the general principles
of equal protection must be applied even after a lack of intentional segregation has been found, i.e., that the Brown per se
rule is not the limit of the fourteenth amendment in school
segregation cases. Second, it applied the Griffin principle that
the classification need not be overtly racial in order to elicit
68
However, the opinion
the new equal protection response.
of new equal probranch
other
the
of
advantage
take
to
fails
The court's discussion of these five factors and the significance of each
is found in 313 F. Supp. at 79-81.
64 313 F. Supp. at 81-82.
65 Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 83 (footnote omitted). This thinly veiled implication that Denver's
neighborhood school policy was a sham is difficult to reconcile with
the earlier finding that no intent to segregate was evident in the core
63

67

city.
Id. at 82.

68

See Griffin discussion, note 58 supra.
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tection which was clearly available. There is no discussion of
education as a fundamental right.
And this is but the first unfortunate aspect of the opinion.
After the groundwork had been so nicely laid, the new equal
protection analysis was not completed. Instead, the court
moved rather more directly to the conclusion that a constitutional violation existed by way of a modern version of the old
Plessy argument. To wit, although the school board need not
take affirmative action to eliminate de facto segregation, it is
under a constitutional duty to insure that its schools offer an
equal educational oportunity. Since the court had previously
held that the minority schools in Denver were inferior, it
naturally concluded that the Board had failed to discharge this
duty. And since segregation, even though de facto, was
the cause of this failure, the appropriate remedy was desegregation.6 9
Judge Doyle seems to have lifted this theory directly from
the opinion of Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hansen.70 Indeed,
that is the only case cited. However, the qualification which
accompanied the theory in Hobson was not discussed in Keyes.
Judge Wright noted that a strict application of the Plessy
argument would always dictate unconstitutionality when inequality was discovered. 7' But in this modern context where
no de jure segregation is present, Judge Wright felt that "no
court would advance so absolutist an approach. 7' 2 The state
must be allowed an opportunity to justify its actions. A
thorough discussion of the justification issue in the trial court's
opinion would have made the analysis much stronger.
Despite Judge Wright's indication in Hobson that the Plessy
argument as there applied was something of a first, when put
in proper perspective the illusion of uniqueness is dispelled.
It is merely a restatement of the new equal protection. The
state can run its school system according to any nonracial
classification it chooses, even if the effect is segregation. However, if an inequality of educational opportunity results, the
state must justify its choice of classifications by showing that
they yield some positive social benefit sufficient to offset the
harm from the inequality. Since segregation always results in
inequality, the state will always need to justify its classifica69 313 F. Supp. at 82-83.
70269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,

408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71
72

Cases cited note 8 supra.
269 F. Supp. at 497.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

tions where they produce segregation. Thus, there is no difference in substance or result between new separate-but-equal
and new equal protection. However, it is always a sad event
when a new label is thrown into an area as confused as this.
One has to regret Judge Wright's inclusion of this theory, especially since he presented a detailed and complete analysis in
the more usual terms of new equal protection later in his
opinion. 73 Even more to be regretted is Judge Doyle's decision
to adopt the former rather than the latter.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals could not agree with the
separate-but-equal approach.74 Although the details of the analysis are sometimes hard to follow, 75 it is evident that the
reason for reversal was lack of intent:
However, then, in the final analysis, the finding that an unequal
educational opportunity exists in the designated core schools must
rest squarely on the premise that Denver's neighborhood school
policy is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment because it permits segregation in fact. This76 . .. cannot be accepted under the
existing law of this Circuit.

The only reasonable interpretation of this statement is that
no constitutional violation is possible if the segregation was not
intentional, i.e., resulted from good faith adherence to a neighborhood school policy. The court appears to have been caught
in the confusion surrounding the Brown per se rule which is
here seen as the limit of the fourteenth amendment in school
cases. The neighborhood school policy is transmuted into a principle of constitutional law which, if religiously adhered to,
offers complete protection no matter what its factual results.
If our prior discussion of equal protection theory has any
semblance of validity, this cannot be the law. There is not
now, nor has there ever been, an intent requirement in the
fourteenth amendment. Yet this court and others like it ' 7 con73 Id. at 506-08.

445 F.2d at 1002-05.
This portion of Judge Hill's opinion is genuinely difficult to interpret.
For example, at one point he indicates that he can see no reason why
an unequal educational opportunity would not be a constitutional violation "provided the state has acted to cause the harm without substantial
justification in terms of legitimate state interest." 445 F.2d at 1004. If
the reference is to intentional state action, it is difficult to reconcile the
opportunity given for justification with the holding in Broum that
de jure segregation is per se a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
If no intent is contemplated, then the ultimate decision that there was
no constitutional violation is in direct conflict with this statement since
no discussion of justification was undertaken which would account for
that result.
76 445 F.2d at 1004.
77 E.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 914; Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
,4

75
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tinue to treat school cases as though they were sui generis to
be decided under a separate constitutional amendment enacted
in Brown. The effect, of course, is that the whole body of equal
protection law which the Supreme Court has been at such
pains to develop in order to protect individual liberties is lost
to minority children seeking to equip themselves to survive in
modern society.
III. A

RECOMMENDED APPROACH

Neither of the Keyes opinions appears to be an exemplar
of legal theory. On the de jure question the trial court used
inconsistent standards to judge intent and causation in the two
areas of Denver considered. The appellate court failed to note
this inconsistency. In considering new equal protection, Judge
Doyle certainly arrived at the appropriate result, but he failed
to perform the necessary step-by-step analysis. The appellate
court mistook the Brown per se rule for the fourteenth amendment. In view of the confusion engendered by these and similar
opinions, it seems appropriate to attempt to combine the lessons
learned in the foregoing discussion into a recommended approach to equal protection problems in any state where no dual
school system has ever existed.
The inquiry must first focus on the possible existence of
de jure segregation. If the plaintiffs can bring themselves under
the Brown per se rule, no further analysis will be necessary.
They face the formidable task of amassing sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove intent. Ideally, a showing that segregation exists, coupled perhaps with evidence of school attendance boundary and construction decisions which had a segregative effect, would give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
intent. If the defendants could demonstrate some reasonably
weighty justification for these decisions the presumption would
disappear.
Barring a presumption, the standard used to judge intent
should be that a person is deemed to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his acts. Only under this test can the subjective element of intent be rendered capable of objective proof.
As to causation, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be required
to show that the present state of segregation is the direct and
proximate result of any past state action. This concept of causation presents almost insurmountable problems in relatively
simple tort suits. It becomes totally unmanageable when
applied to anything so complex as the myriad social forces
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which go into the determination of racial housing patterns. The
burden should be only to show that intentional state action in
78
the past had a segregative effect which was never corrected.
If plaintiffs fail to establish that a racial classification has
been used, i.e., intent, then the analysis must proceed along the
normal equal protection lines. Since the Brown per se rule is
not available, plaintiffs must demonstrate some legally recognizable injury which flows from the classification established
-here, the neighborhood school policy. Under the cases discussed,7 9 the court must look to the "real-world" effect of the
classification and not just to its statutory consequences. Therefore, the plaintiffs may establish inequality by statistical evidence and then prove that the inequality results from segregation produced when the neighborhood school policy is applied
to current racial housing patterns. There is no need to show
that this result was intended.8 0
Even under the old equal protection standard, proof of inequality would entitle the plaintiffs to a judicial determination
as to whether there is a rational relation between the neighborhood school policy and the purpose of providing an education (or whatever other legitimate state purposes might be
served). Presumably this minimal test would be met. Certainly there is an imaginable set of circumstances in which the
relation might be very rational indeed.
However, the plaintiffs are not limited to the old equal
protection approach. Education falls squarely within the class
of fundamental rights.s1 This in itself should call for strict
judicial scrutiny of the effects of the neighborhood school
system. But it need not stand alone. For although no suspect
class is overtly used, the detrimental effects attributed to this
classification fall on a minority group "for which the Constitution has a special solicitude. 8 2- This focused effect adds great
weight to the new equal protection argument.
78

7)

"The school board will also have to show that its past discriminatory
racial designation of schools, site selection, and
conduct -involving
determination of school size - is not a link in the causal chain producing the segregation." Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case -Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 701
(1971). The author was speaking in the context of a state which formerly had separate school systems.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.

483 (1954).

80 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
81 Karst, supra note 53, at 743, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified
sub noa. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
82 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub
nom. Smuck V. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Assuming that the strict scrutiny test is to be applied, the
burden falls on the state to produce some compelling state
interest promoted by the classification in order to justify the
inequality of treatment demonstrated by the plaintiffs. "[Tihe
objectives . . .further [ed] must be unattainable by narrower
or less offensive . . .courses; and even so, those objectives must
be of sufficient magnitude to override, in the court's judgment,
the evil of the inequality which the [classification] en83
genders.
The balancing process by which the justification question
must be resolved is delicate indeed. The state has important
economic and administrative interests in the neighborhood
school system. Any solution to segregation which is so expensive as to destroy the state's ability to perform its educational
function is clearly unwarranted. However, it would be a highly
unusual case in which the burden approached this level. Barring concrete proof of prohibitive expense, the economic and
administrative concerns of the state are simply not sufficient to
overbalance the deprivation inherent in segregated schools. 4
But these are not the interests which weigh most heavily
in favor of the neighborhood school system. The primary
interest of the state is to provide a sound education to all students. Therefore, the balance is to be struck between the
benefits and the burdens of mandatory integration from the students' point of view. The disadvantages of the neighborhood
school system to the students, both white and black, far outweigh the advantages. Granted, there is a greater safety hazard
whenever the distance between home and school is increased.
There may be other drawbacks of like nature. But how do
these compare to the experience of becoming a part of a heterogeneous student body where different backgrounds and outlooks interact daily in the learning process? If today's children
are to avoid the racial misfortunes which have characterized
modern America, they must be given an opportunity to escape
the taught hatred of those years. The neighborhood school
policy tends only to perpetuate the past.
It seems fitting to close with a consideration of the following statement from Judge Wright's Hobson opinion in which he
answered the defendants' attempt to lend historical dignity to

83

Id.

84

How many dollars must the state save to justify its failure to educate a
single child?
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the neighborhool school system by tracing its existence back to
the principles of Horace Mann:
[D]efendants' appropriation of Horace Mann as the supposed
architect of today's neighborhood school policy .

.

. is singularly

unjust. For Mann believed that public schools were at the
source of the democratic enterprise; his faith, like that of his
fellow reformers, was that the public school, by drawing into the
close association of the classroom students from every social,
economic and cultural background, would serve as an object
lesson in equality and brotherhood and undermine the social class
divisions which he and his colleagues felt were inimical to
85
democracy.

These are the highest goals of education. They were at one
time served by the neighborhood school system and still are
in many cities. But there can be no justification for continued
adherence to the neighborhood school system where, because
of changing social conditions, it operates to frustrate the principle in response to which it was designed. Any decision to
abandon the neighborhood school policy as a basic plan must
be legislatively made. However, the failure of legislatures to
act cannot relieve the courts of the obligation to require compelling justification for state infringement upon individual
rights. A dysfunctional school policy can never justify its own
ill effects."6
Andrew L. Blair, Jr.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell

85 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub

nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnote
omitted).
86 This is not to suggest that justification is never possible. The point is
that the courts should not assume an attitude of unthinking reverence
for the neighborhood school policy before its virtues have been demonstrated.

COMMENT
OIL AND GAS - UNITIZATION - Conservation of Oil and Gas
Resources - Greyhound Leasing & Finance Corp. v. Joiner
City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971).
INTRODUCTION

N 1953, an oil well was drilled in Carter County, Oklahoma
on a source measuring approximately 2 by 5/2 miles and
underlying 4,000 acres. Soon thereafter, numerous operators, including Greyhound Leasing's predecessor in interest,' began tapping the same source. In the ensuing years, as primary recovery 2 pressures were being depleted, the necessity of secondary recovery: operations became increasingly apparent. By 1961,
some operators began advocating unitization, 4 and, with Greyhound's predecessor participating, they initiated engineering
groundwork toward that goal. After negotiation, a unitization
plan was adopted and filed with the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission. In 1965, with approximately 95 wells producing
by primary recovery from the common source, a hearing was
conducted on the application. Greyhound Leasing insisted at
the hearing that its two producing wells not be included in
the unit, thereby maintaining the position their predecessor
held in prior negotiations. The Commission consequently
granted Greyhound's request, pursuant to a finding that secondary recovery by the unit would not adversely affect Greyhound Leasing.
In September 1965, shortly after approval of the unit,
1 Greyhound

Leasing and Financial Corporation was the successor in
interest, by merger, of Boothe Leasing Corporation.
2Primary recovery: "[T]he oil, gas, or oil and gas recovered by any
method (natural flow or artificial lift) that may be employed to produce them through a bore; the fluid enters the well bore by the action
of native reservoir energy or gravity." AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (1942).
3 Secondary recovery: "Broadly defined, this term includes all methods
of oil extraction in which energy sources extrinsic, to the reservior are
utilized in the extraction." Index Vol., H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, Oil and Gas Terms 408 (1964). The method of secondary recovery used by Joiner City Unit was injection of salt water
into the formation through an input well, oil being removed from surrounding wells.
" 'Unitization,' or, as it is sometimes described, 'unit operation,' means
the joint operation of all or some part of a producing reservoir. ...
The purpose of unitization is to permit the entire field (or a very substantial portion of it) to be operated as a single entity, without regard
to surface boundary lines." 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW §901 (1968).
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Joiner City Unit began injecting water over a mile from
Greyhound's nearest lease. Eleven months later, Greyhound
brought suit in federal district court to recover damages incurred as a result of injected water having displaced the oil
beneath its leases. The action was tried before a jury, and
Greyhound was awarded $529,844.52 in damages.5 On appeal
to the Tenth Circuit Court, the lower court's decision was
affirmed.
I.

UNITIZATION

IN

OKLAHOMA

In a nation which literally runs on oil, proper conservation of the source of supply is of vital importance. As primary
oil and gas recovery pressures are tapped to the economic
limits of production, it is increasingly necessary to resort to
the use of effective secondary recovery methods in order to
obtain maximum oil recovery. To achieve this end, no fewer
than 22 states,6 including the vast majority of important oil
and gas producing states, with the notable exception of Texas,
have enacted statutes providing for compulsory unitization.
The Oklahoma statute, widely accepted as a model for
other compulsory unitization statutes,7 and perhaps the most
comprehensive on the subject,8 was designed to strike a fair
balance between the protection of traditional property rights
and the interests of conservation. Specifically, the statute was
enacted to regulate oil production "to the end that a greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had therefrom, waste
prevented, and the correlative rights of the owners in a fuller
and more beneficial enjoyment of the oil and gas rights,
protected."9
Under Oklahoma law the Corporation Commission is
charged with the regulation of all oil and gas production in
the state. It has broad powers to "do such things as may be
necessary or proper to carry out and effectuate the purposes

5 Damages were based on the difference between before and after recoverable reserves.
6 Ala., Alas., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Kan., La., Mich., Miss.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Utah, Wash. 6
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 912.
7 Id. § 912.3 at 103.
8 Id. § 912.3 at 102.
9 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.1 (1969). These same purposes are stated
in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100-6-6,-22 (1963). Correlative rights:
"The opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the
owner of each property in a pool too produce without waste his just and
H. WILLIAMS
equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool ...
& C. MEYERS, supra note 3, at 93.
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of this Act."' 10 In the exercise of its police power, the Commission may use the compulsory unitization provisions 1 of
the statute for owners on a common source. 12 Broad scope is
given the Commission to consider the fairest apportionment
formula, 13 including the power to enlarge the unitized area
and to amend the plan of unitization.14 Specific provision also
exists for appeal of any order of the Commission to the Okla5
homa Supreme Court.'
The statute provides that any unit embracing less than
the whole of the common source of supply can be permitted by
the Commission:
[O]nly where it is shown by the evidence that the area to be
so included within the unit area is of such size and shape
as may be reasonably required for the successful and efficient
conduct of the unitized method or methods of operation for
which the unit is created, and that the conduct thereof will
have no material adverse effect upon the remainder of such
common source of supply.16

In a situation where the non-joiner has knowledge that
he is operating in the same pool with the unit and has had
adequate opportunity to participate in the unit, several options
are available to the courts. As the following discussion of each
alternative will reveal, no case law existed prior to Greyhound
Leasing directly on point to support any of the alternatives.
10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.2 (1969). The Colorado counterpart
states "The commission shall have jurisdiction and authority over all
persons and property public and private necessary to enforce the provisions of this article and shall have the power and authority to . . . do

whatever may reasonably be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this article." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-5(1) (1963).
11OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16(5)
(Supp. 1965).
12 Although none share the facts of Greyhound Leasing, numerous Oklahoma decisions have given effect to the Unitization Act, holding it to be
a valid exercise of police power by the legislature and not violative of
section 23, article 2 of the State's constitution. West Edmond Hunton
Lime Unit v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 193 F.2d 818, (10th Cir. 1951);
Jones Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 382 P.2d 751 (Okla. 1963);
Woody v. State Corp. Comm'n, 265 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1954); Spiers v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 843 (1952); Palmer Oil
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951).
13 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16 (4) (d)
(Supp. 1965).
14 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.10. This provision has been subsequently
held constitutional. Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503,
244 P.2d 843 (1952); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204
Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951). The Colorado statutory counterpart is
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-16(6)
(Supp. 1965).
15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.6 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-11 (1963) calls for appeal to the district courts.
If OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969) (emphasis added). The Colorado provision reads: "An order may provide for unit operations on less
than the whole of a pool where the unit area is of such size and shape
as may be reasonably required for that purpose, and the conduct thereof
will have no adverse effect upon other portions of the pool. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 100-6-16(8) (Supp. 1965).
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Legislative intent and public policy considerations, however,
loom large in deciding upon the proper solution.
II.

THE DECISION IN GREYHOUND LEASING

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals limited itself to the
consideration of only two alternatives by restricting its inquiry
to two issues: (1) whether Oklahoma's modified private nuisance doctrine should have been applied; and (2) whether the
Corporation Commission's order resulted in immunity from liability to Joiner City Unit. 1'7 The first question is framed so that
an affirmative answer would give full effect to the protection
of individual property rights while ignoring sound conservation
practices. In contrast, an affirmative answer to the second question would give full scope to conservation interests while ignoring property rights.
In considering the issue respecting the applicability of the
modified private nuisance doctrine, the court apparently viewed
the Oklahoma constitutional provision providing that "[n]o
private property shall be taken or damaged for private use ...
unless by consent of the owner" as being in conflict with the
conservation provisions of the Unitization Act.18 Oklahoma
court interpretations of this constitutional provision have resulted in a strong flavor of strict liability in the application
of the private nuisance doctrine. To interpret Oklahoma's aplication of this doctrine, the court in Greyhound relied heavily
on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes.'9 In Gulf Oil the defendant was
held strictly liable for damages to plaintiff's water supply resulting from defendant's use of "water flooding" in secondary
recovery of oil.2 0 Greyhound also made brief reference to other
17 444 F.2d 439, 441 (10th Cir. 1971).
18 In view of the weight placed on this constitutional provision by the
court, both the Oklahoma provision and its Colorado counterpart are
quoted here in full for purposes of comparison.
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23. "No private property shall be taken or
damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, or for drains
and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, mining, or sanitary
purposes, in such manner as may be prescribod by law."
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 14. "Private property shall not be taken for
private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of
necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or
across the lands of others, for agriculture, mining, milling, domestic
or sanitary purposes."
1, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962).
20 An earlier Oklahoma case, quoted by Gulf Oil Corp., was Fairfax Oil
Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939). This was an action
based on damages from vibrations resulting from defendant's oil drilling
operation. The court held that, even though defendant's wells were
worked on in a lawful manner and without negligence, the effect of
section 23, article 2 of the constitution required that plaintiff recover
as for a nuisance in fact.
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Oklahoma cases considering the private nuisance doctrine, 21 but
the court ended argument on the question by further reference
to Gulf Oil:
We must take the decisional law prevailing in Oklahoma to be
as expressed in the opinion in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes ....
This rule should be applied to the somewhat different facts
before us unless these differences provide some substantial
We find that differences do not provide
reason to the contrary.
22
such a reason.

Thus, the court held the modified nuisance doctrine applicable,
and that salt water intrusion was a nuisance per se under state
decisions.
It appears that the court stretched the rule of stare decisis
by applying Gulf Oil's strict liability holding to the significantly different circumstances found in Greyhound Leasing.
Since the injury was to a water supply, unitization legislation
was immaterial to the facts of Gulf Oil. Under the facts of
Greyhound Leasing, however, the unitization statute clearly
requires that conservation interests be balanced with property
rights. Previous Oklahoma decisions have found no conflict between this statute and constitutional private property
23
protections.
In considering the second issue of whether the Corporation
Commission's order resulted in immunity to Joiner City Unit,
the court gave a negative response to the argument urged by
the defendants. Joiner City Unit argued that the Commissioner's order irrevocably fixed the rights of all parties on the
common source allowing Greyhound Leasing no recovery. It
was a-serted that Greyhound Leasing was completely aware
of the circumstances and had full opportunity to participate in
the unit. The defense concluded that, by refusing to participate,
Greyhound Leasing assumed the risk of remaining outside the
unit and was therefore estopped from asserting any claim if
the risk yielded unfavorable results.
The court acknowledged that the Commission specifically
retained jurisdiction and admitted that the Commission's exerWest Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954);
West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226
P.2d 965 (1950); Larkins-Warr Trust v. Watchorn Petroleum Co., 198
Okla. 12, 174 P.2d 589 (1946); British-American Oil Producing Co. v.
McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.2d 530 (1942). Like Gulf Oil Corp. and
Fairfax Oil Co., however, none of these cases involved a contest over
prevention of waste or correlative rights in a common source of supply
as previously determined by the Corporation Commission. Rather, they
were cases which were primarily exercises in the application of the
state's private nuisance doctrine.
(emphasis added).
22444 F.2d 439, 442 (10th Cir. 1971)
23 See cases cited note 12 supra.
21
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cise of police power was valid under Oklahoma law. 24 The
court also pointed out that no attempt had been made to compel plaintiff's participation in the unit, and that the Commission had approved unitization of all of a common source except
for Greyhound's leases. The court then proceeded to explain
that:
[I]t does not follow that the Commission thereby somehow
permitted the Unit operations on their authority to extend
with the Commission's blessing to the portion not unitized as
defendant infers. The tracts of plaintiff simply were not unitized nor reclassified, and this is clearly permitted under the
relative
statute. These tracts were thus in no different position
2
to regulation than they were before the hearing. 5

Despite the fact that Greyhound was on notice of the unit
operation, it could have taken no precautionary measures to
avoid the flooding of its wells and had every right to full
enjoyment of property rights in the absence of the Commission's exercise of compulsory unitization provisions. Consequently, the court found no Joiner City Unit immunity as a
result of the Commission's order. It also found no Oklahoma
authority to preclude the hearing of a cause of action for damages by a court 26 and upheld the trial court's ruling that:
"[A] s a matter of law . . . the plaintiff need not have resorted
to administrative relief before the Oklahoma Corporation Com'2
mission before commencing the legal proceedings.
The court's second question was framed so as to yield an
all or nothing answer. Had the court chosen this alternative,
holding Joiner City Unit "immune," a non-joiner's right to
remain independent would be reduced to a gamble. To allow
plaintiff no remedy in these circumstances would in effect
coerce unitization in complete disregard for individual property
rights.
On the other hand, the court, in finding no Joiner City
Unit "immunity" and in denying further administrative action
by holding Joiner City Unit strictly liable for its operation,
serves to discourage would-be joiners from unit operation in
complete disregard for conservation of oil resources. From a
public policy standpoint, the long-range effect of this decision
will not only be detrimental to conservation interests because
of delays in unitization, but will be detrimental to the protection of property rights as well. Here the plaintiff is allowed
24

444 F.2d 439, 443 (10th Cir. 1971).

25
26

Id.
Id.

27

Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
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to have his cake and eat it too. He may take the highly favorable risk that he will derive a benefit from water flooding
operations of the unit (without sharing in the costs) with the
assurance that, should his gamble fail, he may still recover any
loss in court. Here the non-joiner's gamble is always to the
detriment of the leaseholders of the unit who are not only
operating in strict conformity with the law but are doing so
in conformity with the directives of a government agency
whose duty is to oversee such operations. This clearly avoids
a proper accounting of the conservation interests found under
28
the statute.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION

As already indicated, given the two basic purposes of protection of property rights and conservation interests, it is obvious that in an action concerning unit operation a court may
chose between three alternatives. The court may (1) give
overriding protection to property rights at the expense of sound
conservation practices, (2) protect the interests of conservation
at the expense of property rights, or (3) strike a balance between property rights and conservation interests.
The more viable alternative, and the only one giving proper
recognition to both the prevention of waste and the full protection of individual property rights, is for the court to require the
non-joiner to initially seek relief before the Commission, rather
than before the court, for a reformation of the unit and a reapportionment of production profits, with a right of appeal to
the state courts. In Oklahoma, this would presently require
the state court to overturn Greyhound Leasing's interpretation
of the statute, recognizing that the statute requires a rehearing
of the matter before the Commission. 29 While case law on this
point is virtually nonexistent, similar cases considered together
seem to support this alternative. 30 Moreover, the provisions
28

See material cited note 9 supra.

29

As a practical matter, to insure the obvious intent of the statute the
state legislature should amend its Unitization Act to specifically cover

this situation.
30 In Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1947),
the dispute was between lessor and lessee and consequently did not
involve protection of correlative rights (see note 9 supra). However,
the decision is reflective of the public policy against waste and the facts
are so similar to Greyhound Leasing as to be of some guidance. Here
defendant lessees participated in a unit recovering gas by injection
of dry gas to force recovery of the more valuable wet gas. Certain lessors who had refused to join the unit brought suit against their lessees
for failing to protect against the displacement of wet gas under their
properties. The court found defendants not liable because the nonconsenting lessors had been given an opportunity to participate in the
unit. The more recent case of California Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154
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of Oklahoma's Unitization Act seem to require this result, 31
despite the Greyhound Leasing interpretation.
The court correctly stated that since plaintiff's leases were
not included in the unit, the tracts were in no different position
32
relative to the regulation than they were before the hearing.
What the court failed to recognize was that once plaintiff's
wells were flooded, the Commission's finding that the unit
would not adversely affect other owners in the common source
was no longer a valid assumption upon which to base the membership of the unit, and that further proceedings before the
Commission were necessary to properly account for the changed
circumstances.
Keeping in mind that the Commission has the power to
enlarge the unit 33 and to do what is necessary to further the
purposes of the Act,34 it is submitted that the Commission has
the power to include the plaintiff in the unit, assigning him
his proportionate share of the income from the time his wells
were flooded less his share of the secondary recovery costs.
For those who would argue that this allows the plaintiff the
same "have your cake and eat it too" advantage of the first
alternative, the Commission could and should additionally
charge plaintiff his pro rata share of secondary recovery costs
prior to the flooding of his wells for any benefit the Commission finds plaintiff enjoyed at the unit's expense.
CONCLUSION

In 1965 more than 30 percent of the nation's total output of
oil was produced by secondary recovery operations. 35 As the depletion of primary recovery pressures continues, the use of
secondary recovery methods assumes ever-growing importance.
Given the complicated nature of ownership rights to oil and gas
it is obvious that adequate conservation measures may be

So. 2d 144 (1963), concerned a dispute between cotenants with essentially the same fact pattern found in Stott. Here the court also found no
liability because the plan had been approved by the conservation agency
and plaintiff had been given an opportunity to join the unit.
31 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1 to 287.15 (1969). The Colorado counterpart is the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 100-6-1 to -22 (1963).
32 444 F.2d 439, 443 (10th Cir. 1971).
33 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.10 (1969) ; Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 843 (1952). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16(6) (Supp. 1965).
34 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.2 (1969).
Colorado provisions quoted
note 10 supra.
35
Lynch, Liability for Secondary Recovery Operations, TWENTY-SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 37, 38 (1971).
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achieved only through the enactment and enforcement of effective legislation.
The Oklahoma statute requires prevention of waste of oil
and gas resources to derive the maximum benefit therefrom.
It also requires the balancing of conservation interests with the
correlative rights of all property owners (including leaseholders) on any common source of supply. The same statute
gives the necessary authority to the Corporation Commission
to achieve and maintain this balance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision providing a
"heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" remedy for the nonjoining leaseholder is certain to cause many would-be participants in unit
operations to be more cautious about unitization. When unitization does take place, greater effort will be directed toward
compulsory unitization. The net result will be to delay unitization and to afford less freedom to the would-be nonjoiner by
compelling his participation. Hence, the court's efforts to protect the private property owner could well be self-defeating.
Where a changed circumstance occurs after issuance of a
unitization order as in Greyhound Leasing, it is urged that the
damaged party should first be required to seek rehearing before
the Commission. This solution gives full scope to the Commission's fact-finding role as intended by the legislature. 36
Where the facts complicate the issues, agencies such as the
Corporation Commission are better equipped to determine the
facts and equitably resolve the issues than courts prone to
render "all or nothing" judgments as in Greyhound Leasing,
largely at the behest of the parties.
In view of the growing importance of secondary recovery
and the similarity between Oklahoma and Colorado law, this
decision would seem to call for thoughtful consideration among
Colorado attorneys concerned with oil and gas law. It is urged
that under the circumstances of Greyhound Leasing, where a
significant circumstance changes after issuance of the unitization order, the alternative requiring a damaged party to seek
rehearing before the Commission is by far the preferable
choice.
Douglas R. Nichols

3 The legislative intent was clearly expressed in the purposes of the act.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.1 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 100-6-6, .-22 (1963).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SYMBOLIC SPEECH Colorado Flag Desecration Statute
INTRODUCTION

C

OLORADO'S present flag desecration statute will be replaced
on July 1, 1972 by section 40-11-204 of the new Colorado
Criminal Code.' The applicable portion of the new statute
provides:
(1)

It shall be unlawful for any person to mutilate, deface,
trample upon, burn, cut, or tear any flag in public:
(a) With intent to cast contempt or ridicule upon such
flag; or
(b)

With intent to outrage the sensibilities of persons
liable to observe or discover the action or its results;
or

(c)

With intent to cause a breach of the peace or incitement to riot; or
Under such circumstances that it may cause a breach
of the peace or incitement to riot.

(d)
(2)

"Flag" as used in
banner, standard,
thereof which is an
bol of the United
2
Colorado.

this section, means any flag, ensign,
colors, or replica or representation
official or commonly recognized symStates of America or the State of

Recently, statutes such as this have frequently been used
to prosecute persons for acts ranging from representing the
flag with dollar signs instead of stars, to writing "Give peace
a chance" and placing peace symbols on flags to be worn on
jackets, to the actual burning or tearing of flags3 - acts which
were or may have been intended to convey specific ideas of a
political nature to observers. The fact that today these statutes
are often enforced against dissenters 4 whose conduct constitutes
symbolic speech, and not against the original targets of the
statutes-those who used flags for advertising and commercial
purposes5 - has caused several federal courts to invalidate
1 Ch. 121, § 40-11-204, [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 480.
2 Id. § 40-11-204(1)- (2).
3 See Note, Flag Desecration - the Unsettled Issue, 46 NoTRE DAME LAwYER 201 (1970).
4 See generally Note, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. LEGAL F.
159 (1969), and Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Crime of Flag Desecration, 12 ARIz. L. REV. 71 (1970).
5 See UNIFORM FLAG ACT, 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. (1966), Commissioners'
Prefatory Note.
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similar statutes in other states. It is the object of this comment
to briefly examine cases which invalidated those statutes and
to suggest that the Colorado statute may similarly be unconstitutional.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK

In dealing with flag desecration statutes, courts have typically relied on the first amendment freedom of speech protection in one of two ways, i.e., as protection of words spoken, or
as protection of words implicit in symbolic conduct. Although
opinions usually mention both approaches, whether or not
the statute will be declared unconstitutional may depend
upon which variation on the freedom of speech doctrine is
emphasized.
A.

Street v. New York

The first of these two doctrines is that arising from the
most recent 6 Supreme Court case involving flag desecrationStreet v. New York. 7 Street was convicted under a statute that
made it a misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile or
defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or
act"" any flag of the United States. Street had burned a flag
in response to the shooting of James Meredith. When questioned by police, the defendant stated "If they let that happen
to Meredith we don't need an American flag." 9 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction because he may have been convicted for his words or for both his words and his deeds, rather
than solely for his conduct, on the basis that the statute had
been unconstitutionally applied. The Street doctrine, therefore,
would not allow conviction under a statute which failed to distinguish between words and acts in its prohibition of flag
desecration.
Street has been cited by a few courts as authority for the
constitutionality of flag desecration laws. In Sutherland v.
6

Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), is an early case in which the
Nebraska flag desecration law was declared constitutional. However,
in that case, defendants had displayed a flag on the label of a bottle
of beer as a means of advertising and free speech or symobilc speech
was not an issue. See generally Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND.
LEGAL F.

159

(1969).

7394 U.S. 576 (1969).
8 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1425(16) (d) (1909). In 1967, § 1425(16), was superseded by § 136 of the General Business Law, which in par. d defines
the offense in identical language. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 136(d)
(McKinney 1968); 394 U.S. at 578 n.1.
9,394 U.S. at 579.
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DeWul 1 ° a three-judge district court 1 refused to declare the
Illinois flag desecration statute void on its face and treated
Street as controlling:
Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with the question
of whether a statutory provision, nearly identical to the one
challenged in the present case, was void on its face for overbreadth. It chose to limit its holding to the statute as applied
and refused to make a broader holding. This court views that
Supreme Court refusal to be of controlling significance
to the
12
question of overbreadth presented in this case.
Although the North Carolina law was declared unconstitutional both for vagueness and overbreadth in Parker v.
Morgan,13 a three-judge district court indicated that it did not
believe all flag desecration laws are necessarily unconstitutional. In Parker, the court stated that the definition of a flag
- a definition very similar to that in most statutes1 4 - was
"simply unbelievable," and that the definition alone was sufficient to void the statute. The North Carolina law also referred
to casting contempt "by words or act" (emphasis added) which the court held to be clearly invalid under Street.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Hoffman v. United States15 agreed that Abbie Hoffman's conduct
(wearing a shirt that came within the statutory definition of
a flag, but which was not an actual flag) did not come within
the condemnation of the federal flag desecration statute, and
reversed his conviction. It did not reach the constitutional
10 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971).

11 Most of the recent flag desecration cases were requests that state statutes
be declared unconstitutional. A three-judge district court must be empanelled before granting an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of a state statute. 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The district judge to whom application was made
and at least one circuit judge must be on the court designated by the
chief judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970). When civil suits are required to be
heard and determined by a three-judge district court, unless otherwise
provided by law, appeals are made directly to the Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
12 323 F. Supp. at 747.
13 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Plaintiff Parker had worn a jacket
on the back of which he had sewn an American flag, over which was
superimposed the legend "Give peace a chance" and the depiction of a
hand with index and middle finger forming a "V." Plaintiff Berg had
affixed a flag to the ceiling of his automobile for his own personal enjoyment and satisfaction, and "apparently without any purpose to communi-

cate an idea." Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
This comment does not attempt to distinguish the relatively minor differences in statutory language. One possible point of discussion, however, is whether the statute purports to proscribe casting contempt on
the flag by "words or act" as in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969),
or only by "an act" as in Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). If the statutes are voided on the grounds that the conduct is
symbolic speech, it would appear to make no difference whether acts
alone, or words and acts, were proscribed.
15 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
14
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question, but added, "[W] e have little doubt that the interest
of the people in the flag of the United States enables Congress
by appropriate legislation to protect it from desecration.""' As
authority, the court cited the dissenting opinions in Street ana
the fact the majority in Street did not dispute their allegations.
In summary, those courts which have relied predominantly
on Street have regarded a prohibition on words spoken as the
fatal element in statutes of broad scope. The alternative theory,
discussed below, does not rely on a distinction between words
and acts.
B.

United States v. O'Brien

Most federal courts have characterized flag desecration as
symbolic speech and applied the theory of United States v.
O'Brien.'7 Though it affirmed the conviction of one who had
burned his draft card, the court in O'Brien noted that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element may justify incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms. Lower courts
have generally found that flag desecration statutes do not meet
the O'Brien criteria, 8 and the forbidden conduct violates first
amendment freedoms.
In Hodsdon v. Buckson' 9 a three-judge district court ruled
the Delaware statute 20 was unconstitutionally overbroad and
proscribed symbolic speech. 21 The court stated that "[T]his law
encompasses acts which bear no relation to any interest within
16 Id. at 228.
17 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
18 The O'Brien criteria for upholding such a statute are:
(1) It must be within the constitutional power of the government,
(2) It must further an important or substantial governmental

interest,

(3)
(4)

The governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
The incidental restriction on alleged first amendment

freedoms must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377.

19 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
20

21

The applicable portion of the statute read:
Whoever publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, defies, tramples
upon or casts contempt either by word or act, upcn (the Ameri- Shall be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not
can flag)
more
than 30 days or both. Id. at 531.
310 F. Supp. at 534. Plaintiff was seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring the attorney general to stop prosecuting him for flying

the United Nations flag in the position of honor with the United States
flag at half mast.

1972
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the legislative competence and which are intended and under'22
stood as symbolic speech.
2
Another three-judge district court in Crosson v. Silver,
citing O'Brien as the controlling precedent, ruled the Arizona
statute2 4 unconstitutionally overbroad and an inhibition of symbolic speech. 25 The court determined with little discussion that
flag desecration can be symbolic speech by noting:
While we need not here determine whether all conduct intended to express an idea is symbolic speech, we think it is
self-evident that most if not all conduct associated with the
United States flag is symbolic speech ....
Further, such con26
duct is invariably successful in communicating the idea.

The court also declared:
We find nothing inherent in the act which stimulates those
viewers who sympathize with the aims of the desecrator to engage in unlawful acts, such as rioting. Nor is the protection of
27
the "sensibilities of passersby" the proper concern of State.

Language such as this definitely casts doubt on the validity
of section 1(b) of the new Colorado statute.
28
In Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn,
another action brought before a three-judge district court to
enjoin enforcement of a state flag desecration statute, the district court held the New York statute constitutional - but ruled
that it did not apply to plaintiffs' emblem. 2" The Second Circuit
',2
23

Id.

319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970).
The statute declared unconstitutional read:
A person who publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, tramples upon,
or by word or act casts contempt upon a flag is guilty of a misARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-793(C) (1956).
demeanor ....
It has subsequently been amended to read:
No person shall publicly cast contempt upon, mutilate, deface,
defile, burn, trample or otherwise dishonor or cause to bring
dishonor upon a flag in a manner likely to provoke retaliation.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-793 (Supp. 1971-72).
The constitutionality of the new statute has not yet been ruled upon
by the courts.
2.5 319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970). Plaintiff was seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief restraining the county attorney from further criminal
proceedings against her for publicly burning or aiding and abetting the
public burning of a United States flag with intent to cast contempt
upon the flag.
26 Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
28 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
Gwathmey v. Town of East Hampton, 437 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1970), is a
companion case to Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee in
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because the New
York statute was unconstitutional, there was no need to convene a threejudge district court to hear the plaintiffs' case.
29 The emblem consisted of a circular representation of the American
flag, having seven stars in the upper left-hand corner and eleven stripes
colored red, white and blue, upon which the peace symbol was superimposed.
24
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Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but held the law unconstitutional both on its face because of overbreadth (it failed
to provide adequate guidance to enforcement officials as to
what was proscribed), and as applied in the case on the grounds
that it was symbolic speech (this was the plaintiffs' means of
expressing their views on a vital political issue). A
Whether the Colorado statute would be declared unconstitutional or not will depend on the doctrine followed by the
court. If the court should interpret Street as authority that
some statutes can be constitutional, it may be upheld-and
subsequently have its application limited by courts that determine it has been unconstitutionally applied. If the court should
characterize flag desecration as symbolic speech satisfying the
O'Brien criteria, as most other courts have done, the statute
would probably be held unconstitutional on its face.
II. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that the Colorado flag desecration statute
could withstand a constitutional challenge. It is highly similar
to the North Carolina, New York, Arizona, and Delaware
statutes that federal courts have recently declared facially
unconstitutional, unconstitutionally overboard, or as inhibitions of free (symbolic) speech. Moreover, the Colorado statute
is not unlike the Maryland31 and federal legislation - legislation found to have been unconstitutionally applied in particular
cases.
Since the Colorado statute shows a substantial legislative
concern. 2 with the potential for riot which attends acts of flag
desecration, the inciting to riot provisions of the Colorado

But see Oldroyd v. Kugler, 327 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J. 1970). Plaintiffs
were seeking to enjoin enforcement of the New Jersey flag desecration
statute. In a per curiam opinion, the three-judge district court granted
the state's motion to dismiss. The court, probably as dictum, stated:
"We find that the above statute on its face is precise, clear and constitutional." Id. at 177. Also in dictum, the court relied upon the lower
court opinion in Hoffman v. United States which was subsequently reversed. 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
31 See Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) where a three-judge
district court declined to hold the Maryland statute unconstitutional-only that it had been unconstitutionally applied where university officials
attempted to prohibit publication of a student-supported magazine with
a burning flag on the cover upon the advice of Maryland's Attorney
General that it would be a violation of the law. The court specifically
noted (at 142-43) that it did not reach the question of whether the
statute was unconstitutional on its face.
32 Ch. 121, § 40-11-204(1) (b)-(d), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 480 (subsections quoted p. 451 supra).
30

1972

COMMENTS

Criminal Code 33 may enable the state to prosecute without sacrificing individual rights of communication protected by the
first amendment. Of course, where the dissenting activity does
not meet the five-person provisions of the code, 34 the riot provisions would not be a satisfactory prosecutorial tool in lieu
of a voided flag desecration statute. Thus, when the activity
is individualized- as in the cases explored in this comment
-there
is no reason to assume Colorado will be any more
successful in stifling the first amendment freedom of speech
than were the other states discussed above.
Rodney D. Knutson

Ch. 121, § 40-9-102(1)- (2), [1971] Colo. Sess. Laws 467, adequately proscribes inciting to riot:
(1) A person commits inciting riot if he:
(a) Incites or urges a group of five or more persons to
engage in a current or impending riot; or
(b) Gives commands, instructions, or signals to a group
of five or more persons in furtherance of a riot.
(2) A person may be convicted under sections 40-2-101, 402-201, or 40-2-301, of attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to incite
a riot only if he engages in the prohibited conduct with respect
to a current or impending riot.
(3) Inciting riot is a class 1 misdemeanor [with a minimum
sentence of 6 months imprisonment, or $500 fine, or both, and a
maximum sentence of 24 months imprisonment, or $5,000 or
both-Section 40-1-106], but if injury to a person or damage
to property results therefrom, it is a class 5 felony [with a minimum sentence of 1 year, or $1,000 fine, and a maximum sentence
of 5 years, or $15,000 fine, or both - Section 40-1-105].
34 Id. § 40-9-102(1).

33
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CHICANO MANIFESTO. Armando B. Rendon. New York: McMillan
Company, 1971. Pp. viii, 337. $7.95. Mr. Rendon sets forth in
this concise book what he feels to be the relevant portions of
the economic, philosophical, political, and spiritual history of
the Chicanos and their revolt against the Anglo system of life
and thought. His basic premise is that attempted assimilation
and cultural discrimination are synonymous terms to the
Chicano. While recognizing the melting-pot concept of the
American heritage, the author feels that it is essential for the
Chicano people to fight to retain their cultural heritage, dignity,
and identity - even to the extent, should it become necessary,
of violent, social revolution. Recalling initial reactions to Das
Kapital and Mein Kampf, this book should be read by all persons who have any concern about the future direction of this
country and the role the second largest minority group will
play in that future.
Francis 0. Wilcox.
$5.95. Francis 0.
x,
179.
1971.
Pp.
New York: Harper & Row,
Wilcox is presently the Dean of Johns Hopkins University's
School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C.,
and previously served as Chief of Staff for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (1947 to 1955) and as Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs (1955 to 1961).
Congress, The Executive & Foreign Policy initially examines
the deterioration of the role of Congress in formulating foreign
policy, but is primarily concerned with the breakdown of the
relationship between Congress and the Executive. The author
notes that Congress, as an elective body, is particularly sensitive to changes in public opinion, and as such, should play a
more significant role in the shaping of foreign policy. Dean
Wilcox, believing that Congress must be more effectively
organized to enable it to deal with the demands of foreign
policy decisionmaking, offers concrete suggestions for improvement. Increased consultation between Congress and the Executive is seen as the key to easing relations between the two
branches of government and to restoring the balance foreseen
by the founding fathers. This book should be of interest to
any person concerned with the present method of formulating
United States foreign policy.
CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE,

& FOREIGN POLICY.
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Richard H. Wagner. New York: W. W.
Inc.,
1971.
Pp. xiii, 491. $7.50. Presently teaching
Norton & Co.,
a course on the environment at Pennsylvania State University,
Mr. Wagner attempts to use his book to introduce both students and general readers to the ecological problems which
confront us. His central theme is that man's relationship to his
environment has passed through several phases, culminating in
rampant technological development, and that man must now
face the problem of restoring the balance of resources and
population which will allow peaceful coexistence between the
earth and the organisms which inhabit it. The book is informative and interesting, though it offers a few new insights into
this widely-explored field. Rather, Mr. Wagner's innovation
is that he has created a book which is intended to fill the
curricular gap existing on many college campuses. In short,
he offers an alternative to the laboratory approach in the effort
to relate science to the world in which we live.
ENVIRONMENT AND MAN.

Environmental Problems Committee. Denver: Colorado Bar Association, 1971. Pp. 160. $3.00
(paperbound). The Colorado Bar Association has developed this
current pamphlet of valuable information to aid the general
practitioner who is faced with environmental questions. The
Handbook sets out the applicable state and federal statutes, the
standards promulgated under each, and the individual's rights
and remedies. It is a thorough summary of present law, which
will be updated periodically and will provide an easy guide
to a complicated topic. Copies may be obtained from the Colorado Bar Association.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK.

Sir Matthew
OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND.
Hale. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1971. Pp. xxxviii, 173. $9.00. Sir Matthew Hale (1609-76) rose
to the bench in 1654, and, except for a brief period under
Richard Cromwell, served as a judge for the rest of his life.
His History of the Common Law was printed three times
(1713, 1716, and 1739) virtually unedited, and numerous times
thereafter with editorial additions. The present text is reproduced from the third edition. Hale's History is generally recognized as the first book with any pretense to be a comprehensive account of the growth of English law. His historical
analysis stands as a classic that was not rapidly superseded,
and was essentially the only precedent for the late nineteenth
and twentieth century body of explicit English legal history.
This reprint has one major purpose: to put into the hands of
THE HISTORY
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students of law and of history the general background
English law.
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Leonard Downie, Jr. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 224. $6.95. In Justice Denied, Leonard Downie
has written a general survey of the injustices of the American
legal system. The author's thesis is clear: "Every day, the
laws, and the trial courts that administer the laws deny justice more frequently than they produce it." In support of this
statement, Downie gives examples of several areas in which the
legal process has ceased to function justly. He touches upon
the archaic way in which the courts deal with narcotics offenders, drunks, and homosexuals. He devotes one chapter to a
discussion of the legal and political problems involved in extending justice to rich and poor equally, and another to the
ways in which the middle class is deprived of equal justice.
An editor of the Washington Post, Downie is a journalist, not
a lawyer, and consequently, his book is aimed at a lay rather
than a professional audience. He does not delve deeply into
the solutions to the problems he raises, nor does he examine
in any detail the ramifications of various policy alternatives.
Rather, his accomplished objective is to graphically illustrate
the parameters of a grave and pressing national problem.
JUSTICE DENIED.

Robert Lefcourt, ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1971. Pp. x, 400. $2.45 (paperbound). Mr. Lefcourt's
powerful and provocative collection of essays attacks the longunquestioned view that the law works in behalf of all the
people. The book is an impressive anthology of radical ideas
on law. The first group of essays offers various theories which
attempt to show the inherent nature of the discrimination in
our legal system against the economically deprived classes of
society. The second group relates the actual events which confronted those who challenged this system. These works are
articulate and often shocking pieces by such nationally-known
figures as Howard Moore, Jr., William Kunstler, and Arthur
Kinoy. Their remarks warrent serious consideration by those
concerned with social upheaval in our country today.
LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE.

Samuel J. Brakel and
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW.
Ronald S. Rock, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1971. Pp. xx, 487. The primary focus of this book is an analysis
of the various state statutes that control the legal rights of
mentally disabled persons. This new revised edition of the
Mentally Disabled and the Law also reports research into imTHE
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portant court decisions and writings that relate to all facets
of the subject. The problems discussed include the question of
how to identify the mentally disabled, hospitalization and
discharge, care and treatment, rights and status during hospitalization, personal and property rights, and the relation of
the mentally disabled to the criminal law. The authors demonstrate that even well-conceived mental health codes are only
as effective as the administration thereof, and as the resources
available allow them to be. Additionally, they suggest potential
problem areas and recommend solutions to typical dilemmas
faced by those who must administer the legal and medical
affairs of the mentally disabled. Any reader with a professional interest in the mentally disabled will find this a rich
source book.
NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE. Eliyahu Hirschberg. Jerusalem, Israel:
Daf-Chen Printing Press, 1971. Pp. 138. $3.00. The author examines the three alternative theories which may be used to govern
the value of money in its role as a medium of exchange: the
metallistic theory, the nominalistic theory, and the valoristic
theory. He recommends valorism as the only legal means adequate to distribute the effects of changes in the value of money
fairly amongst the different economic classes in society. Of the
three possible theories, only valorism recognizes the basic fact
that people contract in terms of the purchasing power of
what they are to give and receive. Since the purchasing power
of money may fluctuate enormously, the author suggests that
certain types of monetary obligations be pegged to a cost of
living Index in order that neither party to the bargain will
be unjustly enriched for reasons extraneous to the particular
transaction. This work will appeal to legal theorists as well
as economists.
Robert Paul Wolff, ed. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1971. Pp. 252. $6.95. This book contains a series
of nine essays written by distinguished scholars and teachers.
Their areas of expertise include jurisprudence, philosophy, and
the social sciences. The essays were compiled and edited by
Robert Paul Wolff, a Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Massachusetts, and are concerned generally with the nature
of law as a social institution. More particularly, the essays
attempt to relate the functions of law to the problems and injustices which exist in society. From this point, the essays
go in widely divergent directions ranging from a discussion
of current unrest in the United States to developments in
THE RULE OF LAW.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

international law. Some of the essays are written on a very
theoretical level, while others are more practical in their
description of law as an institution in modern society. All
seem to arrive at a pessimistic conclusion. The book is intended for lawyers and non-lawyers and is not limited to the
American system. It should be of particular interest to those
who deal in social theory.
LaMar T. Empey and Steven G.
Lubeck. Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1971. Pp. 354. This book
reports the results of a four year experimental union of researchers and practitioners in the juvenile corrections field to
form an innovative community of 15-17-year-old repeat offenders in Los Angeles. The authors describe what they see as our
society's "rites-of-passage" into delinquency that provide no
effective way back to .non-delinquency status. They compare
the Silverlake experience with a traditional institution (Boys'
Republic) in terms of recidivism and produce significant data
in that regard. Despite only moderate success at Silverlake,
Empey and Lubeck clearly see bridging the schism between
scientist and practitioner as the best present chance to move
and shake traditional, hidebound approaches to delinquency
reduction toward more effective solutions. The Silverlake Experiment should be of interest to all readers who are concerned about the many juvenile offenders who will never be
functioning members of adult society.
THE SILVERLAKE EXPERIMENT.

THE STUDENT AND THE COURTS.

John A. Damgaard.

New York:

Exposition Press, 1971. Pp. 96. $4.00. The basic premise of the
author is that students should know the legal consequences
of their acts, particularly when those acts reflect the students'
struggle to "discover themselves." Mr. Damgaard offers students a framework within which they can more easily ascertain
the difficulties which their behavior might create. The book
deals with drug abuse, riots, demonstrations, and other areas
of concern to students. No particular sort of behavior is advocated; decisions are left to the students. The author seeks solely
to provide needed information and a proper perspective so
that those engaging in these activities might avoid unwanted
repercussions.
TOWARD A RATIONAL POWER POLICY - ENERGY, POLITICS, AND
POLLUTION. Neil Fabricant & Robert M. Hallman. New York:
George Braziller, 1971. Pp. vi, 292. $3.95. This exhaustive analytical report was prepared and written by Neil Fabricant,
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Chief Counsel for the Environmental Protection Agency, and
Robert Hallman, Deputy Counsel for that agency. In technical,
yet highly readable language, the authors detail the effects on
human health and environment associated with the operation
of electrical power generation facilities and the growing conflict between a healthy environment and the need for more
industrial energy. They discuss future possibilities for solution
or dimunition of this conflict with emphases on both the technological resolution of problems in the area of more efficient
and less environmentally destructive power production, as
well as on the existing practices and governmental policies
which might facilitate or inhibit implementation of remedial
procedures. This work accomplishes the twofold purpose of
drawing attention to the environmental difficulties occasioned
by the generation of power in America and of discussing, in a
realistic and pragmatic manner, the alleviation of those
difficulties.
Two

MILLION UNNECESSARY

ARRESTS:

REMOVING A

SOCIAL

SERVICE

Raymond T. Nim1971.
Pp. ix, 202. Mr.
Bar
Foundation,
mer. Chicago: American
Nimmer, a research attorney with the American Bar Foundation, identifies in this book two basic assumptions of those
currently involved in the process of policing the inhabitants
of municipal skid rows: that police arrests cannot be eliminated without alternative methods of providing care for public
inebriates, and, that the basic social response of criminalization is appropriate. Nimmer argues that neither of the above
are necessary assumptions. In the process, the book throws a
good deal of light on the skid row policing systems which
produce approximately one and one-half million arrests annually for public drunkenness alone, generally at great expense
to the state with little rehabilitative benefit to the "offender."
The book is written in the vein of current overcriminalization
arguments, and should be of interest to attorneys, politicians,
and police administrators, as well as laymen.
CONCERN FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.

ABSTRACTS OF

LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL PUBLICATIONSEMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT

PATTERNS

BY AGE,

RACE,

AND SEX

IN

URBAN LABOR

MARKETS. A. A. Cook, Jr. RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., May,
1971. Pp. 143. A study is made of employment by age, race,
and sex in urban labor markets. The Social Security Administration's continuous work history sample constitutes a major
source of the data on "covered" employment and is used in
describing the employment of each group relative to the others
and the varying distribution of employment (by groups) across
the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Order Number
PB-201 172. $3.00.
ENHANCING OPPORTUNITIES IN JOB MARKETS:

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

FOR POLICY. Anthony H. Pascal. RAND
Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., March, 1971. Pp. 65. Research findings are presented on manpower program evaluation, youth
employment opportunities, labor market impediments facing
disadvantaged workers, effects of national policy on the poor,
and income differences according to race. Order Number PB201 171. $3.00.
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE MOTHERS.

Edward M. Opton, Jr. Wright Institute, Berkeley, Cal., June,
1971. Pp. 244. Seventy-five women who were current or recent
recipients of aid to families of dependent children (AFDC) in
Richmond, California, were interviewed in depth with respect
to employment histories and a number of factors that could
be causally related to employment. Factors such as number of
children, education, and health that have often been cited as
barriers to employment are related to work histories in this
sample. Personality and motivation are also examined. Unemployment is statistically associated with being a black, an immigrant from the South, a young mother, or a divorced, separated
or unmarried mother. Attention is drawn to some aspects of
the job market for welfare mothers that have been generally
overlooked. Order Number PB-201 109. $3.00.
*
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each abstract.
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THE

IMPACT OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM ON LABOR SUPPLY AND FAMILY

STABILITY:

A

STUDY

OF

FEMALE

HEADS

OF

FAMILIES.

Marjorie

Hanson Honig. Columbia Univ., N.Y., June, 1971. Pp. 157. The
study analyzes relationships between the proportion of the
population receiving public assistance payments under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program and the level
of income available to recipients from the program relative
to expected earnings. Results indicate a statistically significant response of AFDC recipient rate (caseload/eligible population) to size of differential between AFDC stipend and average
full-time earnings. Results relate AFDC recipient rate to increases in the size of the AFDC payment relative to earnings,
by two types of response: increases in the response from the
eligible population, and increases in the eligible population
itself resulting from desertions among husband-wife population
related to level of AFDC income. Order Number PB-201 127.
$3.00.
INCOME GUARANTEES AND THE WORKING POOR: THE EFFECT OF INCOME
MAINTENANCE

PROGRAMS ON THE HOURS OF WORK OF MALE FAMILY

HEADS. David H. Greenberg and Marvin Kosters. RAND Corp.,

Santa Monica, Cal., December, 1970. Pp. 147. An empirical
analysis is made of the effects of alternative income maintenance programs. The Survey of Economic Opportunity was
used to obtain estimates of the labor supply parameters required to assess the implications of these programs for hours of
work of male family heads. These estimates were used in a
simulation of the costs, the impact on incomes, and the changes
in work patterns that might result from the extension to the
working poor of income maintenance programs incorporating
negative income tax principles. Order Number PB-201 170.
$3.00.
Albert Wohlstetter and Sinclair
DIFFERENCES IN INCOME.
Coleman. RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., October, 1970. Pp.
119. The study estimates the extent and some of the components of race differences in income and investigates changes
in these differences since 1939; it examines briefly theories
proposed to account for these differences; and, finally, it deals
with the relation between the objective of reducing race differences in income and other aims of policy. Order Number
PB-201 050. $3.00.
RACE

A

STOCHASTIC

MODEL

OF

DISCRIMINATION

IN

THE

LABOR

MARKET.

Stephen J. Carroll. RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., October,
1970. Pp. 45. The report presents a model of the employment
process which illustrates the dynamic relationship between
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racial unemployment rates. Both the worker's search for jobs
and the employer's search for workers are stochastic and
modeled as simple Markov processes. Dynamic programming
methods are used to find the employer's optimal hiring policy,
and the interaction between the two processes is analyzed.
Order Number PB-201 167. $3.00.
HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT OF A HOUSING INFORMATION BASE.

Karen M. Seidel.

Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, Oregon Univ.,
Eugene, Ore., 1971. Pp. 95. The report has three principal objectives: first, to describe the main characteristics of a systematic and continuing housing planning program; second, to
specify which housing characteristics can be used as indicators
of housing problems and how these critical variables can be
quantified and measured; and third, to delineate the sources of
the data necessary for the establishment of a housing information base and, where no adequate sources exist, to recommend
various means by which adequate housing information might
be acquired. Order Number PB-200 965. $3.00.
HOUSING

FOR

LOW

AND

MODERATE

INCOME

FAMILIES:

NEED,

PRO-

Donald N. Johnson. Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, Oregon Univ., Eugene, Ore.,
1971. Pp. 131. The national goal of improved housing for low
income persons and families has special relevance for Oregon
because of the state's economic dependence upon the lumber
and wood products industry. The gap between the need and
supply of adequate housing is huge. This is the first and most
general in a series of five studies undertaken on various aspects
of Oregon's low income housing problem. Order Number PB200 963. $3.00.
GRAMS AND DEVELOPMENTS.

LEGAL REMEDIES

FOR HOUSING

CODE VIOLATIONS.

Frank P.

Grad.

National Commission on Urban Problems, Washington, D.C.,
1968. Pp. 276. The document analyzes the effectiveness of
various tools used to deal with violations of housing codes:
traditional criminal penalties, civil penalties, orders to vacate
and repair by the local government, rent strikes, tenant unions,
and landlord-tenant bargaining agreements. Major recommendations are made. Order Number PB-196 885. $3.00.
Tri-County Regional Planning
Commission, Peoria, Ill., February, 1970. Pp. 45. The report is
an evaluation of the mobile home parks, and the families who
live in mobile homes in the Tri-County region. It is part of a
study being made of the housing needs of the region. Mobile
home living is going to have an influence on the low-cost
THE MOBILE HOME AND ITS PLACE.
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housing crisis in the area. Already two counties show an occupancy rate of more than 95 percent in the existing parks, many
of which are outdated for the modern mobile home. Not only
are some of the parks outdated, but many of the present laws
are obsolete and need to be revised. Order Number PB-196 889.

$3.00.
RESIDENTIAL LIVABILrrY.

Henry Sanoff and Mann Sawhney. Urban

Affairs and Community Services Center, North Carolina State
Univ., Raleigh, N.C., May, 1971. Pp. 73. The study is concerned
with identifying and understanding the dwelling and neighborhood dimensions with which families living in predominantly
low-income sections feel satisfied or dissatisfied and the dimensions these people consider important. The objective is to provide design criteria to be employed in establishing relationships
between people's attitudes toward and evaluations of the environment and demographic and socio-psychological factors.
Order Number PB-201 196. $3.00.
SELF-HELP HOUSING IN
OREGON.
Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, Oregon Univ., Eugene, Ore., 1970. Pp. 50.
Self-help housing, the use of one's own nonprofessional labor
in constructing a dwelling, used to be a popular way to build
a house, but with the advent of labor specialization, complicated
construction materials and techniques, financing mechanisms,
building codes, and limited access to free materials, it has become less important in the United States. The report describes
the housing program in the Willamette Valley in Oregon. Order
Number PB-200 967. $3.00.
JUVENILE COURTS
A METHOD FOR PREDICTING
JUVENILE COURT INTAKE.

STAFFING AND

SPACE REQUIREMENTS

FOR

Stephen B. Forman. Research Analysis

Corp., McLean, Va., December, 1970. Pp. 21. The paper presents
a procedure that juvenile court planners can use to aid them
in predicting future personnel and space requirements for
juvenile court intake. The procedure involves the utilization of
chart and tabular data that were derived during a study of
the applicability of modern management techniques to the
juvenile court process. Order from Research Analysis Corp.,
McLean, Va., 22101, $2.00.
Omar R.
Buchwalter. Research Analysis Corp., McLean, Va., April,
1970. Pp. 23. The paper is based on a report made to the Department of Justice on a study of the feasibility of offender
participation in the dispositional decision of the juvenile court.
Order Number AD-705 203. $3.00.
OFFENDER PARTICIPATION IN JUVENILE COURT DECIsIONs.
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"I've invested in real estate all my life.
But now I'm afraid to go it alone."
Sound familiar? This recent client echoes some of the fears
about today's inflationary market. He bought too high then sold too quickly for the cheap dollar. He's now taking
a good look at real estate exchanging. It's often the better
way: Equities can pyramid. Capital gain can be tax-sheltered.
And the more desireable properties are reachable.
A client's family problems, too, may be woven into his
"problem properties". Working closely with attorneys and
accountants, the real estate counselor becomes a personal
problem solver as well. He becomes an integral part of an
ethical, professional team. He's one of the new breed of
consultants who is ever ready to meet the dynamic changes
of today's complex human and property conditions.
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